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This dissertation focuses on the institutional change that occurred to the Scottish civil 
justice system after the introduction and implementation of the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act in 2014. In this process, the Scottish civil justice system went through 
its most significant transformation in over 150 years. This reformation has created new 
judicial bodies, changed the jurisdictional reach of courts, significantly altered the 
allocations of the civil cases within the justice system. By conducting a qualitative 
case study, this dissertation explores how change unfolds in a highly institutionalised 
and potentially contested setting with multiple groups of actors. Theoretically, I draw 
on institutional theory and the sociology of professions, and it is to these theories that 
my study aims to contribute. My dissertation is comprised of three interrelated papers 
that appear in chapters three, four and five. 
Chapter Three examines the unsettlement caused by reforms due to the pronounced 
threats to the status of different groups of actors in the field. This paper focuses on the 
impact of these threats, and the varying responses among groups of professional actors. 
In so doing, it examines how intra-professional status differences and uncertainty 
hinder attempts to maintain threatened institutions. 
Chapter Four examines the lack of institutional disruption, and in particular asked why 
such pronounced change within the judicial system did not cause the expected 
disruption within the professional field that occupied it. This paper presents 
mechanisms of persistence that keep field disruption at bay and maintain the internal 
cohesiveness of the profession. These mechanisms are jurisdictional contentment and 
lack of a career bridge. 
Chapter Five focuses on the theorisation efforts of the change agents in the Scottish 
civil justice system and explains why these failed. In so doing, this paper provides a 










This study examines the concept of institutional change. It particularly focuses on a 
change that occurred to the Scottish civil justice system after the introduction and 
implementation of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act in 2014. The Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act is designed to bring pronounced change to a legal system that has been 
in place for 150 years. By studying these reforms, this study explored how institutional 
change unfolded in a highly institutionalised settings and potentially contested fields, 
and with multiple groups of actors, such as solicitors and advocates.   
The reforms caused pronounced threats to the status of different groups of actors in 
the field. This dissertation examined the impact of these threats, and the varying 
responses among groups of professional actors. This study found that how the existing 
status differences within the legal profession and the uncertainty created by the change 
hindered attempts to maintain threatened institutions.  
Moreover, this study examined the lack of change within the legal profession. In 
particular, it is asked why such pronounced change within the judicial system did not 
cause the expected disruption within the professional field that occupied it. In so doing, 
this study found two mechanisms explaining how the legal profession could continue 
its day-to-day arrangements, routines and established relationships without any 
disruption caused by the reforms. 
In addition, this dissertation focused on the importance of emotions during the change 
processes. Particularly, how important change recipients’ emotions for an institutional 
change to successfully take place. The emotion of self-confidence was especially 
important for the change recipients to undertake the new roles and responsibilities that 
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 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“Scottish civil justice fails on many accounts. Its delays are 
notorious. It costs deter litigants whose claims may be well-founded. 
Its procedures cause frustration and obstruct rather than facilitate 
the achievement of justice. Unless there is major reform and soon, 
individual litigants will be prevented from securing their rights, 
commercial litigants will continue to look elsewhere for a forum for 
their claims, public confidence in the judicial system will be further 
eroded, Scotland’s economic development will be hindered, and 
Scots law will atrophy as an independent legal system. The 
conclusions of our review are as stark as that.”  (An excerpt from 
Lord Gill’s speech to the Law Society of Scotland in 2009) 
 
In 2007, the Scottish Government was faced with the fact that Scottish multinational 
corporations do not litigate their commercial cases in Scotland; they routinely 
preferred using the legal system of the eternal rival, England. To understand the 
underlying problems causing this situation, the Scottish Government asked Lord Gill, 
as the Lord Justice Clerk at the time, to meticulously review the Civil Justice System 
which had already been criticised for having notorious delays, being archaic and 
expensive.  
In his review, Gill (2009a) concluded that there were major problems with the justice 
system that were causing serious problems resulting not just in commercial cases going 
to England but for the public in accessing justice. Without reform, he concluded, by 
constantly perpetrating injustice, Scotland had to face losing the independence of 
Scottish law and the confidence of the public in the legal system. Following Gill’s 
report and recommendations, the Scottish Parliament passed The Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act in 2014. Lord Gill, the most senior judge in the country’s legal field as 
the Lord President at the time, became the main figure who initiated the reforms, 
designed them and oversaw the implementation process. As a result, The Courts 
Reform Scotland (Act) 2014, also referred to as the Gill Reforms, brought such a 
profound and radical change to the legal system in Scotland that they were considered 
by many as the most significant transformation of the Scottish civil justice system in 
almost two centuries. Most notably: new judicial courts were established, new tiers of 
judiciary created, and regional sheriff courts, which previously could only hear civil 
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claims up to a value of £5000, now had a threshold of £100,000. This last point is 
particularly significant as it meant that higher value, more complex, cases previously 
handled by barristers, known as advocates in Scotland, in the higher courts could now 
be solely contested by solicitors in the lower level sheriff courts. 
My study is centred on this profound transformation of a core societal institution. By 
utilising this empirical setting, the overarching aim of this study is to explore how 
institutional change unfolds in a highly institutionalised setting and the professional 
field that is embedded within it. 
1.1 Empirical and Theoretical Motivation 
My motivation to study this empirical setting lies in the fact that it provided an 
empirical opportunity to observe a radical comprehensive institutional change of a core 
societal institution, the justice system, in real time, and to explore an extreme case of 
institutional persistence - the Scottish legal profession. The upcoming reforms had 
aimed to radically transform the justice system with its major institutional structures 
and processes largely unchanged over two centuries. The importance of understanding 
such changes, or lack of changes for that matter, in professional settings, such as the 
law, has been described as particularly important because professions and 
professionals play an increasingly significant role in our societies. Professions, as a 
macro institution of society, hold economic and social significance because 
professionals, as institutional agents (Scott, 2008) are the creators, protectors, and 
changers of societies’ major institutions, such as markets, business practices, 
organizations, and religions (Brint, 1994). Furthermore, professions are themselves 
institutions that have experienced various profound changes over time (Abbott, 1988). 
They influence and are influenced by various technological, social, economic, 
political, and legal forces and thus hold great importance in understanding how society 
functions. They are “not only key mechanisms for, but also primary targets of, 
institutional change” (Muzio, Brock, & Suddaby, 2013: 700). That is, the behaviours 
of professionals and professional organizations have consequences for the broader 
surrounding institutions (Brock, Leblebici, & Muzio, 2014; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). 
Accordingly, there have been several calls for research for greater exploration of 
professions within the institutions in which they are embedded (Anteby, Chan, & 
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DiBenigno, 2016; Suddaby & Muzio, 2015; Zietsma, Groenewgen, Logue, & Hinings, 
2017). 
It is also useful to note that, while we have gained significant insights into the 
professions over recent years, they have often been considered to be homogenous 
entities in which members share a common identity, ideals and intentions. However, 
professions are not homogenous, but rather are stratified with intra-professional 
differences (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012; 
Ramirez, Stringfellow, & Maclean, 2015).  However, little work has directly examined 
how these intra-professional dynamics develop and change over time. Therefore, calls 
for further study of ‘within-profession’ differences have also been widespread 
(Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006; Ramirez et al., 2015; Von Nordenflycht, 2010).  
Institutional theory is the main theoretical lens of this dissertation. Institutional theory 
has been portrayed as one of the most powerful theoretical tools to interrogate complex 
societal phenomena, particularly in structured settings governed by extensive systems 
of rules and authority structures, such as professional fields (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). Also, the fact that professions are institutional orders, 
which are sources of “unique organizing principles, practices, and symbols that 
influence individual and organizational behaviour” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 
2012: 2) makes institutional theory a particularly effective theoretical lens for my 
study because it allows a researcher to explore the nestedness of institutions in a 
society and see the links among different institutions such as professions, markets, 
justice system, religion and so on. 
Accordingly, this study is centred on two societal level macro institutional fields: the 
justice system and the legal profession. The justice system consists of the legal 
profession, other occupations such as police and several types of public servants, the 
government, the court system, public and private organizations, NGOs, laws and 
regulations, public, all the transactions among these actors and so on. The legal 
profession, however, largely refers to the professional boundaries and interactions of 
the members and organizations of the profession of law whose members are advocates, 
solicitors, solicitor advocates, judges and sheriff judges in Scotland. That is, the legal 
profession, while being an institution in its own right, inhabits the justice system. The 
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overarching theoretical motivation of this dissertation is to understand the institutional 
change and persistence processes with particular interest given to the emotions and 
behaviours of an affected profession and its intra-professional populations.  
1.2 Overview of the Three Papers  
This dissertation consists of three separate papers, presented in Chapters Three, Four 
and Five. These three papers are the product of a long and strenuous process of 
collecting data, understanding the justice system of Scotland and intra-professional 
dynamics of the Scottish legal profession. They all are based on the same data set that 
I collected between 2014 and 2019 and they explore the institutional change with 
different research objectives. Although they inevitably overlap in certain areas, these 
papers complement each other in several ways because they explain different aspects 
of the change and focus on different time frames within the institutional change 
process. 
Chapter Three:  Intra-Professional Status, Maintenance Failure, and the 
Reformation of the Scottish Civil Justice System 
This paper attends to recent calls (e.g. Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Micelotta 
& Washington, 2013; Scott, 2013) for the study of institutional maintenance. It is 
focused on why there was little effective maintenance work to maintain the status quo 
in the justice system even though the legal profession as a whole were highly critical 
of the reforms. This study contributes to the institutional maintenance literature and 
the professions literature by showing that institutional maintenance requires strong, 
coordinated action across the intra-professional populations. Also, it shows that while 
uncertainty provides opportunities for institutional change, it hinders institutional 
maintenance efforts. 
Chapter Four: Mechanisms of Institutional Persistence  
While examining the lack of institutional disruption and particularly asking why such 
a profound change in the justice system did not cause disruption within the 
professional field that occupied it, this paper contributes to the institutional persistence 
literature by answering recent calls (e.g. Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 
2017; Scott, 2013; Sminia, 2011; Weik, 2018) for research on the continuity of 
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institutions. It also contributes to the professions literature by answering calls 
(Ramirez et al., 2015) for research on the persistence and internal cohesiveness of 
professions. By presenting a new theory on persistence of professional fields, this 
paper identifies field mechanisms of persistence previously unidentified in the 
literature that make a professional field persist even in the face of exogenous shocks 
that radically reshape the landscape. These mechanisms explain new ways of 
understanding continuity within professional fields. A further contribution lies in 
identifying how these mechanisms not only keep the disruption of a field at bay, but 
also hold the segments of a profession together, hence maintaining its internal 
cohesiveness. 
Chapter Five: Emotions and theorisation of institutional change 
One important gap in our understanding of the relationship between emotions and 
institutional processes is the emotional underpinnings of ‘theorisation’. The notion of 
theorisation is portrayed as a very important stage of institutional change because it is 
the stage where change agents convince the recipients of the change to adopt new ideas 
and practices and make them see the merits of these new arrangements. Yet, we know 
little to nothing about the emotional dynamics of theorisation, particularly from the 
recipients’ point of view. In this respect, this paper aims to answer the question of 
‘what role might emotions play in theorisation process of institutional change?’ This 
paper contributes to the institutional change and professions’ literatures by presenting 
a revised theory of theorisation that incorporates emotions. 
The complementarity of the papers 
Chapter Three focuses on the period after the reforms were introduced as an idea, but 
before they were largely implemented. It portrays the chaos and upheaval before the 
implementation where intra-professional populations, solicitors, solicitor advocates 
and advocates, within the legal profession felt threatened by the change and very 
concerned about the future. Yet, the profession could not maintain the status quo 
within the justice system. It shows how intra-professional differences were sharpened 
due to the turmoil and these differences affected the institutional maintenance.  
Subsequently, Chapter Four explores the period after the legislation had been passed. 
It focuses on what happened within the implementation period and afterwards - what 
changed and what was maintained in the legal profession. Its main focus was the 
 6 
professional field, rather than the justice system. It did not focus on intentional 
maintenance work of actors to maintain the status quo, but it focused on the existing 
within-the-field mechanisms of persistence that hold the professional field together, 
particularly after the justice system has changed significantly.  
Chapter Five shifts the focus to the theorisation of the change, as a relatively external 
factor to the field. In this respect, Chapter Five examines how theorisation failed 
because it did not address the emotions of professionals as the change recipients. Also, 
Chapter Five covers the periods before, during and after the implementation since it 
examined the theorisation process that encompasses all these time periods. 
Furthermore, Chapter Four and Five complement each other in explaining the lack of 
change within the professional field because while theorisation was necessary, it was 
not sufficient for change to take place. The field dynamics and conditions, the focus 
of Chapter Four, were also crucial for institutional change, and persistence. 
Table 1-1 A summary of how the papers complement each other 
 
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation Structure 
With the three separate papers that draw on the same data, this dissertation explores 
the institutional change of a core societal institution, the justice system, and the 
institutional persistence of another major societal institution, the legal profession.  
Table 1-2 outlines the structure of this dissertation.  
Chapter One provides an introduction to my research. Chapter Two presents the 
common methodology behind the three papers. Next, three papers are presented in 
order in Chapter Three, Four and Five. Every paper has its own introduction, research 
Chapter Three
• Focuses on the period after 
the review was published and 
before the implementation 
had progressed
• Explains ineffective 
maintenance process 
• Focus is on intra-professional 
dynamics.
Chapter Four
• Focuses on the period before 
and after implementation
• Explains why the professional 
field stayed undisrupted 
although the justice system 
changed significantly
• Focus is on the professional 
field dynamics as already 
existing mechanisms
Chapter Five
• Focuses on the period before 
the implementation, during 
the implementation and 
afterwards.
• Explains how theorisation 
failed as a largely exogenous 
mechanism
• Focus is on one particular 
intra-professional community 
and the emotions of its 
members from a 
macrostructural point of view.
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purpose, literature review, findings, discussion and conclusion section. The final 
chapter offers a conclusion for the dissertation.  
Table 1-2 Overview of dissertation structure 
 






• Research Purposes 
• Research Philosophy 
• Research Design 
• The Case: The Scottish Civil Justice Reforms 
• Date Collection 
• Data analysis 
• Methodological Limitations 






• Theoretical Background 
• Findings 
• Discussion 





• Theoretical Background 
• Findings 
• Discussion 





• Theoretical Background 
• Data Analysis 
• Findings 
• Discussion 













This dissertation is based on a research philosophy that is social constructivist. Aligned 
with that, I conducted a qualitative case study that is based on the Scottish Civil Justice 
System Reforms. Data were collected through qualitative methods that were semi-
structured interviews, non-participant observation, speeches and documents. Thus, in 
this chapter, as basic parts of my research approach, I will explain my research 
purposes, research philosophy, research design, research methods and empirical 
context in detail. 
2.2 Research Purpose 
The main aim of this research is to have an in-depth understanding of how institutional 
change unfolds. Table 2-1 presents the research objectives that will be addressed in 
the following three chapters. Usually, qualitative studies have circularity (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2011). That means that they often start with a general idea which then is 
further developed by consulting the literature and turned into a research inquiry, which 
may also change during the research process. In other words, the researcher goes back 
and forth among the literature, data collection, data analysis and writing-up , and may 
redefine the research question along the way (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011; Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007). My experience was also similar in regard to finalising my 
research questions in this study. I moved back and forth iteratively between the data 
and literature in different stages of my research, and built the research questions of 
Chapter Three and Four on mostly “what surprises and puzzles us on the basis of what 
we already know about the topic”; while questions of Chapter Five were mostly based 
on the gap in existing theory in regards to “what is common knowledge within the 
field and what seems to be unknown” (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011: 38). 
 
 9 
Table 2-1 The research questions 
Research Question The paper 
addressing it  
 




What are the intra-professional dynamics that precipitate institutional change or 
stasis? 
How do intra-professional status and identity differences influence the success or 





Why did a pronounced change within the judicial system not cause disruption within 
the professional field that occupied it? 
Chapter 
Four 
What role might emotions play in theorization process of an institutional change? Chapter Five 
 
 
2.3 Research Philosophy 
As an essential step, researchers should determine their philosophical assumptions so 
that they can design their research according to their worldviews (Creswell, 2014; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The term ‘worldview’, sometimes referred to as a paradigm 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994) is defined as “basic belief systems based on ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 107). 
Paradigms provide answers for researchers to decide “what falls within and outside 
the limits of legitimate inquiry” and have three fundamental questions to answer 
regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 108). 
Ontological questions involve the questions regarding “the form and nature of reality” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 108) and the opinions about the existence and action, and how 
these relate to people and society (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011). Epistemological 
questions involve questions regarding “the nature of the relationship between the 
knower and what can be known” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 108). In other words, 
epistemological assumptions answer “how knowledge can be produced, what kind of 
knowledge is available, and what the limits of that knowledge are” (Eriksson & 
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Kovalainen, 2011: 14). Finally, methodological questions address how researchers 
investigate what she/he believes can be known. In this regard, “methodological 
questions cannot be reduced to a question of methods, methods must be fitted to a 
predetermined methodology” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 108). 
In terms of ontology, I believe that reality is a product of people’s social, emotional 
and cognitive processes. Therefore, there are varying realities since individuals or 
groups develop subjective realities based on their experiences and interpretations 
(Blaikie, 1993; Creswell, 2014). Regarding epistemology, I hold an interpretivist 
approach that asserts “knowledge and social action go together” (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2011: 20). Consequently, the research paradigm that I built my study on 
is constructivism (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Social constructivist researchers recognize the complexity of views and meanings 
available in the inquiry. They acknowledge that these meanings are socially 
constructed, negotiated and shared; and specific contexts matter in regard to 
construction of reality. Thus, they aim to understand the participants’ views of the 
issue at hand as much as possible and consider the specificities of the empirical context 
(Creswell, 2014). Social constructivist researchers also assume that language has a 
particular importance in social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967a; 
Thomas, 1994). This is why they focus on both the empirical content and how the 
content is created (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011). Furthermore, while not 
predetermining dependent and independent variables, constructivist research 
recognises and studies the complex nature of human interpretations of reality as the 
situations unfold. Also, constructivist researchers recognise that their own historical, 
personal and social experiences influence and shape how they interpret their research 
context and data (Creswell, 2014). Thus, they assume and accept that there are multiple 
interpretations of the same data and all these different interpretations are meaningful 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011). 
This worldview is very common in qualitative social science studies including 
business and management research (Creswell, 2014; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011) 
because constructivist research aims to understand “how the seemingly ‘objective’ 
features, such as industries, organizations and technologies, are constituted by 
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subjective meanings of individuals and intersubjective processes” (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2011: 20). Moreover, for studies of institutional theory, a constructivist 
and interpretivist approach is a particularly good fit because this worldview opens 
taken-for-grantedness for discussion by acknowledging that he reality does not exist 
objectively (Burr, 1995; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2011) but based on the subjective 
interpretations and constructions of people. 
Constructivist research generally adopts case study research, ethnography, narrative 
research, grounded theory and phenomenological methodologies (Creswell, 2014; 
Saunders et al., 2007; Yin, 2009). A qualitative research approach is considered a very 
good match for these methodologies (Creswell, 2007a, 2007b) since constructionist 
researchers view the strong interaction between the researcher, the data and data 
sources as a critical aspect of their research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2011). Aligned with this approach, this research is designed as a 
qualitative case study that will be further explained in the next section. 
2.4 Research Design 
I have adopted a qualitative case study approach to research different aspects of an 
institutional change in an in-depth manner by employing multiple qualitative data 
sources and collection methods. Case study research usually involves qualitative 
methodology in which “the investigator explores a bounded system or multiple 
bounded systems over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information and reports a case description and case-based themes” 
(Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano, & Morales, 2007: 245). Thus, a case study is the “the 
process of actually carrying out the investigation” (Merriam, 2009: 46). 
Qualitative case study is considered as a type of methodology that is particularly 
consistent with constructivist approach with interpretivist epistemology (Creswell, 
2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2003) because qualitative 
research enables researchers to closely examine the actors in their natural setting and 
understand their experiences and interpretations of reality. Qualitative case studies also 
involve detailed and meaningful descriptions of the context so that researchers can 
interpret “the immediate behaviours in which people are engaged but also the 
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contextual and experiential understandings of those behaviours that render the event 
or action meaningful” (Dawson, 2010: 943). 
I chose to utilise a case study research for several reasons. First, as Yin (1994: 9) 
argues, case studies are better suited to research that ask the “how” and “why” 
questions in my research. Also, according to Merriam (2009) researchers should select 
the cases based on their research purpose and consider the capacity of the selected 
case(s) to increase one’s understanding of the topic of interest or phenomena. In other 
words, as Yin (2003: 13) stated “you would use the case study method because you 
deliberately wanted to cover contextual conditions—believing that they might be 
highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study”. The contextual conditions hold a 
particular importance to me because they provided a case where a highly 
institutionalised setting gets disturbed. I wanted to understand more about the concept 
of institutional change, and the case study at hand, the reform of the Scottish civil 
justice system, provided an opportunity to study the phenomena that I was interested 
in. This case “offered an opportunity to learn” (Stake, 2005: 152) more about 
institutional change.  
Also, this approach enabled me to explore the taken-for-granted meanings and 
interpretations of the participants. That is because case studies “get as close to the 
subject of interest as they possibly can, partly by means of direct observation in natural 
settings, partly by their access to subjective factors (thoughts, feelings, and desires) 
(Bromley, 1986: 23). This opportunity is particularly important for me because I utilise 
institutional theory where institutions are portrayed as “more-or-less taken-for-granted 
repetitive social behaviour that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive 
understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self- reproducing 
social order” (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008: 4–5). 





(Process or design of research 
based on aligned with the 
research philosophy)
• Qualitative case study research 
design
Research Methods
(Ways of data collection and 
analysis)
• Qualitative research methods:
• Semi-structured interviews
• Non-participant observations
• Documents analysis including 
speeches
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Furthermore, a case study approach enables me to develop an in-depth, contextual 
understanding of the phenomena of institutional change while providing an 
opportunity to employ multiple data sources (Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2003) rather than 
limiting the range of sources available as, for instance, in narrative research. Finally, 
Merriam (1998) argues that case studies are a particularly good fit for studies that aim 
to understand a process such as how a programme or treatment has been implemented 
and/or it how the effects of it unfolded. Similarly, in this research I also aim to 
understand the process of institutional change within the context of the implementation 
of the Scottish Civil Justice Reforms.  
2.5 The Case: The Scottish Civil Justice System Reforms 
This study focuses on the case of the Scottish Civil Justice Reforms that is also called 
as the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. After the introduction of the Act, the 
Scottish civil justice system went through one of the most significant changes in its 
history. The reforms came after an extensive review of the system led by one of the 
country’s leading judge at the time, Lord Brian Gill.  
In 2007, the Scottish Parliament asked Lord Gill, who was the Lord Justice Clerk at 
the time, to thoroughly assess the Scottish civil justice system. Lord Gill and his team 
completed the review in 2009. Gill’s mandate was to “review the provision of civil 
justice by the courts in Scotland, including the structure, jurisdiction, procedures and 
working methods” (Gill, 2009a: 1) with “a view to improving access to justice in a 
manner which was effective, efficient and proportionate” (Bremner, Evans, & Harvie-
Clark, 2014: 6). In his review, Gill criticised the system for being expensive, inefficient 
and slow. According to Lord Gill, the system was in such a bad shape that there was 
only one way to proceed, and that was to bring about a radical transformation to the 
civil justice system. He noted that, “We consider that minor modifications to the status 
quo are no longer an option. The court system has to be reformed both structurally and 
functionally” (Gill, 2009a: i). Gill expanded on his position in the prelude to his 
Report: 
The structural and functional flaws in the working of the Scottish Civil 
Courts prevent the courts from delivering the quality of justice to which the 
public is entitled. The Scottish Civil Courts provide a service to the public 
that is slow, inefficient and expensive. Their procedures are antiquated and 
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the range of remedies that they can give is inadequate. In short, they are 
failing to deliver justice. Public confidence in our system is being 
eroded. The much-admired qualities of fairness, incorruptibility and 
expertise of our judicial system will have little significance if the system 
cannot deliver high quality justice within a reasonable time and at 
reasonable cost (Gill, 2009a: i).  
As a solution to these problems, Lord Gill and his review team provided an exhaustive 
list of recommendations to reform the civil justice system in Scotland. In order to 
implement most of the recommendations in Lord Gill’s review and thoroughly reform 
the civil justice system, the Scottish Government passed the Courts Reform (Scotland) 
Act on 7 October 2014. I believe that understanding the scope and scale of the reforms 
requires at least a broad understanding of the legal system and legal profession in 
Scotland. Therefore, the following section will summarise the key aspects of the 
Scottish legal field. 
2.5.1 The Scottish Civil Justice System 
The Scottish legal system is very different from the rest of the UK with its own history, 
legislation, professions, courts and procedures. The administration and regulation of 
the justice system is substantially devolved to the Scottish Parliament1, with only a 
few aspects legislated by the UK2 government (Harvie-Clark, 2014). 
The justice system in Scotland is divided into two parts, criminal and civil. The 
criminal justice system deals with those who are suspected of engaging in criminal 
activity. The civil justice system is designed to enforce and protect people’s legal 
rights and to regulate disputes regarding these rights between two or more parties 
(Harvie-Clark, 2014). As such, the civil justice system covers cases involving personal 
injury, human rights, asylum and immigration, education, health, social security, the 
creation and enforcement of contracts, divorce and separation, ownership disputes, 
wills and inheritance, enforcement of debt, commercial matters, and the like. 
In Scotland, there is an established hierarchy of the courts where there are superior and 
an array of inferior courts (Pfander & Birk, 2011). As the highest civil court in the 
country, the Court of Session has traditionally dealt with all types of civil cases. It is 
 
1 With the Scotland Act 1998 (c 46).   
2 Matters regarding UK Supreme Courts, Employment Tribunals, EU and International Law 
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divided into two as the Outer House and the Inner House. The Outer House heard cases 
that have not previously been to court, and the Inner House was the appeal court, 
hearing civil appeals from both the Outer House and the lower-level sheriff courts. 
Appeals from the Inner House may subsequently go to the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom, located in London (“Court Structure,” 2015).  The Scottish civil 
justice system, prior to the Reforms, long had the structure depicted in Figure 2-2. 
 
While the Court of Session is Scotland's highest civil court and has traditionally dealt 
with all types of civil cases, sheriff courts are inferior (or regional) courts located in 
every city and many larger towns and have jurisdiction over a wide range of civil and 
criminal matters. In fact, sheriff courts deal with the greater part of civil court business 
(Harvie-Clark, 2014) and thus it has been claimed that “sheriff courts are the most 
important courts in Scotland” (Harvie-Clark, 2014; White & Willock, 2007:  97)  
In Scotland, the jurisdiction of the Court of Session and the sheriff courts overlap 
significantly. However, there are proceedings that are to be heard only in the Court of 
Session, whilst some proceedings are not suitable for the highest civil court in the 
country. Before the reforms were implemented, the Court of Session had jurisdiction 
over civil matters that had a value of £5,000 or more; those with a value less than 
£5,000 were handled in the sheriff courts.  
Court of Session 
(Cases with a value more 
than £5000) 
Sheriff Courts  
(Cases with a value up to 
£5000) 
Inner House Outer House 
United Kingdom Supreme Court 
Figure 2-2 Structure of the Scottish Civil Justice System Prior to the Reforms 
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2.5.1.1 The Scottish Legal Profession 
The legal profession in Scotland broadly consists of judges and lawyers. 
Judges. There are three types of judges in Scotland’s civil justice system: judges who 
sit in the supreme courts, sheriff principals and sheriff judges. Judges who sit in the 
supreme courts, such as the Court of Session, are officially called “Senators” or 
“Senators of the College of Justice”. However, informally the term ‘judge’ is used to 
refer to the judges who sit in the supreme courts. Senators are known as having an 
excellent understanding of the law and legal procedures and they deal with the most 
important cases. Senators are appointed by the Queen having been proposed by the 
First Minister of Scotland. Advocates or solicitor advocates with sufficient experience 
can be appointed as senators. (“Roles and jurisdiction,” 2019) 
The most senior judge in Scotland is called the Lord President3 who is considered the 
leader of the legal field and official head of the judiciary. The second most senior judge 
is called the Lord Justice Clerk and serves as the deputy for the Lord President (“Roles 
and jurisdiction,” 2019). Lord Gill was The Lord Justice Clerk when he wrote the 
review in 2007, and was appointed as the Lord President in 2012 (“The Right Hon 
Lord Gill,” 2019). After Lord Gill’s retirement, Lord Carloway, previously Lord 
Justice Clerk, was appointed as the Lord President. 
Judges who sit in the sheriff courts are called “sheriff judges” or “sheriffs”. Sheriffs 
deal with criminal cases and civil cases that have less value and complexity than the 
cases that are heard in the Court of Session. Sheriffs, including sheriff principals, are 
also appointed by the Queen based on the First Minister’s proposal. Advocate, solicitor 
advocates and solicitors can be appointed sheriffs or sheriff principals (“Roles and 
jurisdiction,” 2019).  
Lawyers. In Scotland, legal cases are argued by lawyers. There are three types of 
lawyer in Scotland: solicitors, solicitor advocates and advocates. Advocates are 
lawyers who are self-employed and independent. They are the equivalent of barristers 
in England. After their experience as working solicitors, they go through special 
 
3 Performs as both the Lord President of the Court of Session who is the chief judge of 
Scotland’s supreme civil court and the Lord Justice General of the High Court of Justiciary 
as the chief judge for Scotland’s supreme criminal court.  
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training, called ‘devilling’, and take examinations in order to be called to the Scottish 
Bar.  Advocates are also referred to as ‘Counsel’ or ‘members of the Bar’.  There are 
around 420 practising advocates in Scotland (“Find an advocate,” 2019). The 
professional association of advocates is an independent referral body called The 
Faculty of Advocates. All advocates are a part of the Faculty. The Faculty of 
Advocates is an ancient professional body that was founded in 1532 and regulates the 
professional conduct and practice of advocates, including their training (“Faculty of 
Advocates,” 2019). 
Advocates wear different clothes than solicitors when appearing in court. Advocates 
have to wear a wig, a white bow, white stiff collar, a black tailcoat and black gown. If 
they do not dress in this particular way, they are considered as having inappropriate 
attire. These badges of office enable people to differentiate who is a solicitor and who 
is an advocate. 
Solicitors are lawyers who are the first point of contact for clients. They almost always 
work in a law firm, but can also work in government offices, corporations and other 
organisations. They provide legal advice and support to clients in a wide range of civil 
and criminal business. If a client needs the services of an advocate, then their solicitor 
will ‘instruct’ the advocate; clients cannot contact the advocates themselves.  
While solicitors represent their clients in the lower courts – the sheriff courts – they 
have always been excluded from the Court of Session. In other words, solicitors do 
not have the right of audience in the supreme courts. However, they have full rights of 
audience in all matters in the sheriff courts.  When solicitors need to take a case to the 
Court of Session, they have to instruct an advocate. Advocates handle the case and 
represent the client in the supreme courts on behalf of the solicitor. On the other hand, 
advocates have traditionally enjoyed the right to appear in any Scottish court, with the 
only condition for them to appear in a sheriff court being that they are instructed by a 
solicitor or a professional body. 
However, some solicitors do qualify as solicitor advocates, allowing them to represent 
clients in the higher court. Solicitor advocates officially are not considered as a 
different type of lawyer, but they are considered as solicitors with extended rights of 
audience. That means solicitor advocates, in fact, are solicitors with extra 
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qualifications and training allowing them to represent clients in the Court of Session. 
Solicitors and solicitor advocates must register as members with the Law Society of 
Scotland which is the professional body that regulates the solicitor branch of the 
profession. There are more than 11,500 solicitors in Scotland as of the end of 2018 
(“Annual Report,” 2018). 
In sheriff courts, solicitors do not have automatic access to counsel as they would do 
in the Court of Session. “Automatic access to counsel” is a common phrase in the legal 
field to state that solicitors do not need to do anything to get help from advocates in 
supreme court cases because they cannot appear there; therefore, access to advocates’ 
services is automatic. If a solicitor wants to instruct an advocate for a case which is to 
be heard in a sheriff court in a way that the legal fees of counsel are legally recovered 
by the losing party or the state as it is in the Court of Session, solicitors have to have 
sanction granted by the sheriff judge hearing the case. A sheriff judge’s granting 
sanction means that he or she gives permission for the employment of counsel 
(advocates) so that the cost of counsel can be recovered at the end. In other words, a 
solicitor can instruct an advocate for a sheriff court case without the sanction granted 
but then all the expenses of counsel have to be paid by the client or the solicitor’s firm. 
Therefore, in practice it rarely happens. Also, solicitors generally work based on a ‘no 
win no pay’ approach, particularly for personal injury cases. That means that if 
solicitors lose, they do not get paid by their clients. Even if they win, without sanction 
granted they have to cover counsel’s fees themselves. As explained by the Scottish 
Government in a briefing regarding the Gill Reforms4: 
“In litigation, the general principle is that “expenses follow success”, i.e. the 
losing party pays the winning party’s legal expenses. Broadly speaking, without 
sanction for counsel’s fees from the court, it is not possible for a successful 
litigant to claim recovery of his or her counsel’s fees in accordance with this 
principle.” (Bremner et al., 2014: 11) 
 
4 The Courts Reform Scotland (Act) has been variously termed the Gill Reforms, the 
Scottish Civil Justice Reforms, or simply the Reforms in official and media reports. These 
terms, therefore, are used interchangeably here.  
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2.5.1.2 History of the Legal Profession in Scotland 
The early history of the Scottish legal profession and where its origins lie is not well 
documented. While it is certainly known that, by the 17th century, the Scottish legal 
profession had established itself as a recognised profession that was its members’ main 
source of income (Carswell, 1967), it is known if the roots of the profession go further 
to the period of feudal system in Scotland. 
In Scotland, the feudal system, where government and land occupancy were 
decentralised socially and economically, was established by the 12th century (Morais, 
2017). As a consequence of this system, there were various institutions and offices 
established throughout the country such as royal officers, sheriffs, barons, bailies and 
justice general. These offices had different responsibilities. For example, while sheriffs 
were responsible for collecting revenue on behalf of the King, the justice-general was 
the King’s delegate for administrative issues. This led to the creation of various court 
systems  (Morais, 2017). 
Consequently, there were a number of both ecclesiastical and lay courts that developed 
around the 12th century. These courts were considered as superior and inferior (higher 
and lower) courts and had their own distinctive histories, procedures and jurisdictions. 
For example, Guild Merchants and Burgh Courts dealt with disputes over buildings 
and streets; Barony and Regalty Courts presided over civil and criminal matters lead 
by Barons or his bailies; and sheriff courts lead by the sheriffs were with the 
jurisdiction of civil and criminal matters. The sheriffs were appointed amongst those 
who were influential local lords and the office was hereditary. They were the local 
representatives of the King in every matter, therefore their purpose was to dispense the 
justice and authority of the King, as well as maintain the King’s power against the 
local lords (Morais, 2017). 
By the 15th century, while the church courts as the superior courts were well organised 
with a hierarchy of appeal, lay courts as the inferior courts were tremendously 
disorganised (Carswell, 1967). The operation of the church court system was 
conducted by clerics and church officials; however, its business was handled by the 
support of notaries and writers to the signet, the origins of today’s solicitors (Wilson, 
1968). 
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In their extremely haphazard way of operation, lay court judges did not have any legal 
training in contrast to the judges who sat in the church courts. Also, there were not any 
professional procurators, or solicitors, appearing in these lower level courts. However, 
in the higher courts, advocates were already in place (Wilson, 1968). Advocates were 
recognised as a group for the first time in an Act of 1424, and developed through the 
15th and 16th centuries with the establishment of legally required professional standards 
(Wilson, 1968). 
As the highest civil court in the country the College of Justice, or Court of Session, 
was founded in 1532 and established a community that included judges, advocates, 
writers to the signet – solicitors - and their servants. However, in terms of appearing 
in the court for representing parties, professional advocates enjoyed a de facto 
monopoly in the Court of Session from its establishment in 1532 (Finlay, 2007). 
The number of licenced advocates in Scotland increased slowly during the 16th century 
from over twenty to over fifty. The members had common financial interests, as well 
as a “unifying spirit” within the newly established Faculty of Advocates (Carswell, 
1967: 46). We see that “from this point, the course of the Faculty of Advocates and its 
members, with the privilege of sole right of appearance in the Court of Session was 
fully established and can be traced directly to the present day” (Carswell, 1967: 46). 
However, according to Carswell (1967) the Faculty was not held in as high esteem as 
it is today because the courts, including the highest ones, were corrupt and influenced 
by political and financial forces. However, by the 16th century, advocates started to 
gain high status and became more specialised leading to a clearer division of labour 
between solicitors and advocates, as Finlay (2007: 37) states: 
“It was in the sixteenth century, as advocates grew in status and specialisation, 
that the more mechanical oversight of processes came to be the province of the 
writer, or law agent, with advocates restricting themselves to work of more 
intellectual consequence. By the eighteenth century the expressive term “doer” 
was often applied to an agent, while the advocate was often referred to 
colloquially simply as the ‘lawier’.” 
Solicitors – or procurators, doers, notaries, agents, clerks and writers as they were 
variously known (Finlay, 2007) – were a small group doing advocacy in the lower 
courts. However, most of the agents and writers did not perform as procurators, rather 
they handled “the normal array of private client work that formed, and forms, the more 
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instrumental and ‘mechanical’ side of the law…Writers were involved in drafting 
deeds, such as securities, marriage contracts, and memorials for the opinion of counsel; 
ensuring the registration of bonds and instruments in the appropriate registers; and 
acting as trustees on sequestrated estates, working as curators and factors and assisting 
in reaching arbitrated settlements” (Finlay, 2007: 52) 
In the 15th century, most of the Scottish population was illiterate. Therefore, the 
function of notaries, agents and writers was crucial for drafting written documents, 
recording debts and business transactions, handling contracts, and keeping various 
records. However, how representation started in the lower courts is not well known. It 
is documented that there were professionals appearing in the lower courts by the 16th 
century, albeit their numbers and how they conducted their practices is unknown. It is 
known that professionals who appeared in the lower courts were generally notaries or 
writers to the signet, not advocates. Notaries used to seal and check the authentication 
of the legal documents and deeds of people, as well as record these transactions. The 
most important legal documents that the notaries handled and recorded were regarding 
land transactions. We see that even today, one of the main areas that solicitors work 
on is buying and selling properties, including land, while the lawyers who appear in 
the lower courts are solicitors, not advocates.  
According to Carswell (1967), there existed some form of legal representation during 
the 15th century and the word “procurator” that is the equivalent of today’s solicitor, 
had started to gain professional significance in certain courts. However, their 
professional status was very low compared to advocates. Finlay (2007: 31) states, 
referring to the state of the legal profession in the 14th and 15th centuries, “the lowly 
position of procurators belies their practical importance. In Scotland a division is not 
simply to be drawn between advocates and procurators but may be more appropriately 
made between practitioners who belonged to the College of Justice (a supreme court) 
and those who did not”. We see that in today’s Scotland the very same division 
continues with solicitors not having the right to appear in the supreme courts. 
Solicitors have always been considered as the lowest status group within the legal 
profession (Abbott, 1988; Finlay, 2007; Warren, 1855). This was the case not only in 
Scotland, but across continental Europe. For instance even in the 16th century, French 
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humanist Doneau (as cited in Finlay, 2007: 32 1626) stated “the office of advocate is 
more praiseworthy, and has more dignity attached to it, than the office of procurator, 
which is worth little, so much so that the infamous are admitted to it, whereas an 
infamous person cannot become an advocate”.  
Over time, formal measures were established by the supreme courts and the parliament 
in order to oversee the workings of the inferior courts. These local courts did not have 
as much business as the Court of Session in which advocates regularly appeared and 
writers to the signets handled the technical management of the cases. We see that from 
the very beginning, while members of the Faculty of Advocates had a right of audience 
in all courts and every level, procurators could only access some of them. Therefore, 
with the insufficient business in the local courts where procurators worked, the 
opportunity to be specialists was even more limited. With court business delivering 
insufficient income for a living, procurators had to become involved in practices that 
were semi-legal or non-legal in nature (Finlay, 2008). While the scope of notaries 
increased, they also gained significance within the circle of the Scottish Crown, as well 
as influential families. They started building networks and handling the private 
businesses of these families and the Crown. Then, finally the notaries became licensed 
in the 16th century. While it is not known when notaries started conducting these 
functions as a primary source of income, before the 17th century they were already 
established as a professional group. Further, by the 16th century, solicitors started 
opening places of business where they continued performing their established 
practices as notaries, writers and clerks similar to their current businesses (Finlay, 
2007). 
In the 18th century, the inferior courts of Scotland’s had been strongly regulated. Many 
regulations were designed and applied by inferior judges regarding the admission of 
procurators and how they should conduct themselves. Succeeding years brought the 
betterment of the lower branch of the profession, and by the end of the 18th century, 
solicitors were beginning to assert themselves (Finlay, 2007). 
Almost from the moment that different branches of the profession were established, 
there was considerable inter-relation between them, however, it is known that the 
segments of the profession remained different and intentionally kept distinct. “In 1608, 
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for example, the Writers to the Signet Society disciplined its member, Harry Wilson, 
for occupying the same chamber as an advocate; he was required to find a writing 
booth for his own use or face expulsion” (Finlay, 2007: 42). Nonetheless, advocates, 
writers and agents kept a close working relationship. Advocates generally used to work 
at home or in chambers near to the courts; writers and agents had offices. If one wanted 
to reach an advocate, they generally had to reach to the writers as contacts. Finlay 
(2007: 43) also shares some real-life examples from the Faculty’s records of 1758: 
“Those wishing to see the advocates Patrick Home or Sir John Stewart had to 
‘apply to Thomas Cockburn senior writer’ or next to the name of the advocate 
Sir Archibald Grant is the phrase ‘Apply Mr Lockhart to send Lauchy Grant to 
see sir Archibald Grant.’”  
The similar relationships between the segments of the profession still continues today. 
While solicitors are the first point of contact for the clients to reach an advocate, they 
still cannot use the facilities of advocates, such as the Advocate’s library, in the Faculty 
of Advocates.  
The inequalities within the Scottish legal practice started to weaken by the early 19th 
century. Competent people had been admitted to the branches of the profession and 
the associations with the local universities began providing legal education with local 
nuances; a foreign education was not the stamp of a good advocate anymore. 
Different professional associations of solicitors have appeared throughout history. 
However, the creation of the Law Society of Scotland in 1949 radically changed the 
formal structure of the solicitors’ branch of the profession by bringing together local 
professional associations which each had their own deans under the roof of a single 
organisation (Wilson, 1968). Regarding the relationship between the professional 
bodies of solicitors and advocates, Sir David Edward’s (1996: 56) anecdote is apposite: 
“It was some time before it was recognised, even by solicitors, as speaking for 
the profession as a whole. Indeed, the idea that either branch of the profession 
needed to be "represented" by a professional body, whether internally or 
externally, was altogether novel. When I was elected Clerk of Faculty in July 
1967, I paid a courtesy call on the Secretary of the Law Society, R. B. Lawrie, 
who later said he had been greatly surprised by this visit since he had had no 
previous contact with the Clerk of Faculty.” 
To sum up, we see that the practices and relationships between the segments of the 
legal profession have not changed much over time. From the 15th century, “judges are 
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almost invariably selected from the ranks of counsel” (Wilson, 1896: 111); solicitors 
have been appearing in the inferior courts and excluded from superior courts; 
advocates have been enjoying the right of audience in every court in the land; 
solicitors’ professionally low status is long established; and the clothes of advocates 
with their wigs and gowns are a historic remnant that remains in place. 
2.5.2 The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 
According to the Gill Review (2009a), the excessive periods of time spent waiting for 
court hearings, the disproportionately high costs of litigation, and professional 
inefficiency across the legal system were the three major problems that were 
significantly disrupting accessing to justice. To address these, Gill (2009a) proposed 
holistic changes to the structure, jurisdiction, procedures and working methods of the 
judiciary. As a result, the following changes were introduced by the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act, 2014: 
•  The jurisdiction of the sheriff courts was changed. Rather than the previous 
£5000 limit, sheriff courts could now hear claims of up to £100,000. In place 
since 22 September 2015. 
•  A third tier of judges, summary sheriffs, was introduced in 1 April 2016. 
They deal with straightforward claims below £5000 in a process known as a 
“Simple Procedure”. Its first phase was implemented on 28 November 2016. 
The second phase is expected to be implemented in 2019. 
•  A specialist All Scotland Personal Injury Sheriff Court was created. There 
is no upper value limit in this court, however, sheriff court rules apply if a 
solicitor wishes to engage the services of an advocate. In place since 22 
September 2015. 
•  A nationwide Sheriff Appeal Court was created. This hears appeals from 
cases decided at sheriff courts rather than having them heard at the Court of 
Session. In place since 1 January 2016. 
•  Support for party litigants aimed to be improved with more on-line 
information, better in-court advice services, and provision for “lay 
representation.”  
• Court procedures were modernised. Use of information technology, such as 
conference calls and electronic evidence submissions were increased to 
improve efficiency.  
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As a consequence, the Scottish civil justice system changed from having the structure 
depicted in Figure 2-2 to the significantly different structure shown in Figure 2-3.  
 
 
Dotted lines indicate new judicial bodies 
The reforms, with these changes, aimed to extend the jurisdiction of sheriffs and sheriff 
courts such that a large proportion of the civil cases heard in the country’s highest civil 
court, the Court of Session, would go to the sheriff courts. Therefore, the demands on 
the Court of Session were expected to reduce with overall efficiency expected to 
increase. 
With costs are higher in the Court of Session for the public and for the state than the 
Sheriff Courts, the reforms were intended to be more cost efficient. Furthermore, 
solicitors have automatic access to Counsel’s services in the Court of Session. Thus, 
having a case in the Court of Session causes very high expenses for the public and the 
state, if legal aid is provided by the state. Since solicitors can appear in the sheriff 
UK SUPREME COURT 
Court of Session 
(Cases with a value 
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- 
Appeal Sheriffs 
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Figure 2-3 The revised structure of the Scottish civil justice system. 
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courts and do not need advocates’ services there, this would reduce costs for the public 
significantly, while speeding up the process and increasing efficiency. Also, the legal 
fees of the Court of Session are higher than the sheriff courts. Members of the public 
would avoid higher costs by having a case heard in the sheriff courts rather than the 
Court of Session.  
Further, by changing the threshold of sheriff courts, the reforms aimed to leave the 
high value, most complex and important cases to the best judges available in the land 
and leave the relatively less complex cases to the sheriff judges. Also, by shifting some 
higher value cases to sheriff courts was that solicitors would have an historical 
opportunity to take a professional leap and build their capacity to argue complex and 
important cases. 
From medieval times, solicitors had handled the businesses of clients, but when they 
went into court, an advocate would argue the case. That was the traditional allocation 
of work.  When the case was raised in the Court of Session, then a solicitor would be 
bound and obliged to instruct an advocate, since he/she could not appear in the Court 
of Session. Now that had significantly changed because there was now a choice as to 
whether or not to instruct an advocate. With the majority of work in the Court of 
Session now being pushed down into the sheriff courts, solicitors could do the 
advocacy themselves if they choose to do so. Thus, there was a possibility of changing 
assigned practices since the established division of labour was officially disturbed with 
the reforms changing the upper limits of the sheriff courts and providing a platform 
for solicitors to advocate in high value cases. 
In sum, with the change of creating summary sheriffs and simple procedure, the 
reforms aimed to reduce the time and costs of raising a simple action through courts. 
This change was also expected save costs since summary sheriffs have a lower salary 
than regular sheriffs. Further, with the creation of an All Scotland Personal Injury 
Sheriff Court, the reforms aimed to reduce the volume of personal injury cases in both 
the sheriff courts and the Court of Session leading to a specialised sheriff court in 
personal injury and increased specialisation of sheriffs. In addition, the reforms aimed 
to reduce the amount of appeals going to the Court of Session from the sheriff courts 
so that the Court of Session and the judges who sit there would be less busy leading to 
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cost saving and efficiency with the change of having a new sheriff appeal court. 
Overall, the overarching aim was to increase access to justice by making the processes 
simpler, cheaper and faster, while saving cost.  
2.6 Data Collection 
A strength of the case study approach is that it enables the researcher to use multiple 
data sources and methods of data collection (Stake, 2005). Therefore, while benefiting 
from primary and secondary data sources, I collected data predominantly through three 
qualitative methods: interviews, non-participant observations, and documents 
including speeches. I chose these data collection methods carefully in order to secure 
the good data triangulation process. Also, the level of analysis in this research is macro 
level and considering the fact that macro institutional affects are strongly linked to 
micro actions, these data collections methods were particularly fitting for my research. 
In addition, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) during the fieldwork process, I moved back and forth between data collection 
and data analysis, and the literature while simultaneously focusing on data, context, 
and theory. Therefore, I started collecting data in September 2014 and finished it in 
December 2018. That is, I started collecting data even before the passage of the bill 
that introduced the Scottish Civil Justice Reforms, continued through during the 
implementation of the reforms and after the implementation process.  
Furthermore, since my background was not in the discipline of law and I never had 
experience in the Scottish Legal System, I did not have any previous knowledge 
regarding the context before starting the fieldwork. Therefore, in order to have a good 
understanding of the legal system in Scotland, the culture of the legal profession and 
day-to-day practices of law firms and professionals, I read countless published 
documents, internet blogs, and news articles before going into the field. These readings 
were not a part of the data analysis per se, but they built a foundation of my 
understanding of the context and helped to form a general direction regarding data 
collection. 
Access to and sampling of participants. I accessed my first participant who was an 
advocate through personal connections. Studying the concept of institutional change 
within this context was just a raw idea at the time. After interviewing him regarding 
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the scope of the reforms, I was convinced that the case presented a rare opportunity to 
explore institutional change from different aspects. Later I designed the research and 
started reaching out to other participants.  
Two sampling techniques were utilised in this research. First, I sent emails to the 
several names that were picked through ‘purposeful sampling’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). Some of these individuals were high-
profile supreme court judges and Members of the Scottish Parliament who had 
significant roles in the initiation, design, and introduction of the reforms. I contacted 
them through very personalised e-mails depending on their position in the legal field 
and contribution to the reforms, and they were all willing to be a part of the research.  
Other individuals who were purposefully selected were those who had sent their 
opinions to the government during the consultation process and their letters were 
publicly available. I hoped that they would be more willing to talk about the reforms 
and they were, indeed, generally very keen to help. I contacted them through email, 
too. Appendix 1 is a draft of the email I sent to them. I also contacted sheriffs that were 
interviewed by sending them letters via post. Appendix 2 is a draft of the letters that 
were addressed to the sheriffs.  
The second snowballing technique (Patton, 1990) was also utilised. That is, at the end 
of every interview, I asked the participant if they could recommend someone to talk to 
next. Based on their recommendations, I contacted the new individuals through email. 
In my email, without giving the name of the previous participant, I mentioned that they 
were recommended as someone I should talk to understand the reforms better and 
asked if they would be willing to do so. Appendix 3 is the email that was sent to those 
who were recommended.  
2.6.1 Data Sources 
Data were collected through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were 
interviews, non-participant observations, while the secondary sources were various 
documents including transcribed public speeches. 
Interviews. In-depth interviews are particularly useful to understand the multiple 
interpretations, perspectives and meanings of participants (Johnson, 2001).  According 
to Goffman (1989: 125), in-depth interviews have the aim of “subjecting yourself and 
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your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals, 
so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of response to their 
social situation, their work situation, or their ethnic situation.” That is, interviews help 
the researcher to make sense of the actions of the participants and learn more about a 
world that he/she is an outsider (Johnson, 2001). 
Accordingly, in this study, a total of 93 semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted (one participant was interviewed twice). While the shortest of these face-
to-face interviews lasted for 44 minutes, the longest was 143 minutes. Depending on 
the wish of the participant, I conducted the interviews either in one of the available 
syndicate rooms in the University of Edinburgh Business School, or the offices of the 
participants or neutral places like coffee shops. I recorded all of the interviews, except 
one during which I took extensive notes. The recorded interviews were transcribed 
either by me, or a professional transcription service approved by the University of 
Edinburgh Business School which signed a confidentiality agreement.  
I aimed to interview a wide range of participants in terms of their professional 
background, and experience. I interviewed thirty solicitors, twenty solicitor advocates, 
twenty four advocates, eight sheriff judges (one retired but working as a part-time 
sheriff), four supreme courts judges, two Members of the Scottish Parliament, two 
consultants who worked with the team who designed the reforms, one clerk of court 
and one project manager who worked in the Faculty of Advocates. Table 2-2 presents 
the list of the participants including their given pseudonyms.  
I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews and pre-prepared a list of questions that 
guided me through the interviews. However, I did not strictly follow the questions and 
let the participants share their opinions and feelings, and elaborate their responses as 
much as they liked. I aimed to reach deeper meanings and interpretations by going 
with the flow as much as possible.  This open approach helped me to see what was 
most important for the participants regarding the reforms changing their environment 
because participants often raised issues that I was not aware of or had not considered 














1 Brandon Advocate 
INTW 
47 Robson Advocate 
INTW 
2 George Advocate 
INTW 
48 Callum Solicitor 
INTW 
3 James Advocate 
INTW 
49 Nick Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
4 Charles Advocate 
INTW 
50 Naomi Solicitor 
INTW 
5 Aaron Solicitor 
INTW 
51 Simon Solicitor 
INTW 
6 Garret Solicitor 
INTW 
52 Gabriel Solicitor 
INTW 
7 Thomas Solicitor 
INTW 
53 Ronald Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
8 Keene MSP 
INTW 
54 Tony Advocate 
INTW 
9 Scott Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
55 Matt Advocate 
INTW 
10 Taylor Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
56 Sebastian Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
11 Phillip Advocate 
INTW 
57 Ashley Advocate 
INTW 
12 Samuel Solicitor 
INTW 
58 Jane Solicitor 
INTW 
13 Paul Advocate 
INTW 
59 Ted Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
14 Nancy Solicitor 
INTW 
60 Bill Advocate 
INTW 
15 Sheriff Wilson Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
61 Lucas Solicitor 
INTW 
16 Sheriff Martin Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
62 Carrie Solicitor 
INTW 
17 Sheriff Parker Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
63 Ronnie Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
18 Steven Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
64 Peter Advocate 
INTW 
19 Kim Solicitor 
INTW 
65 Doyle Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
20 Isaac Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
66 Nathan Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
21 Gary Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
67 Sheriff Barley Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
22 Ian Solicitor 
INTW 
68 Sheriff Samson Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
23 Sarah Solicitor 
INTW 
69 Terry Advocate 
INTW 
24 James Solicitor 
INTW 
70 Louis Solicitor 
INTW 
25 Clark Solicitor 
INTW 
71 Amy Advocate 
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My interview questions evolved through the research process as my understanding of 
the reforms, and their progress, developed. In the interviews that took place before the 
implementation I was more focused on understanding the dynamics leading to the 
reforms, how the participants assessed the introduction of the reforms, how they 
positioned themselves regarding the reforms, if they resisted the change or accepted it 
and why, what they expected about the implementation and so on. In the interviews 
that took place during and after the implementation process, my questions were more 
INTW 
26 Cathy Solicitor 
INTW 
72 Jayson Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
27 Susan Solicitor 
INTW 
73 Harold Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
28 Jonathan Advocate 
INTW 
74 Wendy Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
29 Sheriff Taylor Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
75 L. X Judge 
INTW 
30 Kevin Solicitor 
INTW 
76 L. Y. Judge 
INTW 
31 Percy Solicitor 
INTW 
77 L. Z. Judge 
INTW 
32 Claire Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
78 Rick 
Consultant to the 
reform team 
INTW 






34 Adam Solicitor 
INTW 
80 Tracy Clerk of court 
INTW 
35 Liam Solicitor 
INTW 
81 Benjamin 
Consultant to the 
reform team 
INTW 
36 Jess Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
82 Charlize MSP 
INTW 
37 Ali Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
83 Brian Advocate 
INTW 
38 Randy Solicitor 
INTW 
84 David Advocate 
INTW 
39 Caroline Solicitor 
INTW 
85 Lilly Advocate 
INTW 
40 Dennis Solicitor Advocate 
INTW 
86 Neville Advocate 
INTW 
41 Scarlet Solicitor 
INTW 
87 Ginny Advocate 
INTW 
42 Michael Solicitor 
INTW 
88 Emma Advocate 
INTW 
43 Richard Solicitor 
INTW 
89 Daniel Advocate 
INTW 
44 William Solicitor 
INTW 
90 Kyle Advocate 
INTW 




retired Part time sheriff 
INTW 
46 Sheriff Clive Sheriff Judge 
INTW 
92 L.T Judge 
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about the implementation process, what had changed, how the participants felt about 
change, what their expectations were, any discrepancy between their expectations and 
the implementation process, and so on. Appendix 4 provides a sample of the interview 
questions. 
Non-participant observations. Qualitative researchers usually use observations 
along with in-depth interviews in order to develop a better understanding of the various 
interpretations and perspectives within the context that they study on (Johnson, 2001). 
I conducted 24 hours of non-participant observation. These observations took place 
mainly in the Parliament Hall in the Faculty of Advocates, Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 
All Scotland Personal Injury Court and one law firm that is located in Edinburgh. 
During my observations, extensive notes were taken. I also recorded my thoughts 
during and after the observation to a recorder I brought to the field. These recordings 
were also transcribed by me on the same day of the recording.  
Although sheriff courts and Parliament Hall are open to the public, permission to 
observe was granted by the Clerk of the Faculty and the sheriff judges hearing the 
cases. After the interview with the Clerk of the Faculty, he verbally approved my 
request for observation after consulting with the Dean of the Faculty. I also had the 
chance to make observations in parts of the Faculty of Advocates not open to public 
before and after interviews with advocates who preferred to meet in the Faculty. Some 
of the participants gave me a tour of the Faculty including the Advocates’ Library and 
explained details regarding the history and traditions of the profession and the 
building. I extensively documented my observations whenever I attended meetings 
and interviews. These data included working practices, architectural design of 
buildings, and details pertaining to the activities and informal comments of those being 
interviewed. 
Also, one particular sheriff judge, Sheriff Wilson5, was very helpful to me throughout 
my observations in the sheriff courts. He helped me to gain access to the court rooms 
of other sheriffs by contacting them personally, as well as helping me to understand 
 
5 This is a pseudonym.  
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the things I could not at the time. In both sheriff courts I made 12 hours of non-
participant observation spread across three weeks.  
In regard to my observation in a law firm, the access was granted by a partner of the 
firm who acknowledged that he consulted his colleagues before accepting my request. 
It was a law firm which deals mainly with personal injury claims.  I spent 8 hours of 
non-participant observation and conducted several interviews during my time in there. 
Table 2-3 presents the details of my non-participant observation process. Overall, these 
observations helped me significantly to develop an understanding of the legal system 
and how it works, and the legal profession and its intra-professional dynamics. 
Table 2-3 Details of non-participant observation 
Observation Location Dates and time spent 
Edinburgh Sheriff Court and All 
Scotland Personal Injury Court (They 
are located in the same building sharing 
court rooms)  
12 hours in total: 
20 March 2017- 2 hours 
23 March 2017- 4 hours 
29 March 2017- 2 hours 
11 April 2017- 4 hours 
 
A Personal injury law firm in 
Edinburgh 
8 hours in total: 
5 May 2017- 4 hours 
10 May 2017- 4 hours 
 
Parliament House and the Faculty of 
Advocates 
4 hours in total (and more during and 
after the interviews):  
12 December 2016- 2 hours 




 Total: 24 hours 
Speeches. I also analysed 21 public speeches given by the judicial office holders of 
the legal system between the years of 2013-2019 regarding the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2014. The total page number of the transcriptions of the speeches was 
266. These speeches were addressed to either only solicitors or all of the legal 
professionals in Scotland. Transcriptions of these speeches were available to the public 
at the official websites of the Scottish Judiciary, the Law Society of Scotland and the 
Faculty of Advocates. I also had the opportunity to listen in person to one of the 
speeches given by Lord Gill. All of the speeches referenced the reforms to greater or 
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lesser degrees.  Table 2-4 presents the list and the details of the speeches that were 
analysed.  
Table 2-4 List of speeches 
No: Speech Made 
By  
Addressed To/ Location and 
Title of the Speech (if 
available) 
Date Number of 
Pages of 
Transcription 
1 Lord Gill 
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk 
Law Society of Scotland 
 
“‘Victorian’ Scots Justice 
System” 
8 May 2009 9 
2 Lord Gill 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
 
Ceremony of installation of 






3 Lord Gill 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish legal profession 
 
Speech to the Opening of the 





4 Lord Gill 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish legal profession 
Speech to the Opening of the 





5 Lord Gill  
As the Lord 
President 
Law Society of Scotland 
“Looking Over the Horizon: 
Life after the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Bill” 
4 April 2014 11 





The President of 
the Sheriff 
Appeal Court 
Society of Solicitors in The 
Supreme Courts, Society of 
Solicitor Advocates, And 
Scottish Young Lawyers' 
Association 




7 Lord Gill 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 






8 Lord Carloway  
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk 
Commonwealth Association 
of Law Reform Agencies 
(Calras) Biennial Conference- 
Law Reform in A Fast-
Changing World 
In Royal Society of 
Edinburgh 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
“To ‘Mend the Lawes, That 
Neids Mendement’: A 





Scottish Perspective on 
Lawyers as Law Reformers” 
9 Lord Gill  
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
Speech to The 
Commonwealth Law 
Conference 
“Independence of The 





10 Lord Carloway 
As Lord Justice 
Clerk 
Faculty of Advocates 
Faculty of Advocates’ 
Conference 






11 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk 
The Scottish Legal Profession 






12 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk  
The Scottish Legal Profession 
Speech to 15th Annual 21st 




13 Lord Carloway  
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
In the Ceremony of The 
Installation of Lord President 





14 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
President 
Law Society Council 





15 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
World Bar Conference 
“The Role of The Court in 





16 Lady Dorrian 
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk 
Society of Young Lawyers 
(SYLA) Annual Lecture 2016 




17 Lord Carloway  
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
Speech to Brexit Conference 





18 Lord Carloway  
As the Lord 
President 
Law Society of Scotland 
Law Society of Scotland 
Annual Conference Keynote 
Address “The Scottish Courts 





19 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
Speech to the Opening of The 






20 Lady Dorrian 
As the Lord 
Justice Clerk 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
The 21st Century Bar 
Conference 





21 Lord Carloway 
As the Lord 
President 
The Scottish Legal Profession 
Speech to Opening of the 






Documents. Atkinson and Coffey (1997) argue that written texts are fundamental for 
the functioning of social life and are often very relevant for qualitative research.  Using 
documents in conjunction with the in-depth interviews is recommended for qualitative 
case studies (Yin, 2003). Using documents in addition to my other data sources also 
helped me to fill the blanks in my understanding of different perspectives and 
interpretations available in the data.  As previously mentioned, along with the 
documents I analysed, I also read numerous documents including textbooks, journal 
articles, news articles, blogs, reports, historical accounts, court cases and so on that I 
did not include to my data analysis. However, through these documents I learned a lot 
about the legal field, the disciplines of law, and the history of the legal profession in 
Scotland. 
In regard to the data sources that I used for analysis; I first assessed all 193 responses 
(letters) submitted to the Scottish Government by different stakeholders during the 
consultation process. These written submissions were made by various stakeholders – 
including advocates, solicitors, academics, judges, leaders of affected non-
governmental organizations, and different professional bodies. The total number of 
transcription pages of these letters was 1587. Appendix 5 presents the list of responses 
and the relevant details.   
I also analysed 48 documents, with a total of 1941 pages, that were either published in 
print or made publicly accessible online by the Scottish Government. These documents 
include briefing reports, minutes of parliamentary committees, Lord Gill’s review on 
the civil justice system, reports of the different committees regarding the reforms, 
memorandums, the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, Courts Reform (Scotland) 
Bill, explanatory notes regarding the Bill and so on. Table 2-5 presents the list of the 
published documents analysed. 
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Table 2-5 List of documents analysed 
No Name of the document and publishing date (if available) Number 
of pages 
1 Report of the Scottish Civil Justice System by Lord Gill, 2009 375 
2 Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014  113 
3 Bill (As Introduced) (SP Bill 46), 6 February 2014 98 
4 Extract from the Minutes, Finance Committee, 26 March 2014 1 
5 Extracts from the Minutes of the Justice Committee 18 February, 4 
March, 18 March, 25 March, 1 April, 22 April, 29 April, 6 May 
2014 
2 
6 Extract from the Minutes of the Parliament, 21 May 2014 1 
7 Extract from the Minutes, Justice Committee, 10 June 2014 2 
8 Extract from the Minutes, Justice Committee, 17 June 2014   2 
9 Extract from the Minutes of the Parliament, 7 October 2014  2 
10 Minutes of proceedings-Parliamentary Year 4, No. 05, Session 4 
Meeting of the Parliament Wednesday 21 May 2014  
8 
11 Bill (As Amended at Stage 2) (SP Bill 46A)  108 
12 Explanatory Notes (and other accompanying documents) (SP Bill 
46-EN) 
84 
13 Revised Explanatory Notes (SP Bill 46A-EN)  52 
14 2nd Grouping of Amendments for Stage 2 (SP Bill 46-G2)  3 
15 2nd Marshalled List of Amendments for Stage 2 (SP Bill 46-ML2)  22 
16 Correspondence from the Cabinet Secretary for Justice to the 
Justice Committee and Finance Committee updating financial 
information on the Bill, 24 September 2014 
5 
17 Written submissions and correspondence relating to the report of 
the Finance Committee, 26 March 2014 
54 
18 Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service -Annual Report & Accounts 
2017-18  
82 
19 Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service -Annual Report & Accounts 
2016-17 
82 
20 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee 29th Report, 2014 
(Session 4) Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill published by the 
Scottish Parliament on 23 April 2014  
23 
21 Delegated Powers Memorandum (SP Bill 46-DPM) 24 
22 Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee Report, 7 October 
2014 
22 




24 Supplementary Delegated Powers Memorandum (SP Bill46A-
DPM)  
9 
25 Finance Committee Report- 26 March 2014 13 
26 Analysis of Consultation Responses -13 September 2013  97 
27 Business & Regulatory Impact Assessment - Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Bill- 5 March 2014 
11 
28 SPICe Briefing -Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill-13 March 2014 40 
29 Making Justice Work – Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill- 
Consultation on the treatment of civil appeals from the Court of 
Session, May 2013 
13 
30 SPICe Briefing -The Scottish Civil Court System -13 February 
2014  
18 
31 Official Report, Meeting of the Parliament, 7 October 2014  57 
32 Official Report, Finance Committee, 26 March 2014 19 
33 Official Report, Meeting of the Parliament, 21 May 2014 63 
34 Official Report, Justice Committee, 10 June 2014  22 
35 Official Report, Justice Committee, 17 June 2014  28 
36 Policy Memorandum (SP Bill 46-PM) 58 
37 1st Marshalled List of Amendments for Stage 2 (SP Bill 46-ML1) 7 
38 Report on the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill as amended at Stage 
2, Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee  
6 
39 Groupings of Amendments for Stage 3 (SP Bill 46A-G)  2 
40 1st Groupings of Amendments for Stage 2 (SP Bill 46-G1) 2 
41 Marshalled List of Amendments selected for Stage 3 (SP Bill 46A-
ML)  
17 
42 Making Justice Work: Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill – A 
Consultation Paper-February 2013  
48 
43 Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill - analysis of consultation responses- 
13 September 2013 
1 
44 SPICe Briefing-Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill: Stage 3- 25 
September 2014  
20 
45 Scottish Government response to the Stage 1 Report, 2 June 2014 13 
46 Oral evidence taken by the Justice Committee 18 March, 
25 March, 1 April, 22 April, 29 April 2014 
106 
47 Making Justice Work – Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill-
Consultation on the treatment of civil appeals from the Court of 
Session – analysis of responses, October 2013 
22 
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Across the Papers. Data sources were more limited in Chapter Three than in the other 
two papers since the paper on Chapter Three is published as an article in the earlier 
stages of my research. Table 2-6 summarises the details of data sources for every 
paper. 
Table 2-6 Details of data sources analysed in the three papers 
Paper Data sources analysed 
Chapter 
Three 
• Twenty-one interviews: five advocates, a clerk of court, five solicitors, 
three solicitor advocates, a sheriff judge, a project manager working in 
the Faculty of Advocates, a consultant in the team designing the reforms, 
two Members of the Scottish Parliament, and two supreme courts judges. 
• Seventy-one written submissions to the Scottish Government. 
• Three public speeches. Two of these were addressed to solicitors and 
explained how the reforms would positively affect them. The third 
speech, to all members of the Scottish Justice System, explained the need 
for the reforms and revealed the timeline of their implementation 
Chapter 
Four 
• All of the collected data explained above: 93 interviews, 24 hours of 
non-participant observation, 21 public speeches, documents analysis of 
48 documents, 193 submissions to government. 
Chapter 
Five 
• All of the collected data explained above: 93 interviews, 24 hours of 
non-participant observation, 21 public speeches, documents analysis of 
48 documents, 193 submissions to government. 
 
 
2.7 Data Analysis  
The data used here have been coded and analysed in ways consistent with methods 
outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013). I 
started the data analysis with open coding of the data from the interviews, speeches, 
documents and non-participant observation notes. These open codes were developed 
using in vivo codes without making any attempt to create categories. Instead, at this 
stage, I mainly used participants’ own words, or coded in the way that they were 
 40 
written in the documents. I mainly used NVivo qualitative analysis software to 
organise the coding process, however later, particularly during the writing up of the 
Chapter Five, I switched to using Microsoft Word and exported the data from NVivo 
to Microsoft Word. 
Also, I open coded the data interview by interview, or document by document and 
organised in the same manner as well. That is, I made clear what interview that the 
open codes belong to. I also aimed to keep data sections as coherent pieces and created 
more than one open code for these coherent sections, such as a whole paragraph, or 
sentences that supported each other. That approach helped me in several ways, 
particularly in understanding the data. Table 2-7 presents a sample of my open codes 
and their organization. 
Table 2-7 Sample of open coding 
Interviewee: INTW 13 Paul, Advocate 
Location: A coffee shop 
Date: 6 May 2016 
Quote Open codes 
 
I think there are aspects of the legal system which are old-
fashioned. But lawyers inherently just to do their job, look 
back in time because they have to look at previous decisions 
to see what has been done. So, in that way, the law always 
looks back and it's a quite conservative profession.  
 
But it has to be a conservative profession to a degree 
because continuity and stability and predictability in the 
law is important. If you change the law too much, nobody 
knows where they stand, so that's part of being a lawyer, 
that's part of the Court system.  
• Some parts of the legal 
system are old fashioned 
 
• Lawyer’s job is to look 
back in time to see what 
has been done 
 
• Law is a quite 
conservative profession 
 
• Law needs to be 
conservative to secure 
continuity, stability and 
predictability 
 
• Changing law too much 
would cause nobody 
knows where they stand 
My own experience from working as a solicitor was that 
largely the system was able to take account of the demands 
of modern life. Not everywhere, it's not perfect, and there's 
always a need for reform.  
 
One area, for example, is in relation to information 
technology. I don't think the courts have kept up to date 
with developments in that area enough, but by and large I 
think it did pretty well... 
• The system before the 
reforms, was not perfect 
but good enough for the 
modern age. 
 
• The system required 




 • The system before the 
reforms, was not perfect 
but good enough for the 
modern age. 
Interviewee: INTW 14, Nancy, Solicitor 
Location: In her office 
Date: 28 May 2016 
Quote Open Codes 
 
I am an enthusiast for Lord Gill who I do think has been a 
highly influential figure in the Law of Scotland for all of his 
professional life but notably in his role as Lord Justice 
Clerk, the author of this Report and then his time as Lord 
President and I find his approach something that is 
beneficial.  
 
Yet, I have some misgivings about whether the outcomes 
that he designed necessarily were needed, I think he was 
given a political objective, there was an assumption that 
there was unmet need or hindrances in access to justice in 
Scotland and perhaps just because I am old and a dinosaur 
I am not entirely convinced that was right.  
 
• Lord Gill has been an 
influential figure in the 
Law of Scotland 
 
• Having misgivings about 
the outcomes that Lord 
Gill desired 
 
• Thinking that Lord Gill 
has a political agenda 
 
• Not convinced that there 
were hindrances in 
access to justice in 
Scotland 
              I do have concerns that the lower courts may become 
overcrowded, over-busy 
 
And I am somewhat troubled that the introduction of the 
lower level of Judge, to a summary sheriff, maybe nothing 
more than a cost saving exercise. 
 
Summary sheriffs are being paid less than full-time sheriffs 
would have been, that in turn is going to mean that 
probably a number of the candidates will not be of the 
same calibre as those who would have applied for the 
better paid jobs and it may produce a reduced quality of 
judgement 
• Concerns regarding that 




• Having concerns about 
the consequents of the 
introduction of summary 
sheriffs  
 
• Introduction of summary 
sheriffs just for cost-
saving 
 
• Concerns regarding the 
possibility of summary 
sheriffs being less 
qualified than other 
sheriffs or judges 
 
• Concerns regarding the 
possibility of having 
reduced quality of 





In the second stage of analysis, I re-categorised the open codes by considering the 
research questions of each paper. That is, before writing each paper, I went back to 
open codes and their attached quotes, assessed the codes one more time, searched for 
codes that could be grouped together as a higher-level category and iteratively 
collapsed them into a higher level of abstraction in order to produce second order codes 
for that particular paper. 
In the final stage, I further organised the second orders into the aggregate dimensions.  
This, from the first stage of open coding until the end of the analysis, was a recursive 
process where I constantly compared codes, looked for similarities and differences 
among them, moved back and forth between codes and the raw data (Locke, 2001; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994; Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). I also moved back and forth between the data and literature particularly to reach 
the aggregate dimensions.  By doing so, I linked the general themes that emerged from 
the data to more general constructs from the literature on institutions, inter-institutional 
areas, sociology of professions, sociology of emotions and institutional change. In this 
way, I was able to develop theoretical inferences from the emergent findings. For 
example, the aggregate dimensions of “specification of the failures of the existing 
system” and “justification of the new structures and practices” emerged particularly 
from comparing what emerged from the data with work on theorisation (Greenwood, 
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002).  
Furthermore, following the suggestion of Miles and Huberman (1994) I also utilised 
the practice of ‘memoing’ during the data analysis process. I took notes that were 
attached to interviews and codes. I followed this practice for the large part of the data 
analysis process. While using NVivo I used its ‘create memo’ option to attach the 
memos to interviews or to codes, and while using Microsoft Word I used the comment 
facility to add the memos.  In these memos, I reflected back on the interview at hand 
based on my field notes and jotted my personal thoughts and interpretations regarding 
what had been said in the data. Sometimes I built links between other data pieces, 
interviews or theory. I also used the memos to remember the ideas that came to my 
mind during data analysis of that particular interview. These ideas were generally 
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about emergent patterns within the data or how the data relates to the existing theory 
and so on. Table 2-8 is an excerpt from one of my memos on an interview script: 
Table 2-8 An excerpt from one of the memos 
Interviewee: INTW 4, Charles - Advocate 
Location: A meeting room in the Faculty of Advocates 
Date: 18 December 2014 
It was clear that he considers handling the money or being the first contact for clients is 
beneath the role of advocates. He considers that these practices are a “tremendous burden” 
and are kind of dirty jobs. They don’t require intellectual resources to be employed, hence 
beneath advocates’ high level of intellectual ability and standards. That fits with other 
statements of advocates and solicitors, particularly official statements in the website of the 
Faculty of Advocates. Of course, this brings Abbott’s claims about professional purity and 
intra-professional status hierarchy to mind. Abbott states: 
“Professions tend to withdraw into themselves, away from the task for which they claim 
public jurisdiction. This pattern results from internal status rankings. The professionals who 
receive the highest status from their peers are those who work in the most purely 
professional environments. They are professionals’ professionals who do not sully their 
work with nonprofessional matters, consultants who receive referrals only from other 
professionals. Barristers and modern-day surgeons are examples. Such high-status 
professionals may have exceedingly high incomes and extensive professional education, but 




2.7.1 Data Analyses of the Three Papers 
This dissertation includes three papers, presented in Chapter Three, Four and Five, in 
which different research questions were proposed. Although the main approach to data 
analysis was the same, the process of reaching the second orders and the aggregate 
dimensions by moving back and forth between data and the literature was different in 
each paper. That was because there were differences in regard to theoretical 
background of the papers, in addition to the differences in the research questions. The 
details regarding data structure of papers are explained within the papers, except 
Chapter Three. The paper on Chapter Three is a published paper and the data structure 
details were not included in the original manuscript. The below table presents the data 











Table 2-9 Data structure for Chapter Three 
First orders Second orders Aggregate 
dimensions 
• Advocates’ professional identity 
• Solicitors’ professional identity 
• Elitism in the Bar 
• Status of advocates 
• Status of solicitors 






• Limited formal and informal 
interactions among the segments 
• Differing approaches regarding to 
resistance to change and not being 
able to have common way to do so 
Weak intra-professional 
communication 
• Uncertainty regarding the 
implementation 
• Uncertainty about the sanction 
process 
• Uncertainty about the solicitors’ 
preference on instructing advocates 
in future 





2.8 Methodological Limitations 
One of the major criticisms regarding qualitative studies, and particularly case study 
research, is the generalisability and transferability of the findings. The question of how 
localised and idiosyncratic results, particularly ones based on single contexts, can be 
transferred and generalised to broader contexts maintains its pertinence especially for 
those who seek to apply positivistic validity and reliability measures to qualitative 
research.  
Furthermore, in qualitative research, the skills, experience and personal biases and 
peculiarities of researcher may be excessively seen to effect the quality of the research 
(Fontana & Frey, 1994). For instance, researchers may be accused of asking leading 
questions to manipulate interviewees or might miss asking important follow-up 
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questions and so on. Also, the fact that the researcher is usually present during data 
collection can influence how participants respond or behave. What they say can be 
very selective depending on their relationship with the researcher or their impressions 
regarding the researcher. 
However, generally these concerns are rooted in positivist philosophical assumptions 
(e.g. Yin 2003) and an underlying worldview of constructivist approach embraces the 
idiosyncrasies of qualitative case studies, as well as the deep involvement of the 
researcher in the process, to explore contexts deeply and provide thick descriptions of 
the context as well as the experience of the actors within these contexts. Creswell 
(2014: 204) even goes further and states  “In fact, the value of qualitative research lies 
in the particular description and themes developed in context of a specific site. 
Particularity rather than generalisability is the hallmark of good qualitative research”.  
I am also aware of that my case study presents inevitable idiosyncrasies. However, I 
believe every profession is stratified one way or another and has communities within 
communities. Almost every institution is strongly linked to professions and inhabited 
by one or more occupations or professions. Therefore, I aimed to discuss the findings 
in a way that they are theoretically relevant, and offer insights to a range of other issues 
related to other professions as well as the more general concepts of institutional 
change, persistence and maintenance. Nevertheless, I also agree with Scott (2013: 262) 
that idiosyncrasies are important for social science and we are not “seeking universal 
social law”, as it is beautifully put by Simonde de Sismondi (1837: iv): 
I am convinced that one falls into serious error in wishing always to generalize 
everything connected with the social sciences. It is on the contrary essential to 
study human conditions in detail. One must get hold now of a period, now of a 
country, now of a profession, in order to see clearly what a man is and how 
institutions act upon him [sic]. 
2.9 Trustworthiness 
There is no one particular way of determining the quality of qualitative research (Amis 
& Silk, 2008; O’Reilly & Parker, 2013). Along with aiming to uncover the complexity 
and multiplicity of social realities, the diversity in the ways that studies are conducted 
and the unique characteristics of contexts make it very hard to measure how rigorously 
a qualitative research is conducted. Therefore, the traditional positivist methods of 
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research assessments of validity and reliability are generally not considered as 
legitimate options to assess the quality of qualitative research. 
In this regard, Lincoln and Guba (1985) promoted criteria of trustworthiness of the 
qualitative research as the goodness criteria for the work.  In order to increase the 
trustworthiness of my research, I employed several strategies of triangulation 
(Creswell, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). First, I triangulated my methods by using 
different data collection methods such as interviews, non-participant observation, 
speeches and documents. Second, I triangulated my data sources by interviewing 
participants that belonged to different groups within the legal profession. In this 
regard, I also had a wide range of professionals who have different levels of 
experiences. Moreover, I analysed speeches belonged to different prominent figures 
and collected a wide array of documents including letters to government that belonged 
to an extensive list of stakeholders like NGOs, insurance companies, professional 
associations, individual professionals to retired sheriffs. At the end, I crosschecked the 
data coming from different sources to see if they all fit together and if there were any 
inconsistencies. 
I also used triangulation of theory and frequently checked my interpretations of the 
data to see if it is consistent with related theories such as sociology of professions, 
sociology of emotions, organizational change, career studies and so on. Doing this 
helped me to increase trustworthiness particularly in Chapter Five. Studies located in 
different literatures suggest that women and men experience self-confidence 
differently and lack of self-confidence affects them differently (Cech, Rubineau, 
Silbey, & Seron, 2011; Perkins, 2018). Furthermore, studies showed women have a 
tendency to assess their professional abilities more harshly than men (e.g. Beyer, 1990; 
Beyer & Bowden, 1997). Women also suffer from a lack of self confidence in 
professions more than men (Perkins, 2018). 
After my data analysis had indicated that solicitors felt a lack of self-confidence, I 
went back to the open codes of the interviews, and re-organized them based on gender, 
double checked if the majority of the emotion related quotes belonged to female 
participants. However, I saw that was not the case. I had interviewed 50 solicitors 
(including solicitor advocates) and 13 of them were female and a disproportionate 
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majority of the quotes regarding the emotions leading to the lack of self-confidence 
belonged to the male participants. Therefore, while analysing the data for Chapter 
Five, I took the gender of the interviewee into account and organized my analysis 
accordingly. I also made a particular effort to include male participants’ quotes 
regarding emotions in the writing of the paper so that readers also could see that.   
Along with usage of triangulation methods, I also ‘member checked’ my research 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I discussed my data, interpretations and emerging themes 
with three of the participants (a sheriff judge, an advocate and a solicitor) at the various 
stages of my research to see if they thought the findings were accurate. Furthermore, 
I also employed ‘peer examination’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) by which the empirical 
material, the interpretations and conclusions drawn from the data have been 
crosschecked by another researcher. 
Furthermore, in order to secure transparency of my research, I clearly presented the 
data collection methods and analysis process with sufficient detail in this dissertation. 
I provided rich descriptions of data and context, and shared quotes from the data in the 
findings sections as much as possible to allow the reader to clearly see my 
interpretation process. 
2.10 Research Ethics 
Designing ethical research is one of the main responsibilities of researchers. This study 
was designed by carefully considering the ethical aspects of my research. I also 
precisely followed the guidelines of the University of Edinburgh Business School. 
The participants were made aware of this research by email and asked if they would 
be willing to give an interview. Before every interview, I carefully and fully explained 
my research and research purposes and presented an informed consent form to be 
signed by the participant. In this form I shared the details of the research, the contact 
details of the research team and highlighted that I offered confidentiality. I asked them 
their permission to record our interview and did so only if they acceded. Appendix 6 
presents the informed consent form that was used. Before and after every interview I 
verbally asked participants if they had any questions or concerns regarding the study. 
I aimed to be friendly and open so that they could raise their concerns. I also made 
sure that the participants understood that they could withdraw from the research at any 
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time. The transcription of each interview was sent to the participant who was asked if 
they were happy with it. This was an intentionally given opportunity to participants to 
raise their concerns one more time. As a result of this process, one of the participants 
stated that she did not want to be a part of the research. Then, I completely deleted her 
data. 
In this study, pseudonyms for the names of participants and organizations were used. 
For convenience, I assigned names according to the gender of the participant. 
However, two of the participants were in such a unique professional position in which 
number of women was very limited that, in order to protect their identities, I named 
them with male names and was very careful not to use their quotes in ways that would 
reveal their identities. 
I copied my data to computers and the cloud using these pseudonyms. The documents 
with the real names of the participants were stored in two separate external hard discs 
that were locked in a locker in one of the PhD offices in the University of Edinburgh 
Business School. By doing this I aimed to reduce the risk of data leakage. Since I used 
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In 2014, the Scottish Parliament passed legislation to thoroughly reform its civil justice 
system. The system had been criticised as being antiquated and of causing “erosion in 
public confidence” (Gill, 2009a: ii). The reforms came after an extensive review of the 
civil legal system led by one of the country’s leading judge, Lord Brian Gill. 
The civil justice system in Scotland is a Victorian model that had survived by 
means of periodic piecemeal reforms. But in substance its structure and 
procedures are those of a century and a half ago. It is failing the litigant and 
it is failing society (Gill, 2009b). 
The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act is designed to bring pronounced change to a legal 
system that has been in place for 150 years. Most notably, the reforms will introduce 
two new judicial courts (a Sheriff Appeal Court and a Special Personal Injury Court) 
and a new tier of judiciary, Summary Sheriffs. Further, regional Sheriff Courts, which 
previously could only hear civil claims up to a value of £5000, will now be able to 
hear cases of up to £100,000. This last change is particularly significant as it means 
that higher value, more complex, cases previously handled by advocates in the Scottish 
High Court can now be contested by solicitors in lower level courts. 
The media have been consistent in their assessment of the magnitude of the changes, 
describing them as “sweeping reforms” (The Scotsman, 2014) that will “modernise” 
(BBC, 2014) “shakeup” (Brodies, 2009) and have “a massive impact on civil justice” 
(Inhouselawyer, 2010). Gill acknowledged the radical nature of the reforms while 
addressing the deeply rooted jurisdictional competition within the legal profession, 
stating: 
Yes, it presents radical reform. But it has to be radical to ensure real change 
rather than piecemeal reform. What opportunity does it present? It throws 
open to every solicitor in Scotland a large tranche of work that hitherto has 
been the exclusive preserve of the Bar6 and of solicitors with rights of 
audience in the higher courts7. It gives to every solicitor in Scotland the 
opportunity to develop skill in appellate advocacy and to develop an 
expertise that has hitherto been seen as the exclusive preserve of the Bar. 
(Gill, 2014: 7) 
 
6 When legal professionals complete a set amount of additional training and pass associated exams, 
they are “called to the Bar” as advocates. 
7 So called ‘solicitor advocates’. 
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As Harel (2014) rightly emphasises, the legal system is important because it contours 
desirable outcomes, such as justice, security and prosperity. For Lord Gill (2009a) 
achieving these lofty goals in Scotland involved the creation of more effective 
decision-making processes, and a more democratic legal system. Hence, the Scottish 
civil justice reforms have been designed with the intent of generating wider, cheaper 
and quicker access to the legal system for members of the public. 
The present paper is part of a larger study taking advantage of this empirical 
opportunity to observe in real time how major institutional changes unfold. The 
overarching motivation of the study is to understand the processes of institutional 
maintenance and change, with particular interest given to the political behaviours of 
affected professions. In the present paper, we report and discuss two early and 
surprising observations. 
As might be expected, the legal profession is not homogenous but contains groups that 
have their own identities that are associated with differences of status (Currie et al., 
2012; Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002). Because 
status brings with it privileges and benefits, “status maintenance concerns are central” 
for those with higher status (Blader & Chen, 2011: 1041; see also Washington & Zajac, 
2005). Changes that threaten to disrupt that status hierarchy, therefore, such as those 
intended for the Scottish civil justice system, can be expected to generate significant 
resistance. As Micelotta and Washington (2013) found in their study of Italian law 
firms, the legal profession is a powerful actor – even in its relationship with the state. 
In Italy the profession managed to “repair” a “broken” institutional order caused by 
new legislation even though “the law had already been passed and there was no room 
for negotiation” (Micelotta & Washington, 2013: 1149). Further, status hierarchies 
often remain entrenched in professions for long periods of time, reflecting the 
motivation and ability of high status actors to maintain their privileged positions, as 
Delmestri and Greenwood (2016: 8) illustrated: 
‘Ivy League’ schools, a category of universities in the US, for example, have 
retained their prominence. So, too, have the ‘Magic Circle’ of UK law firms and 
the ‘Big Four’ international accounting firms. ‘Oxbridge’ and elite UK ‘public 
schools’ (such as Eton and Harrow), … and the Grande Écoles, a category of 
higher education institutions in France, have similarly retained their privilege 
and prestige for centuries (Kodeih & Greenwood 2014). Malter (2014) notes that 
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the grandes crus classés of the Médoc, five growth classes of wine producers, 
have remained virtually unchanged for 150 years.  
It might be expected, therefore, that those with high status within the legal profession 
in Scotland would be agents of resistance and maintenance, whereas those with lower 
status would be supportive of change. We thus expected to observe “institutional 
maintenance work” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) from some members of the legal 
profession, but not others. In fact, this outcome was not found. Both high and low 
status groups within the legal profession were critical of the proposed changes and 
both preferred retention of existing arrangements. That is, the legal profession as a 
whole favoured institutional maintenance. That was the first of the two surprising 
observations that we discuss in this paper. The second was that, despite the lack of 
support for change, there was little effective ‘maintenance work’. Contrary to the 
portrayal of the professions as “Lords of the Dance” (Scott, 2008) and as highly 
motivated and effective in maintaining their privileges, resistance in our study was 
weak and ineffectual. These observations led us to consider the following research 
questions. First, rather than take external shocks and their consequent impact on 
institutional settlements for granted, what are the intra-professional dynamics that 
precipitate institutional change or stasis? Second, why do actors who have power, 
opportunity and resources to resist change, and in whose interests it is to maintain an 
institution, fail to do so? Third, how do intra-professional status and identity 
differences influence the success or failure of attempts at institutional maintenance?     
In addressing these questions, we respond to calls for research about institutional 
maintenance (Lawrence et al., 2009) and in particular to investigating the importance 
of professions as institutional agents (Scott, 2008). Moreover, we draw upon the 
surprisingly thin literature on professional identity and offer insights on intra-
professional segmentation and its consequences for institutional processes.  
Our work makes several contributions to our understanding of institutions and 
professions. First, we show how professions are demarcated into communities with 
different levels of status that are grounded in pronounced bases of identity. As a 
consequence, institutional maintenance requires strong, coordinated action across 
these communities. Second, we reveal how status differences foment intra-
professional rivalries that prevent coordinated action, even when there is universal 
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opposition to a proposed change. Third, we demonstrate that lower status groups do 
not automatically support change, even when it appears to be in their best interests to 
do so. Finally, we show that while uncertainty provides opportunities for institutional 
change, it hinders institutional maintenance efforts. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Institutions, Institutional Change and Institutional Work 
Institutions are complex self-reproducing social structures underpinned by regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that give meaning to social exchange, 
provide stability, guide behavior, and create repetitive social behaviors (Greenwood et 
al., 2008; Scott, 2013). They constitute communities defined by common functional, 
relational and cognitive criteria (Mazza & Pedersen, 2004) and thus provide 
governance systems that deliver frames of reference that shape individuals’ 
sensemaking, interpretation and decision-making processes (Thornton et al., 2012).  
Recent work has portrayed institutions as sources of, and entrained to, different 
institutional logics, the “material practices and symbolic systems including 
assumptions, values, and beliefs by which individuals and organizations provide 
meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and 
experiences” (Thornton et al., 2012: 2). In other words, institutional logics prescribe 
an interpretation of reality, appropriate behavior and the definition of success in a 
given context (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & 
Lounsbury, 2011). Logics act as guidelines for institutional actors for interpreting and 
functioning in social situations, including whether to resist or accept change (Scott, 
2013). 
Although institutions, by definition, are resistant to change because of the entrenched 
values, norms and routines that build over time, they do undergo change. Change can 
be caused by internal contradictions stemming from tensions among institutional 
logics (Reay & Hinings, 2005; Seo & Creed, 2002), emerge incrementally within the 
day-to-day activities of actors that subsequently get disseminated across a field (Smets, 
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012) or result from an exogenous shock, such as a regulatory 
change that disrupts a settled institution and requires the negotiation of a new 
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settlement (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Edelman, 1992; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; 
Rao & Kenny, 2008). 
Considering the taken-for-granted, self-reproducing nature of institutions, it is not 
surprising that researchers have focused more on understanding the creation, 
disruption and transformation of institutions than upon maintenance processes. Yet, 
“the institutional work of maintaining institutions is both necessary and overlooked…. 
Even powerful institutions require maintenance so that institutions remain relevant and 
effective” (Lawrence et al., 2009: 8). Hence, several recent attempts have been made 
to map maintenance work (e.g. Adamson, Manson, & Zakaria, 2015; Currie et al., 
2012; Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010; Lawrence et al., 2009; Lok & De Rond, 2013; 
Micelotta & Washington, 2013). These studies highlight how actors who benefit from 
existing arrangements respond to threats of change by trying to maintain the status 
quo. In particular, it has been shown that “individuals who belong to higher status 
social groups most often benefit from existing social arrangements” (Battilana, 2006: 
663) and are thus especially likely to resist institutional change (Currie et al., 2012; 
Ferlie et al., 2005; Suddaby & Viale, 2011).  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that we know far too little of who engages in 
maintenance work, and why and how they do so. These are still largely unanswered 
questions. Lawrence, Leca and Zilber (2013: 1025) however, offer “a prominent 
answer” to the first of these questions: “professionals and other actors associated with 
the professions.” The professions, they suggest, are a compelling starting point for 
studying maintenance work. 
3.2.2 Professions and Institutional Maintenance 
Institutional theory has long recognised that the professions are important institutions 
in their own right (Scott, 2008). Nevertheless, professions compete for status and 
power because of the significant privileges that they bring (Abbott, 1988). Therefore, 
although recent work has provided examples of change initiated by professional 
associations or as emerging from the practices of professionals (e.g. Greenwood et al., 
2002; Smets et al., 2012), mature professions, such as law, accounting and medicine, 
are essentially conservative (Greenwood et al., 2002) and are continually engaged in 
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efforts to maintain their identity and thus their status (Currie et al., 2012; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013; Scott, 2008). 
Although the literature on identity per se is vast and growing (for a review, see Gioia, 
Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013) studies have focused predominantly on 
organisational or individual identity. Work on professional identity, by contrast, 
remains “sporadic” (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008). The need for more research 
in this area has been widely acknowledged (e.g. Alvesson, Lee Ashcraft, & Thomas, 
2008; Ashcraft, 2012; Barbour & Lammers, 2015; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Pratt 
et al., 2006), yet insights into intra-professional identities and responses to professional 
identity threats have been notably lacking (Currie et al., 2012). 
The fact that professions are institutions makes it problematic to directly transfer 
insights on organization identity to the professions. While a profession, as an 
institution, is a source of institutional logics that provides frames of reference for 
individual professionals to interpret their reality, define their values and interests, and 
provide justification for the question of “who am I?”, it is also a part of a broader 
institutional field that can be the source of several other institutional logics. This brings 
an underlying complexity that has yet to be examined. 
Micelotta and Washington (2013: 1169), for example, show how Italian lawyers 
“refused the imposition of a professional model that does not reflect the actual identity 
and practices of the profession.” Other studies have similarly shown that whether a 
new institutional order is perceived as aligned or misaligned with identity will affect 
whether its implications are perceived as opportunities or threats and thus will shape 
the level of resistance (Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Gioia, Patvardhan, et al., 2013). 
Professional identity, in other words, is central to the interests of a profession and any 
change perceived as threatening that identity can be expected to trigger maintenance 
work. 
However, it is important to note that, despite the commonly held monolithic 
perception, professions are not homogenous (Abbott, 1981, 1988; Ramirez et al., 2015; 
Stringfellow & Thompson, 2014). Within most professions, status hierarchies specify 
and define intra-professional communities with their own identities, interests and 
privileges. How these intra-professional differences are invoked and affected during 
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processes of institutional change, and how they might shape responses to those 
changes, has largely been unexplored. Rather, most studies have considered 
professions to be homogenous entities in which members share a common identity, 
ideals and intentions. As such, it is implied that possible tensions caused by intra-
professional status hierarchies and intra-professional identity differences are 
insignificant and can be discounted. This, as we show below, is problematic. 
3.3 Findings 
Following our data analyses, three main themes emerged as important in 
understanding the impact of the law reforms on the legal profession. First, it is very 
clear that, within the legal profession, there are communities with different status, and 
that these status differences along with associated professional identities heavily 
influenced the ways in which the reforms were perceived and enacted. Second, these 
intra-professional differences have resulted in different bases of opposition to the 
reforms. Surprisingly, given that the reforms were intended to provide more 
opportunities to solicitors, we found that opposition to the reforms was universal. 
Third, despite this overwhelming opposition, the legal profession was unable to 
mobilize a coherent program of maintenance work as has been possible in other similar 
highly institutionalized settings. Again, we found status and identity as highly salient 
in understanding the reasons for this. We next explain each of these emergent themes 
in more detail. 
3.3.1 Different Status Communities 
Contrary to much of the research that has viewed professions as homogeneous, we 
found significant intra-professional differences across the legal field. Here we focus 
predominantly on advocates and solicitors, the groups who practice law and were most 
affected by the law reforms. Almost all of the interviewees defined their roles, 
professional interests and status in terms of their specialised branches of the legal 
profession. We assess the different status communities and note how these differences 
influenced their perception of change. 
Advocates. Advocates consistently stressed how their training, legal expertise, and 
their strong “professional traditions” set them apart from others in the legal profession. 
These characteristics also provided the bases for their perceived high status. Both 
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interview and document analyses revealed a strong belief in how advocates feel that 
their work is important, complicated and distinctive. Further, they almost always 
defined themselves in comparison to solicitors with extensive explicit and implicit 
references to their differing status, as in this description of the characteristics of 
advocates by Brandon8, an experienced advocate: 
If an advocate, which is different to being a solicitor actually, if an advocate tells 
you something, generally speaking, you can rely on that, and trust what they say 
is accurate…. And honesty, I think, is the other one.... And a mutual respect, so 
that I would not denigrate a fellow Member of Faculty. And it's less aggressive 
[than being a solicitor], and sometimes solicitors can fall out with each other. 
While explaining the consequences of working alone, George pointed out how 
advocates have higher status with the public:  
So there are many pros and cons, but being self-employed as an advocate 
definitely carries kudos, if you like, in the public's mind.... I think people realize 
that it is quite an important role. Because you're advising the solicitor and you're 
advising the client, so, in that sense, you have to be confident in your own ability 
and your own advice, whereas if you're a solicitor, you can always go and ask a 
partner, and it's a collective thing. 
Having professional training, dealing with very complex cases, and having expert 
skills and knowledge were repeatedly mentioned as important aspects of an advocate’s 
professional identity. Further, advocates that we interviewed repeatedly reflected on 
their commitment to higher professional standards than solicitors. James, an advocate, 
explained:   
If you're asked for a written opinion about something, you could spend a whole 
day on it. And frequently, when I'm drafting things, I rewrite them three or four 
times, and change them, and change them again. Now, I probably wouldn't have 
done that as a solicitor. It's because I know that my piece of work is going to get 
sent to the solicitor and sent to the client and probably to the court at some point 
if it's a court document. So it has to be absolutely as good as it can be…. 
Advocates are people who are on a completely higher level [than solicitors]. 
Another advocate, Charles, while giving an example of the negligence of a solicitor in 
a case, explained how advocates monitor themselves to meet professional standards, 
and how these standards are reproduced: 
 
8 All names used in the paper are pseudonyms. 
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Now, most advocates would not [make that mistake]…. The informal restrictions 
or pressures on the way in which we handle ourselves, are more concentrated on 
us because our training is more involved, and more intense… and because we, 
traditionally, have more contact with judges, and finally, because up until the 
present, all judges have been members of the Faculty of Advocates 
professionally before they went on to the Judicial Bench, or the Court of Session 
Bench. It's more of a step for us to fall beneath those professional standards. 
He also explained how solicitors have to deal with clients and take responsibility for 
billing and payments, something considered beneath the role of an advocate:  
We wouldn't want to [access clients directly]. We don't get direct access to 
clients, but also we don't have to handle their money, which is a tremendous ease 
of burden from our point…. That's all done for us by the solicitors. 
The tradition and gravitas attached to the identity of advocates was also apparent in 
the way that the Faculty of Advocates defined itself in its submission to the Scottish 
Government during the consultation process before the Act was passed: 
The Faculty of Advocates is Scotland’s independent referral bar. It is also one of 
Scotland’s great national institutions. Before and since 1707, the Faculty has 
been central in developing and preserving Scots law as an independent legal 
system. Its members (including Sir Walter Scott and Robert Louis Stevenson) 
have contributed significantly to the Scottish Enlightenment and to Scottish 
culture generally. It was thanks to the donation by the Faculty of some 750,000 
books that the National Library of Scotland was established in 1925. 
The Faculty proudly defined itself as an independent, distinctive, and national 
institution with a long history of contributing to the betterment of society. Our non-
participant observation data confirmed that advocates are very proud of being part of 
the Faculty. For example, when we conducted interviews in the Law Chambers, we 
were always given a tour of the building and told stories about the ancient traditions 
that members still follow. 
While advocates are proud of their status and traditions, members of other branches of 
the law profession emphasise, and resent, what is perceived as elitism. For example, 
solicitors that we interviewed emphasised to us that the Faculty of Advocates has 
traditionally been dominated by men with similar backgrounds. Aaron, a solicitor, 
explained: 
The Bar has undoubtedly been privileged. It has been largely male, it has been 
largely private or very privileged public schools. It has been largely wealthy and 
it has been largely self-confident males with very good and expensive 
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educations. … there are many more women now but their CVs mirror the men. 
But the Bar has had all these privileges…. As a solicitor, even as an 
inexperienced one, you are very aware of the fact that you can’t go to Faculty of 
Advocates Library. You are not allowed to go in there, unless you have 
permission. You are just like any other member of the public. 
Another solicitor, Garret, made similar observations: 
In Scotland, it is not that long ago that we did not have any female judges. We 
have more [now], but…there is still a long way to go before we have anything 
like parity. And it is something which I think that, you know, probably fosters 
the view of elitism, because it is mostly men, mostly going to private schools, 
most have gone to certain universities, most have a certain social background. 
Thomas, a solicitor, explained it this way: 
That is something that I have been very aware of for the last twenty years or 
more that the Bar was so archaic in its structure. It did have excellence but it was 
so archaic: the clothes, the wigs, the traditions. The idea that if you were a 
training master and your advocate was such and such a person, you would be a 
kind of family, with all the other people who had been trained by that person… 
right up to the judge.… To me it’s redolent of English private schools and 
elitism. 
He went on to suggest that the elite status of advocates is now under threat. 
These traditions will slowly wither…. Counsel9, with an effort to survive, will 
become more and more like solicitors who see the clients every day and answer 
their questions and try to simplify their explanations. 
However, a Member of the Scottish Parliament, Keene, interpreted the possible 
impacts of the reforms on the profession in a different way:  
Advocates are the stars, they are the elite. Advocates will always be the elite 
because they are the cream, they are the very best. I think what we will see is – 
after the reforms and over time – advocates will find niche work and they will 
always be there.… The Bar will [continue to] exist as an elite. 
Solicitors. While advocates based their identity and status on tradition, legal expertise, 
and elitism, solicitors, by contrast, defined themselves by continually emphasising the 
importance of their clients. Garret, a solicitor, reflected that the defining characteristic 
of solicitor is, “Doing your best for the client. We have a duty to the court, we have a 
duty to the client.” 
 
9 The terms advocate, barrister, counsel and Member of Faculty were used interchangeably in the 
interviews. 
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Solicitors also emphasised that they are the ones who have responsibility for meeting, 
communicating, and managing the relationship with their clients. Aaron, contrasting 
solicitors with advocates, used an analogy with the health profession: 
In a jurisdiction, when you have a split legal profession, as in the UK including 
Scotland…a solicitor is a bit like a GP and an advocate is a bit like a specialist, 
medical consultant. Advocate, or barrister, is somebody that your GP sends you 
to. 
He added how solicitors are better at explaining things than advocates: 
When I have meetings with counsel, I am surprised still in 2015, sometimes to 
see that they are often hopeless for explaining things. They use jargon, Latin 
words, a number of counsel I have seen them say to a client ‘Now Mrs. Smith 
your solatium is worth £10,000.’ And she is immediately blank. She has no 
idea what solatium is. But she doesn’t say. I immediately intervene and explain 
things. Why does not she or he be sensitive to the fact that the client won’t 
know what it means? It is jargon as far as the client’s concern. Why does he or 
she not know that? I still like the contact with the client even though it can be 
very infuriating sometimes…. I like engaging with the client at a basic level.   
Thus, language is an important point of distinction, both functionally and 
symbolically. Advocates see technical, even arcane, language as a mark of their 
expertise while solicitors use more accessible language to retain a close proximity to 
their clients. 
Solicitor Advocates. As with advocates and solicitors, solicitor advocates also define 
themselves by comparison to other branches of the legal profession. Here, however, 
perceived differences were not as starkly drawn. For example, one solicitor advocate 
told us: 
I really don't see much difference between the various branches of the 
profession, duties to the court, duties to the client, it's pretty much all the same 
really. It's just that the jobs are a bit different, the functions are a bit different. 
I mean the Faculty of Advocates might argue that they've got different codes 
of practice that they have to have regard to different ethics. I don't there is much 
of a difference. 
Clearly, though, there are some significant differences, notably in how work is 
obtained, and where it is carried out, as Scott, a solicitor advocate, explained to us: 
Well, a solicitor advocate will be somebody usually, in fact almost always, who 
is working in a particular legal firm. And more often than not, the work they 
are being instructed in will come from within that firm. Whereas an advocate 
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is a lone gun who is out there for hire.… They don't have the benefit of being 
a member of a larger firm. 
Solicitor advocates, similar to solicitors, thus defined themselves, and derived their 
status, from their membership of a particular firm, and the firm’s values, as Taylor 
explained: 
I'm thinking XYZ [firm name], we're seen as being a firm which tends to wear 
its heart on its sleeve a bit. We do act for all the major trade unions, bar a very 
tiny number. We believe that our clients should get their maximum damages in 
minimum time. 
As we can see from the discussion above, the legal profession is not homogenous, but 
composed of distinct sub-communities. Though acknowledging their common 
membership of the legal profession, they differentiate themselves on the basis of 
tradition, legal expertise, and membership of an exclusive community (advocates), 
proximity to clients (solicitors), and membership of particular legal firms (solicitor 
advocates). This differentiation is exacerbated and enshrined in a status hierarchy that 
had significant implications for how the groups responded to the proposed reforms. 
3.3.2 Bases for Opposition 
Given the differences in status and privilege of the professional communities, it is not 
surprising that each group held different views on the reforms being introduced. 
However, they were united in opposing the charges, albeit for different reasons.  
Advocates constitute the legal community under most obvious threat from the reforms. 
Indeed, Lord Gill (2014: 7) made it very clear that he expected the reforms to open to 
solicitors “a large tranche of work” that had previously been only available to 
advocates. This was clearly perceived as a direct threat to the status of advocates, most 
notably in terms of the business that they would in future be able to secure but also 
because it would allow more complex cases, previously the sole preserve of advocates 
in the Court of Session, to be contested by solicitors in lower sheriff courts. In line 
with Gill’s reasoning, advocates consistently referred to their profession as under 
threat. Charles, an experienced advocate, stated: 
There will be a disproportionate effect that will fall on the senior branch of the 
legal profession, which is mine. The use of counsel, use of advocates, barristers 
in cases will increasingly be seen as unnecessary, [an] additional expense.… 
That will… undermin[e] the quality of representation available to people. 
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Another advocate, George, addressed the possible impact of the reforms on the income 
of advocates and on the population of the profession: 
A lot of my work is in higher value cases, fatal cases, medical negligence cases, 
so [the threshold change] wouldn't have the biggest impact on me. But some 
other people, it would have a huge impact.... In terms of income, it could reduce 
it by more than half.… Individual advocates are likely to have to leave the Bar. 
Scotland already has a small Bar relative to its population. That small Bar would 
become even smaller. This would diminish the choice and quality of 
representation available to litigants throughout Scotland. 
Advocates were not the only ones pointing to the possible negative impacts of reforms 
on advocates. A solicitor, Garret, emphasised the need for advocates to change in order 
to survive: 
I think advocates have to change the way they work. They will have to adapt and 
I don’t think there will be enough work for the current number of advocates to 
be sustained.… I think, overall there may be an effect on skill sets, because 
relatively less advocates will be appearing in court and that has an impact on 
their developing their skills. 
Another solicitor, Aaron, provided insight into why solicitors were unhappy with the 
reforms explaining that the change will increase the competition between solicitors 
and advocates, undermining a status quo in which advocates and solicitors each 
understand their roles in the legal system: 
I supposed that inevitably the competition is going to mean that two branches of 
the profession will be similar. Whether they become equally good or whether 
they become equally bad could be argued. Advocates will have to struggle and 
fight more to find work…. Two branches of the profession are going to become 
more alike, and they are going to become much more in competition rather than 
solicitors feeding work to the counsel. 
In their submission to the government during the consultation process, the Faculty of 
Advocates expressed an additional concern that the reforms would threaten the 
continued reproduction of skilled professionals: 
There is an additional, potentially significant, long-term systemic effect for the 
future health of the Scottish legal profession. There are, today, far fewer 
opportunities for advocates to appear in court early in their careers than was 
formerly the case. One of the purposes of the Bill is to remove from the Court of 
Session “low value” cases of all classes. By the nature of things, it may be in 
relatively straightforward cases at the lower value end of the spectrum that 
advocates can obtain the experience early in their careers which equips them, as 
their careers develop, to undertake higher value complex litigation. Over the long 
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run, then, these proposals would prejudice the continuing ability of the system 
to produce the experienced and highly skilled advocates who are needed for 
those higher value and complex cases. 
Unsurprisingly, all of the advocates that we interviewed vehemently opposed the 
reforms. Several also questioned the central tenet of the need for change, as 
exemplified here by Phillip: 
In the context of what Lord Gill set out to do, his idea was improving access to 
justice. Most of us in the Faculty feel that that's laughable because it will mean 
that people will not have access to counsel, and the expertise that the Faculty 
provides, and will have to rely on solicitors who have much less experience, 
much less knowledge. 
Similarly, a solicitor advocate, Taylor, bluntly suggested that, “The idea of increasing 
access to justice [through these reforms] to me seems like breath-taking hypocrisy.” 
Several of our interviewees held that the traditional civil justice system had worked 
well and that radical change was unnecessary. For example, Phillip, when asked about 
the key drivers of the reforms, stated, “I really don't know because the system actually 
works.... the system actually works really, really well.” Samuel, a solicitor, similarly 
opined, noting, “I wouldn't say it's perfect, it's not. But it works extremely well.” 
In dismissing Lord Gill’s claims of improving the civil justice system, solicitors and 
advocates also felt that the reforms were actually an attack on the status of some of 
their work. For example, Scott, a solicitor advocate dealing with personal injury cases 
felt that personal injury cases were not considered sufficiently important to be heard 
in the higher court: 
I see a degree of elitism behind these reforms, which is pushing my clients out 
of the Court of Session into a potentially worse forum for them, in which they 
may recover less of the cost to obtain redress, and the result is that they end up 
having to pay more. I think where personal injury is concerned there was a view 
on the part of some judges that they didn't want to see personal injury work in 
the Court of Session anymore. They felt it was beneath the court. 
George, an advocate also specialising in personal injury cases, provided a similar 
opinion: 
I think the Lord President [Gill] doesn't think personal injury work is something 
that is particularly difficult and should be heard in the highest court in 
Scotland…. but personal injury work can be very difficult and complex. 
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3.3.3 Maintenance Failure 
The profession was united in opposition to the reforms. Its members shared a lack of 
conviction that the reforms would increase access to justice; even solicitors, who 
apparently had most to gain from the reforms, felt that the changes were unnecessary, 
and in fact would diminish the standing of their work. However, there was a distinct 
absence of any concerted effort to coordinate a response across the legal profession. 
As one advocate explained: “There may have been some informal conversations, but 
there were too many different vested interests for advocates and solicitors to join 
together.” 
Aaron, a solicitor, compared the ability of his branch of the profession to take 
collective action with advocates’ inability to do so. 
Solicitors have been much, much better at campaigning, campaigning for public 
inquiries. Advocates cannot do that because they are in a collegiate structure 
where the Dean of Faculty speaks on behalf of all of them…. As a solicitor, good 
or bad, somebody like me when there is a Gill inquiry, or any other inquiry, we 
feel fairly free to write a letter as an individual. A solicitor says, ‘this is what I 
think’. No matter how good or bad, the views may be expressed. But advocates 
very rarely, even now, break the ranks, and send off their own individual views. 
If you look at the Gill responses, you can see a few that responded, not two 
hundred who could have. Even now when their professional future and 
livelihood has been threatened, they still did not break the ranks for one or two 
hundred of them to write individual letters to the Gill committee.  
Phillip, an advocate explained this position: 
So Faculty would be resisting it, but the Faculty is also mindful of its place in 
public life in Scotland, and those who are in control of the Faculty are very polite 
in what they say, and so they wouldn't be at the forefront of the resistance. 
Though they would be questioning about the object of reforms and how these 
were to be achieved. 
Our findings also show that the slow implementation process created an uncertainty 
that resulted in professionals being unable to foresee the likely outcomes of the 
reforms. Several participants addressed this issue explicitly. For example, a solicitor 
advocate, Scott, told us, “We are left at the moment in a state of ignorance. We don’t 
know what to expect. We don’t know what the fees will be in the court. We are in the 
dark.” Garret, a solicitor also touched upon the uncertainty and its consequences, “I 
suppose you have to adapt as best you can. You have to try to anticipate what is likely 
to happen. There is a lot of concern about what is going to happen.” 
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Paul, an advocate, explained how hard it is to perform in uncertainty and deal with the 
changes: “We are in a position of deep uncertainty. So what's to be done with that? I 
don't know.” The result was a form of paralysis in which coordinated opposition to the 
reforms proved impossible. 
In sum, therefore, advocates and solicitors, while they opposed change, lacked any 
coordinated action. There was no mechanism in place for a coherent, universal 
response; rather, voices from the legal profession were fragmented and thus could not 
carry the weight that was required to prevent the reforms being implemented. 
3.4 Discussion 
We contribute to the literature on institutional theory by offering insights into intra-
professional segmentation and its consequences for institutional processes. In so doing 
we expose the role of status in intra-professional dynamics, uncover those factors that 
hinder institutional maintenance work, and highlight the importance of professions as 
institutional agents. 
3.4.1 Intra-professional Status and Institutional Change  
Our research indicates that the reforms disturbed not only the deeply entrenched 
institutional logics within the field, but also professional and organizational privileges, 
identities and the responsibilities of professional groups. The overt intent of the 
changes was to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and make the civil justice system 
more accessible to members of the public. It was also expected that the reforms would 
democratize the legal profession by providing opportunities for solicitors to develop 
expert knowledge and increase their domain of professional jurisdiction. However, in 
so doing, advocates have been threatened with the loss of their well-established 
privileges. Thus, for them, the reforms were profoundly undesirable. As members of 
a distinctive profession, this constituted a singular challenge to their professional 
identity. Given the threat to their status and privilege the dissatisfaction of advocates 
if not surprising. What was unanticipated was the inability of advocates to effectively 
carry out the type of maintenance work that has been characteristic of legal and other 
professionals in similar circumstances (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013). 
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We were also surprised that solicitors were opposed to the reforms. For them, the 
changes are perceived as inconvenient, unnecessary and based on insufficient research. 
They interpreted the intentions behind the reforms as an attack on the field of personal 
injury because their cases would be heard in lower courts by less skilled judges. In 
other words, advocates and solicitors see the reforms as threatening their perceived 
expertise and thus constituting a challenge to their professional identity (Lamont & 
Nordberg, 2014). Following Petriglieri (2011: 644), the reforms were “appraised as 
indicating potential harm to the values, meanings, or enactment of an identity”. This 
was manifest in concerns about professional jurisdiction, values, future of their 
profession, income, and ability to reproduce traditions.  
We found that these pronounced threats to the identity and status of different branches 
of the legal profession, and high levels of uncertainty, significantly sharpened intra-
professional differences. Members of different groups defined their opposition by 
positively distinguishing themselves from other segments of the legal profession. 
Advocates, in particular, responded to the proposed change by differentiating 
themselves from solicitors and emphasising their distinctiveness, in function and 
status, at every opportunity. The Faculty of Advocates followed the same path in 
written submissions. Further, solicitors highlighted the difference between them and 
advocates, while resenting the intra-professional status differences and deeply rooted 
elitism among advocates. 
The unsettlement in the field was intended to disturb the status hierarchy within the 
legal profession by expanding opportunities for solicitors at the expense of advocates. 
Several of our interviewees commented that, indeed, the reforms will close the intra-
professional status gap between advocates and solicitors. Therefore, the reforms, as a 
conduit for institutional change, are expected to increase competition between 
advocates and solicitors. This potentially strengthens the identity threats to advocates. 
Tajfel (1978) argues that groups are more prone to compare themselves with others 
when their identity is threatened. Ashforth and Mael (1989) similarly argued that 
established and affirmed high status groups are less likely to feel threatened and, 
therefore, less in need of positive distinctiveness. Our findings provide an example of 
low status (solicitors) and high status (advocates) groups seeking to retain the 
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distinctiveness of their positions. Interestingly, then, status threats are not restricted to 
just those at the elite end of the profession, leading to our first proposition: 
P1: Lower status groups will not automatically seek change even when it appears 
to be in their professional interests to do so. 
Theoretical and empirical exploration of the links between professions, identity and 
institutional change remain scarce. We address this lack of attention by demonstrating 
that identities within a profession are not homogenous as often assumed. Rather, there 
are significant differences that provide an important lens through which actors 
interpret institutional change and decide whether to accept or resist it.  
Further, our findings demonstrate how intra-professional identities can emerge in 
response to status threats, something acknowledged as particularly lacking in the 
literature (Currie et al., 2012; Ramirez et al., 2015). In particular, we show that groups 
respond to such threats by critically defining themselves against competing groups. 
Thus, we propose: 
P2: Externally enforced institutional change, and accompanying threats to status, 
can result in sub-groups of a profession emphasising intra-professional identity 
differences. 
3.4.2 Uncertainty, Intra-Professional Differences and Institutional 
Maintenance Work 
Institutional maintenance work requires substantial effort, especially during externally 
imposed institutional change. Yet despite the fact that, “the real mystery of institutions 
is how social structures can be made to be self-replicating and persist beyond the life-
span of their creators” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 234), research on institutional 
work has predominantly focused on the creation, disruption or transformation of 
institutions with institutional maintenance work much less developed. Recent studies 
on maintenance work (e.g. Adamson et al., 2015; Currie et al., 2012; Dacin et al., 2010; 
Lawrence et al., 2009; Lok & De Rond, 2013; Micelotta & Washington, 2013)  reveal 
that maintenance is not a process of straightforward replication as is often assumed in 
conventional representations of self-reproducing institutions. Particularly during times 
of externally imposed institutional change, maintenance work requires active and 
strategically coordinated resistance to change. Interestingly, however, in our case 
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resistance was weak, despite the different segments of the profession being less than 
convinced of the necessity of the change. Particularly surprising was the inability of 
advocates to mount a more effective maintenance strategy. The reasons for this 
constitute an important contribution of the paper. 
Considering the essentially conservative and powerful nature of professions 
(Greenwood et al., 2002) and their continuous efforts to maintain the status quo to 
keep their jurisdictional power along with the associated social and financial privileges 
(Abbott, 1988; Larson, 1977), our findings present us with a paradox whereby very 
powerful and structured professional groups with opportunity and resources failed to 
mobilise effective resistance. Although the reforms were strongly opposed by 
advocates and solicitors, resistance was surprisingly mild. We found two underlying 
reasons for this failed institutional maintenance: intra-professional status differences 
and deep uncertainty created by slow implementation of the reforms and weak intra-
professional communication. 
Research that recognises the importance of collective and collaborative action in 
institutional work efforts (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007; Mair & Marti, 2009; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007; Wijen & Ansari, 2007) has 
generally focused on institutional entrepreneurship. The process and importance of 
“achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors to create new 
institutions or transform existing ones” (Wijen & Ansari, 2007: 1079) is well-
recognized in such processes of institutional change. Our study shows that institutional 
maintenance work also requires collective and collaborative intentional efforts, but 
that it may be difficult to accomplish even when there is a single dominant profession 
involved, because of intra-professional stratification. This leads to our third 
proposition: 
P3: Institutional maintenance work requires strong, coordinated action across 
intra-professional groups if it is to be effective. 
The different intra-professional groups could have united in resistance to the change 
and potentially maintained the status quo, as Micelotta and Washington (2013) found 
with professional groups in Italy. But the significant intra-professional status 
differences prevented effective maintenance work. Thus, we contend that there must 
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be some form of collective identity, even if only on a temporary basis, for maintenance 
to occur. Without this, organizing around a shared purpose (Cornelissen, Haslam, & 
Balmer, 2007), or constructing a plan of action (Gecas, 2000), will likely prove 
extremely difficult. However, in our case, status differences prevented even a 
temporary alliance, leading to our fourth proposition: 
P4: Status differences that foment intra-professional rivalries are likely to 
prevent coordinated maintenance work, even when it is perceived as being in the 
best interests of all involved. 
Further, we found that uncertainty hinders institutional maintenance work by creating 
a form of paralysis. Members of the Scottish legal profession could not perform 
maintenance work because of the lack of specific information regarding the 
implications of the reforms. This created an ambiguity of outcome that, when allied to 
the mistrust among different groups, prevented collective action. In the institutional 
work literature, uncertainty has been presented as enabling the creation of institutions 
because “the possibilities for strategic action are the greatest” in fields without any 
structure (Fligstein, 1997: 401), that is, when the degree of uncertainty is very high. 
Further, Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2000) suggest that unstructured or under-
organized contexts likely spawn institutional entrepreneurship. Our work offers an 
extension of this line of theorizing. That is, while uncertainty is important for creating 
the ambiguity necessary for change to occur, it hinders the ability of actors to maintain 
or repair institutions because of their inability to foresee potential change outcomes. 
Therefore, we propose that: 
P5: Uncertainty provides opportunities for institutional change, but hinders 
attempts at institutional maintenance. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Institutional logics in the Scottish Civil Justice System have been largely settled for 
over 150 years, with well-established institutions, interests, values, identities and 
expectations. The upcoming reforms are disturbing not only the deeply entrenched 
institutional logics within the field, but also professional identities and status 
hierarchies. In examining how these processes unfurl, we have offered three significant 
contributions. First, we demonstrate how identities and status within a profession are 
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not homogenous, as often assumed in the literature. There are significant differences 
that determine how interactions take place. Second, we show how identity differences 
are sharpened rather than dulled when an externally imposed change threatens 
different levels of status. Third, we unveil how intra-professional identity differences 
and high levels of uncertainty are two of the factors that hinder institutional 
maintenance work. These contributions, and the corresponding propositions above 










Institutional fields are vulnerable to change. Their portrayal of being impervious to 
change has been abandoned and “they are now treated as contested terrains contoured 
by variation, struggles, and relatively temporary truces or settlements” (Greenwood et 
al., 2008:19). That is, institutional scholars now consider institutional change as the 
norm rather than the exception because even in very established and mature fields, 
change is inevitable, and stability is only temporary (Greenwood et al., 2002; Hardy 
& Maguire, 2010; Hoffman, 1999; Munir, 2005; Rao & Kenny, 2008; Reay & Hinings, 
2005; Sauder, 2008; Sminia, 2011; Zietsma et al., 2017). Indeed, “much of the 
institutional change literature starts with a description of a stable field that later 
changed because of the rise of new actors, new interests or exogenous shocks that 
changed power positions or unsettled logic prioritizations” (Zietsma et al., 2017: 32).  
One particularly effective type of exogenous shock that institutional theory literature 
presents is the “legislative deus ex machina smacking into stable institutional 
arrangements and creating indeterminacy” (Clemens & Cook, 1999: 447). This type 
of shock can be so strong that it can break down a field “including what the purpose 
of the field is, what positions the actors occupy, what the rules of the game are, and 
how actors come to understand what others are doing” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011:5). 
Similarly, Zietsma et al (2017) state that new legislation, such as government-led 
reforms, are a very common source of disruption and contestation within the 
established fields. 
It is also apparent that what happens in one field affects other institutions and fields 
that are linked to it (Bourdieu, 1975, 1999; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 2012; Hinings 
et al., 2017; Scott, 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011) since every institution is embedded 
in a web of “countless proximate or distal fields, as well as states” (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2011:3). That is, conflict and disruption in any field can also be triggered 
as a result of an issue arising from an adjacent institutional field, hence “stability of a 
field is largely a function of its relations to other fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 
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19). The authors further elaborate that “a significant change in any given field is like 
a stone thrown in a still pond, sending ripples outward to all proximate fields” 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 19) and the changes happening in related fields are “the 
most common source of crisis in other fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 100). 
These severe changes in proximate fields are also a type of exogenous shock to the 
field in question (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).  
In a similar vein, this study is shaped around two societal level macro institutional 
fields: the justice system and the legal profession. The justice system consists of the 
legal profession, other occupations such as police and several types of public servants, 
the government, the court system, public and private organizations, NGOs, laws and 
regulations, public, all the transactions among these actors and so on. The legal 
professional field, however, largely refers to the professional boundaries and 
interactions of the members and organizations of the profession of law whose members 
are lawyers and judges. In other words, the legal profession, which is an institution in 
its own right, inhabits another institution that is the justice system. In my research 
setting, both fields experienced a severe legislative shock - the Scottish Civil Justice 
Reforms. This massive shock changed the justice system tremendously, however, the 
legal profession in Scotland that sits within the justice system did not experience any 
disruption. Also, some aspects of this legislation were directly related to the practices 
of the legal profession in Scotland. That is, both the severe change in the justice system 
as well as the legislation itself were exogenous shocks that, on the face of it, should 
have massively disrupted the legal profession. Yet, the professional field did not get 
disturbed. 
In line with conventional understanding, we would expect with this change taking 
place in the judicial system, there had to be change within the professional field, too. 
That is because this case had all the ingredients for the disruption and jurisdictional 
dispute to take place between major actors in the legal profession. The judicial system 
experienced a serious legislative shock that changed the system profoundly. This 
legislation aimed to change the allocation of resources within the profession. Also, 
some groups within the legal profession that inhabits the judicial system were offered 
significant opportunities and some were seriously threatened by this external shock. 
They also had the resources to disrupt the status quo or resist the change altogether. 
 73 
The heterogeneity within the profession was high and jurisdictional boundaries and 
status hierarchies were seriously threatened by this external shock. Moreover, along 
with the legislative shock, there was also a skilful and powerful institutional 
entrepreneur working within the professional field in order to theorize change.  
I therefore expected to find significant disruption with intense conflict, competition 
and struggle within the profession (Bourdieu, 1975; Greenwood et al., 2002; Wooten 
& Hoffman, 2008; Zietsma et al., 2017) since even during settled times, there is a 
constant jockeying in a field as actors strive to protect, and enhance, their interests 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Particularly, professions constantly compete over 
practices, economic and social status and jurisdiction internally and externally 
(Abbott, 1988; Anteby et al., 2016; Martin, Currie, & Finn, 2009). However, 
surprisingly, there was a distinct lack of disruption and dispute within the legal 
profession. As such, my anticipated story of institutional disruption and change 
became one of institutional persistence.  As a result, although fundamental change had 
occurred to major institutional structures and processes within the judicial system, the 
profession did not experience any disruption, with its day-to-day practices, intra-
professional relations and routines remaining almost completely intact.  
Here, I differentiate institutional persistence and maintenance from each other because 
institutional maintenance usually refers to intentionally undertaken institutional work 
for maintaining status quo. However, in this paper, my focus is on the field 
mechanisms of persistence existing in professional fields that buttress institutional 
continuity of a field. Therefore, in this paper, I examine the lack of institutional 
disruption, and in particular asked why such pronounced change within the judicial 
system did not cause disruption within the professional field that occupied it. Doing 
so, I contribute to the institutional theory literature by answering calls for research on 
the persistence of institutions (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017; 
Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009;  Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Sminia, 2011; Weik, 
2015, 2018) and also to the professions literature by answering calls for research on 
the persistence and internal cohesiveness of professions as one of the major institutions 
of society (Ramirez et al., 2015). By exploring an extreme case of institutional 
persistence in the Scottish legal profession, this study provides insight into those 
conditions in which institutional continuity takes place, even when existing theory 
 74 
suggests that there would be disruption and a probable change in the field (e.g. Abbot, 
1988; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Suddaby & Viale, 2011).  
4.2 Theoretical Background 
4.2.1 Institutions and Institutional Fields 
Institutions are “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviours that are 
underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to 
social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008: 5). Institutions exist at individual, organisational, field and 
societal levels. Societal institutions are the higher-level institutions that provide wider 
institutional environments where more specific lower level structures exist and 
function. Some of the higher level institutions are religion, science, the market 
economy, legal fields, professions and the state (Greenwood et al., 2008). Each of 
these has their own institutional infrastructures, web of actors and organisations with 
their own spheres of jurisdiction or action (Greenwood, Hinings, & Whetten, 2014; 
Scott, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Both higher level and lower level 
structures and the actors that are embedded within them change, reproduce, constrain 
and empower the structure and actions of each other (Scott, 2013). 
Within this web of institutions, ‘fields’ have been portrayed as the ‘central construct’ 
of institutional theory (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Zietsma et al., 2017). The 
importance of fields comes from the fact that they “fulfil a vital role in connecting 
organization studies to wider, macro structures—sectoral, societal, and transnational” 
(Scott, 2013: 204). According to Zietsma et al. (2017:5) the core idea of institutional 
theory is that fields are “the predominant source of pressures for institutional 
conformity and site of institutional embeddedness”. They are the “local social orders” 
(Fligstein, 2001:107) where meanings are co-created and shared (Glynn & Abzug, 
2002). That is, with their infrastructure serving as “the mechanism of social 
coordination”, fields are “the locations of many of the institutions that guide everyday 
behaviour” (Zietsma et al., 2017:5). In other words, fields are the places that 
institutions come to life and are enacted. 
Fields have been operationalised by scholars in several different ways (Zietsma et al., 
2017). For instance, while some are more established with highly institutionalised 
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structures (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; Purdy & Gray, 
2009; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000; Vaccaro & Palazzo, 2015), others can be emerging, 
contested and evolve around issues (Farjoun, 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Maguire, Hardy, 
& Lawrence, 2004; Patvardhan, Gioia, & Hamilton, 2015; Zietsma et al., 2017). In 
mature and highly institutionalised fields, as in my setting, the institutional 
infrastructure is very well developed and durable (Hinings, Logue, & Zietsma, 2017). 
These fields have been defined as mature, stable and settled fields (Greenwood et al., 
2002; Zietsma et al., 2017) in which practices, identities, meanings, what is appropriate 
and what is not, and formal and informal mechanisms are clearly defined (Zietsma et 
al., 2017). 
Aligned with that, institutions and institutional fields have been portrayed, particularly 
in the early and traditional studies of institutional theory as impervious to change. 
These studies highlighted how institutional pressures create uniformity, conformity 
and stability that are also buttressed by shared logics and common understandings 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Levy & Scully, 2007; 
Scott, 2013). However, it is clear that “that view is not supported by work of the past 
decade which suggests, at least in part, that there is less field stability than initially 
theorized” (Hinings et al., 2017: 181). That is because within the structured 
relationships around common meanings, in fields, not all actors are equal: there are 
status hierarchies, differences in power and influence, differences in access to 
resources and legitimacy, and differences in field positions (Compagni, Mele, & 
Ravasi, 2014; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Zietsma et al., 2017). Therefore, even in 
settled times, institutional fields are in flux with an ongoing contestation and 
contention causing constant threat to existing order, with competition over meanings, 
resources, boundaries, stakes, decision making authority, status and access (Bourdieu, 
1975, 1999; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998). As a 
consequence, change is inevitable and now scholars recognise change in institutions 
and institutional fields as the normal condition rather than the exception (Greenwood 
et al., 2017; Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017; Scott, 2013; Zietsma et al., 
2017; Zucker, 1977).  
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4.2.2 Institutional Change  
With the considerable effort given to exploring how and why change happens, 
institutional change has become a main research area in organisation theory over the 
last two decades. How and why institutions are “created, transformed and 
extinguished” (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002: 45), as well as “who initiates and 
promulgates change” (Micelotta et al., 2017: 1886)  and the consequences of the 
change (Greenwood et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012) have become significant 
concerns of researchers. According to the literature, institutional change can be 
triggered in three ways: by exogenous shocks or events, endogenous and agentic 
efforts (also known as institutional entrepreneurship), or improvisations in the day-to-
day practices of actors (Micelotta et al., 2017). I will focus on institutional change that 
is triggered by exogenous shocks since this study is an example of a severe exogenous 
shock. 
Exogenous Shocks or Jolts. Studies, particularly early ones, focusing on change 
caused by exogenous disturbances or ‘jolts’ (Meyer, 1982; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 
1990), explored how external forces fundamentally change the institutional fields. 
Some examples included wars or revolutions (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996), 
disruptive technological changes (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Romanelli & 
Tushman, 1994), changes in political regimes (Clark & Soulsby, 1995; Whitley & 
Czabán, 1998), regulatory changes (Amis et al., 2004; Bacharach, Bamberger, & 
Sonnenstuhl, 1996; Lounsbury, 2002), changes in connected fields (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012) and competitive pressures (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
Macroenvironmental changes start a process of deinstitutionalisation and change the 
criteria for being ‘legitimate’ (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994), where survival of 
organisations, as well as the emergence of new ones, depend on their ability to adapt 
to the changes (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Lee & Pennings, 2002; Ruef & Scott, 
1998). Studies showed that organizations could be capable of adaptation and 
successfully respond to disruptive changes by transforming their structures and 
strategies, albeit depending on some criteria such as organisational characteristics 
(Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006; Lamberg & Pajunen, 
2010).  
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While internal dynamics and processes of an institutional field significantly influence 
the change or stability of it, a severe change in a connected field can also cause severe 
disruption in other fields. That is because fields are embedded in a “dense latticework 
of other fields” that include the state and other higher-level institutional orders such as 
professions or justice system (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 100). This connectedness 
and embeddedness may serve as a stability mechanism until a serious change happen 
in one of the connected fields. According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 100), a 
severe change happening in a connected field is the most common source of the crisis 
and disruption in other fields because they “disrupt the routine operation of the field 
in question”.  
These exogenous factors, by creating issues and tensions, as well as forcing field 
members to act in a certain way, can destabilise fields. However, as a matter of fact, 
not all the changes in connected fields nor every exogenous shock hit fields hard 
enough to create change, particularly in established fields, such as many professional 
fields. Although, the mechanisms that hold a field together in the face of a strong 
exogenous shock is largely unexplored (Zietsma et al., 2017) institutional theory 
literature suggests several factors that make fields vulnerable in the face of exogenous 
disturbances. First of all, there needs to be strong trigger for change such as a 
regulatory shock (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Greenwood et 
al., 2002; Zietsma et al., 2017). In this respect, directly imposed government mandates 
are considered as particularly effective (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Zietsma et al. 
2017). Then, the shock needs to create opportunities or threats for certain sub-groups 
or populations within the fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012); without these 
opportunities or threats, established fields do not turn into contested issue fields 
experiencing change (Abbot, 1981,1988; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Zietsma et al. 
2017). Then, these sub-groups or populations need to have enough resources to 
mobilize change if they wish to. That is because existence of opportunities or threats 
is not enough for experiencing disruption if parties do not have resources to benefit or 
avoid those (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Zietsma et al., 2017). Moreover, presence of 
an institutional entrepreneur with skills, power and resources can be very important 
for the change to take place (Maguire et al., 2004; Micelotta et al., 2017; Zietsma et 
al., 2017). In addition, if jurisdictional boundaries and status hierarchies get disturbed 
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by the external shock, it makes a field more vulnerable to change (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012; Ramirez et al., 2015; Zietsma et al., 2017). Also, the more 
heterogeneous a field is, the more fragile it becomes (Clemens & Cook, 1999). 
Furthermore, if the change has already been realised it is harder to reverse the process 
(Micelotta & Washington, 2013) and the vulnerability to change increases. Finally, if 
a “field is dependent on another for either the production of inputs or the consumption 
of output, then crisis in the proximate field will produce crisis in the field in question” 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012: 100).  
4.2.3 Institutional Persistence  
Unlike institutional change, institutional persistence has gained limited attention and 
is “an understudied phenomenon” (Scott, 2013: 178). Perhaps, it is because persistence 
of institutions, and taken for grantedness within institutions, has also been taken for 
granted by scholars. Scott (2013: 152) states “in my reading of the institutional 
literature, most institutional scholars accord little attention to the issue of institutional 
persistence”. Similarly, many scholars (Greenwood et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2009;  
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Scott, 2013; Weik, 2015, 2018) have called for research 
on the continuity and persistence of institutions. For instance, Greenwood et al. (2017: 
16) argued that institutional continuity still constitutes one of the most important 
research areas. That is because understanding institutional persistence can shed new 
light on “taken-for-granted understandings that defy change by their social invisibility 
in a time when some of our most central institutional structures - political bodies, 
public agencies, financial institutions, corporations - are viewed by growing numbers 
as either corrupt, ineffective or both”. So, there must be mechanisms that provide 
persistence and continuity to institutions and institutional fields and enable actors to 
engage with the same practices and structures.  
Along with ‘institutional persistence’, researchers used the terms ‘institutional 
continuity’, ‘institutional durability’ and ‘institutional stability’ to describe similar 
phenomenon or used these terms interchangeably. In this regard, one of the main 
explanations of institutional continuity is that actors actively created institutions at a 
time in the past, but then how these institutions have been created is forgotten (Weik, 
2018). New actors consider institutions as external entities and take them for granted. 
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They stop perceiving alternative ways of acting or thinking (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Weik, 2015, 2018; Zucker, 1987). Complementary to this work, Scott (2013) 
takes an intermediate perspective that suggests there are institutional elements that are 
exogenous to individuals such as rules, norms, and beliefs; but they are also 
endogenous, therefore, self-reinforcing.   
Furthermore, some researchers also highlighted that institutions help make sense of 
the world and construct identities (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Glynn, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Weber & Glynn, 2006). Institutions provide 
input for bodies of knowledge (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), meaning for social categories 
(Lounsbury & Rao, 2004) and guidelines to act and interpret reality (Thornton et al., 
2012). Therefore, institutional reproduction is vital so that “people do not go insane as 
it is institutions that form the backdrop against which sense and identity are 
constituted” (Weik, 2018:4) 
It is also acknowledged that, by using routines and habits, actors save energy and 
simplify the complexities of the world (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Douglas, 1987; 
Weik, 2015, 2018). This contributes to the persistence of institutions because it enables 
actors to avoid engaging in forms of action that require great amounts of effort, and 
also reduces the cognitive efforts required to cope with cognitive complexities (Weik, 
2015, 2018). That is, institutions make things familiar for actors who seek to create “a 
stable world in which objects have recognizable shapes, are located in depth, and have 
permanence” (Douglas, 1966:45). 
Another account to understand institutional continuity is derived from the concept of 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Institutional work directed towards 
maintaining institutions involves “supporting, repairing or recreating the social 
mechanisms that ensure compliance” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 230). By 
surveying the empirical literature (e.g., Angus, 1993; Guler, Guillén, & Macpherson, 
2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Holm, 1995; Leblebici et al., 1991; Russo, 2001; 
Townley, 1997; Zilber, 2002), Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) found six types of 
maintenance work: ‘enabling’, ‘policing’, ‘deterring’, ‘valourizing/demonizing’, 
‘mythologizing’ and ‘embedding and routinizing’. The first three maintain institutions 
“through ensuring adherence to rule systems” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 230). This 
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category comprises use of legitimate and regulative authority by establishing rules and 
standards; creating the processes enabling policing, control and enforcement; and 
realising deterrence strategies to prevent varying factors threating the institution 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Trank & Washington, 2009). The latter three “focus 
efforts to maintain institutions on reproducing existing norms and belief systems” 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 230). This category is more about normative and 
cognitive aspects of institutions, rather than the regulative aspects. It involves 
valorising and demonising actors who reflect positive or negative aspects of the 
normative foundations of the institution; using stories effectively to create myths on 
the history of the institution; and infusing meaning into routines and day-to-day 
practices so that it would be hard to stop performing them (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006; Trank & Washington, 2009). In addition, in their conceptualisation, Lawrence 
and Suddaby (2006) note that to achieve institutional maintenance, the contradictions 
inherit to institutions have to be concealed or repaired in some way or other since these 
contradictions are the endless source of conflict and change (Sminia, 2011). 
A range of studies have explored institutional maintenance work of actors in different 
settings. For instance, (Zilber, 2009) studied symbolic aspects of institutional 
maintenance and the use of stories. She showed how well-institutionalised narratives 
at the societal level re-enacted in subordinate levels, and vice-versa, as maintenance 
work. She also touched on the political aspect of institutional maintenance. Dacin et 
al. (2010) also showed how societal institutions, the British class system in their case, 
can be maintained through micro-level practices that are social rituals. Lok and De 
Rond (2013) and Heaphy (2013) worked on how breaches of micro-practices are 
repaired and restored to maintain existing arrangements and role expectations. 
In addition, some research has addressed the maintenance work aimed at professions 
or performed by professionals.  For instance, studies have showed how professional 
bodies and professionals perform maintenance work, usually in order to maintain the 
knowledge base of their profession, institutionalised privileges, professional status and 
jurisdiction, by theorizing change and reframing professional identities (Greenwood 
et al., 2002), legitimizing the actions of professional bodies (Trank & Washington, 
2009), developing new routines (Currie et al., 2012), controlling education and training 
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(Dunn & Jones, 2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2011), performing as gatekeepers to maintain 
their trade and the moral foundations of their practice (Anteby, 2010), and, the use of 
rhetorical and narrative strategies (Daudigeos, 2013; Kellogg, 2012). Further, 
Micelotta and Washington (2013) demonstrated how professionals can re-constitute 
institutional arrangements even after regulative disruption has taken place. Wright, 
Zammuto and Liesch (2017) showed how professionals maintain their values while 
interacting with each other and engaging in practices within their organisations. Their 
research also provided an empirical account for how emotions work as a triggering 
mechanism for individual and collective action for maintenance work. In a similar 
vein, Siebert, Wilson and Hamilton (2016) highlighted the emotional aspect of 
institutional maintenance in their research of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland. 
The emotion was ‘enchantment’ in their study that was about how organisational 
spaces and professionals’ interactions with these spaces provide stability for 
institutions.  
Some other studies also showed the relationship between emotions and institutional 
maintenance. For instance, Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen and Smith-Crowe (2014) 
connected the emotions of shame and pride to the reproduction of institutions and 
claimed that emotions are the key for maintaining institutions. Voronov and Vince 
(2012) similarly argued that without enough emotional investment actors would not 
engage in maintenance work. In addition, Delmestri and Goodrick (2016) found that 
control of emotions through denial can stabilize institutions because denial stops 
disruptive emotions from emerging and threatening the status quo. 
Continuity could also be the result of routines and day-to-day activities (Feldman, 
2000; Giddens, 1984; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Schatzki, 2005; Sminia, 2011; 
Whittington, 2006). However, this also brings the problem of ‘intentionality’ into the 
discussion of institutional maintenance.  Institutional maintenance work suggests a 
high degree of ‘intentionality’ behind the actions of actors since the original definition 
of the term included the phrase “purposive action” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215). 
However, institutional continuity, or change, does not always arise from deliberate 
action (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002; Micelotta et al., 2017; Smets et al., 
2017; Sminia, 2011). It can also occur as a result of day-to-day practices, routines and 
interactions (Giddens, 1984; Sminia, 2011).  In this research, I did not particularly look 
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for purposeful actions aimed at maintaining the institution. I only aimed to uncover 
the mechanisms of persistence to explain why institutional continuity takes place in 
some conditions where theory would suggest otherwise. 
In summary, institutional fields change, be it because of always-present tensions, 
inconsistencies, competition and contradictions (Dorado, 2005; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell Jr, 1992; Zilber, 2002) 
or exogenous forces or changes in micro-practices. According to Holm (1995), 
boundaries are not fixed in institutions, and perfect reproduction is not possible by 
institutional structures. Contestations and contradictions emerging in fields can tear 
apart institutional fields (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Hardy & 
Maguire, 2010; Hoffman, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002). Thus, “the appearance of 
stability is probably misleading” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 59) and disorganization 
within the institutions leading to break down is the norm (Zucker, 1988). That is, with 
the exposure to external forces, as well as “contradiction and conflict being seen as so 
inherent to any institution, it seems to be virtually inevitable for institutional change 
to emerge, and the question of how institutional continuity is realized becomes even 
more compelling” (Sminia, 2011: 1561). In this regard, why institutional persistence 
takes place and a field does not get disrupted and contested even in the face of strong 
exogeneous shocks is largely unknown (Zietsma et al., 2017). 
4.2.4 Professions and Professional Fields 
In this research, professions are considered as macro institutions of society, as well as 
institutional agents and carriers (Scott, 2013). The economic and social significance 
of professions and professional organizations stems largely from their ability to shape, 
facilitate and enable the processes of higher level, core societal institutions, such as 
justice systems. Therefore, the behaviours of professionals and professional 
organizations have significant repercussions on the broader surrounding institutions 
(Brock et al., 2014; Suddaby & Viale, 2011).  
Professions place great importance on being able to create and retain control over their 
expert and specialized knowledge, for it is this that allows professionals to secure and 
control their economic and social positions, as well as professional practices and 
boundaries (Zietsma et al., 2017). Because professions are strongly linked to different 
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levels of institutions and organizational fields, their professional projects resonate and 
influence the institutionalization projects of other adjacent entities, such as other 
professions, state, and transnational organizations (Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Suddaby 
& Muzio, 2015). In this regard, recently, scholars have called for more research on the 
role of the professions and professional service firms in institutional environments 
(Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Suddaby & Muzio, 2015; Zietsma et al., 2017), and the 
broader system of multi-level relationships in which professions are embedded 
(Anteby et al. 2016; Suddaby & Muzio, 2015; Zietsma et al., 2017). 
Although professional fields are generally very well established with a single logic or 
a few relatively minor permutations (Zietsma et al., 2017), the politically conflicted 
portrayal of institutions is particularly noticeable in the professions literature. Previous 
studies highlighted areas of jurisdiction as the main cause of contestation among 
professions (Abbott, 1988; Bucher, Chreim, Langley, & Reay, 2016). Some other 
studies also emphasised the boundary disputes in the professional fields, such as 
between legal and accounting firms (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and in the 
rearrangement of professional tasks in medical fields (Bucher et al., 2016; Dunn & 
Jones, 2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2005).  Furthermore, prior 
research has also demonstrated the existence of a high degree of intra-professional 
conflict and competition, and showed that all these jurisdictional battles also occur 
within a profession (Abbott, 1988; Currie et al., 2012; Galanter & Palay, 1991). 
Many studies indicate that professions perform boundary work to maintain, change or 
broaden their jurisdiction, and that these boundaries are in regular flux and based on 
constant negotiations (Bucher et al., 2016; Gieryn, 1983; Suddaby & Viale, 2011; 
Thomas & Hewitt, 2011). Maintaining or broadening jurisdiction is seen as very 
important for the survival of a profession through the provision of access to material 
and non-material resources such as power, status and money (Abbott, 1988; Bucher et 
al., 2016). Scholars suggest that higher status professions tend to maintain their 
jurisdictions while lower status groups try to change them (Abbot, 1988; Battilana, 
2011; Bucher et al., 2016; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, 2004; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005). 
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A profession generally is not a cohesive or homogeneous entity, but rather an 
institutionalized compromise consisting of several segments or strata (Currie et al., 
2012). Segments do not represent simple points of differentiation, but refer rather to 
organized identities, which are in constant flux as they adapt to their institutional, 
organizational and technical contexts. They engage in tactics to implement and defend 
their desired position relative to other segments, and to other professions. According 
to Freidson (1986), segments are based on the connection between the functional 
differentiation within a profession and the degree of specialization in professional 
knowledge. In Freidson's (1970) study, structural dominance, knowledge and power 
are the key factors in theorising the professions, as well as the institutional 
infrastructure. The justice system is a particularly good example based on Friedson’s 
analysis, since it is characterized by a more significant internal differentiation than 
most professions.  
Previous research shows that the higher the theoretical knowledge of a profession, the 
more specialised its professional members. In other words, internal stratification 
results from professional knowledge being increasingly abstract and specialized, 
leading to fragmentation, domination and the differential allocation of resources 
(Abbott, 1981; Freidson, 1984; Ramirez et al., 2015). Other than the division of labour, 
there are other bases for professional stratification, such as diversity of professional 
ideas (Becker, 1963), hierarchical differences that result from some segments having 
more power than others, and the social standing of constituent groups (Heinz & 
Laumann, 1982). Abbot (1988) considers the ability to control expertise as a vital 
factor for the survival of a profession. He contends that a profession’s abstract 
knowledge delineates its domain of jurisdiction and social and economic status. 
Considering that professions internally and externally compete over practices, 
economic and social status, and jurisdiction; professional stratification and 
competition raise the question of how segments are held together at all, something 
about which relatively little is known (Ramirez et al., 2015). 
4.3 Findings 
In this paper the main focus is on solicitors and advocates, since they were the 
professionals that were most affected by the reforms. Also, I focus on the professional 
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field of the legal profession in my analysis. In this research, solicitor advocates were 
considered as solicitors since they identify themselves as solicitors and their colleagues 
consider them as solicitors unless they were specifically asked about an aspect of 
solicitor advocates. The professional body of solicitors designate solicitor advocates 
as members of the solicitors’ branch of the profession. Solicitor advocates are also 
legally considered and defined as solicitors. My primary and secondary data also 
showed that solicitor advocates should be classified as solicitors. However, when it 
was considered as helpful to get more insights on the context and data, whether a 
participant was a solicitor advocate is shared with the reader. 
My data showed that the reforms have been implemented in the justice system without 
difficulty or causing contestation within the legal profession.  Although there was 
weak resistance by the different professional groups before the Bill passed through 
parliament, the introduction of the Act and the implementation process was smooth. 
The data indicate that professionals were not deliberately resistant to reforms during 
and after the implementation. As one of the interviewees put it bluntly, “I don’t think 
that there is any group who said, ‘[not] over my dead body’.” Professionals did not try 
to sabotage the implementation process and they let a fundamental change occur to 
major institutional structures and processes of the legal field. Almost all of the 
participants acknowledged that the reforms had brought substantive change to the legal 
field. For example, a solicitor, Dennis, described the changes as:  
A radical change…It will never go back to the kind of landscape that it was 
before. I mean the Gill Reform was a kind of earthquake, I don’t think there is 
any doubt about that.  
To this end, with the shift of a significant amount of civil business from the higher 
Court of Session to the lower Sheriff Courts and a new Personal Injury Sheriff Court, 
there existed a historical opportunity for solicitors to compete with advocates for 
professional expertise, recognition, status and income. However, the findings showed 
that there was no apparent contestation and conflict between solicitors and advocates 
in this realm.   
The data also show that although the reforms have successfully been implemented 
while radically changing major institutional structures and processes of the judicial 
field, there has been much more modest change at the professions level, resulting in 
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practices and routines of professionals and the structures and systems of professional 
services firms remaining almost completely intact. Professionals and professional 
service firms kept substantively engaging in the same practices that they engaged in 
prior to the reforms.  
According to the participants, what they do during a day, the way that they do their 
work, whom they interact with,  the way that interact with each other, their relations 
with clients, their individual and organizational routines, the procedures that they 
follow have almost remained the same. In other words, as Susan shared that “the core 
of what they do” did not change. Scarlet, also, told us:  
It was a huge change but on the other hand actually in the way that it affects our 
work, it has made a bit of a difference, but it is not a massive change for us. We 
haven’t really changed our routines - I cannot say that we have [changed our 
practices and routines]. 
In summary, based on my interviews, observations and document analysis, I saw that 
after the reforms, the legal professional field stayed undisrupted, although the justice 
system changed significantly. As a response to my research purpose that aims to 
understand why the change in judicial system did not disrupt the professional field that 
occupied it, the following data structure emerged from my data:  
Figure 4-1 Data structure 
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4.3.1 Jurisdictional Contentment  
The first aggregate dimension emerged from data analysis is the ‘jurisdictional 
contentment’ within the legal profession. Three sub-themes emerged from the data 
analysis that I believe lead to a state of contentment within the professional field: 
settlements in the boundaries of segments, emotional and cognitive investments and 
ecology of collaboration. These three sub-themes with their own sub-categories are 
discussed below. 
4.3.1.1 Settlements in the Boundaries of the Segments 
The first key sub-theme of the findings that emerged was that different segments of 
the legal profession, such as advocates, solicitors, judges, and sheriff judges, have 
established settlements within the boundaries of their distinct ecologies. Though 
acknowledging their common membership of the profession, the segments are clearly 
differentiated. These segments have established their own roles, jurisdictions, labels, 
professional associations, career systems and so on. In other words, solicitors and 
advocates exist in their own ‘mini worlds’ that have evolved over time in different 
ways, despite the fact that all of the members define themselves as belonging to the 
‘legal profession’. Several aspects of these bounded worlds emerged in the data. 
Different roles and responsibilities. The Scottish legal profession historically was 
designed as a split profession, with different roles assigned to different segments of 
the profession. Almost all of the interviewees defined their roles and responsibilities 
in terms of their specialised branches of the legal profession. These roles and 
responsibilities consist of dealing with different practices. For example, on a basic 
level, solicitors defined their responsibilities as handling the everyday legal matters 
and affairs of their clients, including all types of communication, legal guidance, 
drafting documents, negotiating with other parties, instructing advocates on behalf of 
their clients, and contributing to the successful operation of a law firm. On the other 
hand, some of an advocate’s responsibilities were defined as to provide specialised 
legal expertise, assist and guide solicitors, and provide effective oral arguments in 
courts. 
The different roles also show themselves in the labels and categories that are associated 
with different segments. For example, although, in theory and legally, solicitors, 
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solicitor advocates and advocates are all called lawyers, during the interviews when 
all of the participants used the word ‘lawyer’, they all meant only solicitors or solicitor 
advocates and they did not include advocates whom they referred as ‘counsel’, 
‘members of the bar’, ‘advocates’ or ‘barristers’. Another example is that when the 
participants used the word ‘judge’ they only meant judges who sit in the high level 
courts such as the Court of Session and do not include sheriff judges; when referring 
to sheriff judges they used terms such as ‘sheriffs’ or ‘sheriff judges’. There are also 
labels and categories that are used within the segments. For example, solicitors and 
solicitor advocates almost always emphasised if they and their organisations act as 
either ‘pursuers’ or ‘defenders’ and how they are different from the ‘other side’. 
According to the findings, the differences in the roles of the segments show in how 
they are professionally organised, also. For example, most of the segments have their 
own professional associations that represent them. These professional bodies serve as 
the gatekeepers to the profession, set and maintain professional standards, and provide 
training for their members.  
Different repertoire of skills. Since all the responsibilities of the segments are different, 
they also require a different repertoire of skills.  Considering that the solicitors are the 
first and only contact point for clients, they are expected to have the certain skills to 
manage the clients well. Some of the other frequently mentioned skills are being 
commercially aware, being good at teamwork and managing people, handling 
mundane tasks without losing motivation, and having strong communication skills. As 
a very experienced solicitor, Michael, explains: 
The skills that I quite like to see in solicitors, and the skills that I like to think I 
have... Certainly should have them, after all these years, are being able to talk to 
people, take time with them, take detailed statements about exactly what the 
problem is, spend some time letting the client talk, and don't interrupt because 
you will get an impression of what kind of person he or she is, what kind of 
witness might they be. 
However, these skills are not desirable for advocates since their established roles and 
responsibilities within the profession are different. My data showed that what is 
expected from advocates is to be detached from the client. Their distance from the 
client and being a sole practitioner without any links to a law firm are seen as ensuring 
that they can offer independent advice because “when you are a solicitor instructed for 
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a client there is much more identification with the client than there ever is at the Bar” 
as Ashley, an advocate, stated. The other skills of advocates that emerged in the data 
are quick thinking, very strong academic ability, stress and pressure management, time 
and project management, strong advocacy and presentation skills, and the ability to 
persuade and negotiate. Gavin, a solicitor of 31 years told us: 
Why did I never become an advocate? Because I don't particularly visualize 
myself as being quick at argument on my feet. I see myself as being somebody 
who has to go away and think about things. 
Different career paths and systems. Although all branches of the legal profession start 
their journey in the same way, their career paths unfold differently since they all have 
established different career systems. The legal professionals in Scotland usually go to 
the same or similar universities, most of them study the same degrees and they all have 
the same traineeship until a certain point in their career. After that point, however, the 
career systems are very well established and differentiated within the boundaries of 
the branches, although a shift among particular branches is possible as one’s career 
progresses. 
The career system of solicitors is centred on the fact that they always work in 
organizations, unlike the advocates who work independently. Solicitors can work as 
inhouse lawyers in different organisations or they can work in law firms. Working in 
law firms provides a variety of options for solicitors to progress their careers, including 
from being a salaried employee to an equity partner. According to the data hierarchical 
advancement within their firms, such as becoming a partner, matter very much to many 
solicitors as a career goal. There are also different types of firm that provide solicitors 
with different opportunities, ranging from, for example, large multinationals to small 
rural practices. I found that most solicitors aim to have positions in well-known, elite 
and big law firms. In addition, what is apparent in my findings is that the specialisation 
of the law firms, such as family law, personal injury or immigration, is also very 
important for solicitors’ career paths. They may also choose to be a solicitor advocate 
if they want to appear in higher courts and keep working in an organisation. 
Also, solicitors can move to be a sheriff judge during the course of their career if they 
wish. However, they cannot be a judge who sits in the high court because only 
advocates can be judges. If solicitors want to be a judge, they have to be an advocate 
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first. As it is a condition to work as a solicitor before being an advocate, solicitors also 
can choose to become an advocate if they pass the required exams and training. 
However, the data indicated that most solicitors do not see being an advocate as the 
next step in their careers. For example, Richard, a solicitor of 22 years, said: 
We [he and his solicitor colleagues] don’t like doing advocacy or we wouldn’t 
be here. Some people don’t like doing advocacy and some people [those who 
preferer joining the Scottish Bar] love it. 
A senior partner of a big firm and a solicitor of 44 years, William, shared his opinion 
on developing a career path.  
Advocacy is not something which is very attractive to most lawyers and it is 
worth keeping that in mind.  It is perhaps no more than, I don’t know and I am 
guessing, it might be 10% of lawyers who would ever actually want to stand on 
their feet and argue a case, most people, in terms of their personality, are not well 
suited to it. 
Therefore, according to my data, solicitors do not always see being an advocate as a 
career step in their professional journey. Their careers usually evolve within the 
boundaries of their segment of the legal profession. 
On the other hand, since advocates are sole practitioners, their career system is mainly 
based on their being independent of any organization or law firm. After going through 
“some of the best training you can ever get in litigation” as one of the solicitors 
described the devilling process of advocates, they build their career on litigation 
[active advocacy] while working independently. The data indicated that advocates 
want to establish a very good professional and individual reputation since they get 
instructed by solicitors based on their expertise and experience. Therefore, their 
livelihood depends on their professional reputation and capability. In their career path, 
they put a career goal to gain specialisation, expertise and seniority. When asked about 
an advocates’ career path, Gordon an advocate himself explained: 
Obviously, one of the first things is to get work in the first place, and the more 
established you are, the easier that is. Once you develop a reputation, then 
people will want to instruct you, but when you're first starting out, that's a big 
challenge. It's just getting the work in the first place, establishing yourself and 
proving yourself as being an able advocate. As you go on, Scotland is a small 
jurisdiction, so we all know each other. So, if somebody's any good, it tends to 
get known fairly quickly. Equally, if you do something bad, everyone will 
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know about it fairly quickly. You get known amongst the judges and your 
fellow advocates and the legal profession more generally. 
As mentioned above, all advocates were solicitors once and all judges were advocates. 
That is, an advocate has the possibility of becoming a judge or a sheriff. They can also 
go back to being a solicitor, albeit it is a very rare move, and work in a firm.  
Overall, in my data I saw that although certain shifts between segments of the legal 
profession are possible, the roles within the segments are clear and the career paths of 
these roles are very different. Sheriff Clive, who was a solicitor before sitting on the 
bench, explained how a sheriff leaves behind his or her past of being a solicitor or 
advocate after moving to a different branch of the profession: 
As someone who is appointed to Judicial Office, we have taken an oath to do the 
job to the best of our ability and we will do that. I don’t think that a sheriff who 
was a solicitor is less well disposed to advocates than a sheriff who was an 
advocate. I think once you are on the bench those sort of loyalties don’t really 
count very much. We are all highly committed [to our current position] and just 
want to do a good job. 
Different professional objectives. Strikingly, my findings suggest that different 
segments of the profession think that they all play a different game to each other with 
different professional objectives. These objectives were exposed during the interviews 
when professionals described how the reforms created a wave of fear over the 
possibility of disturbing well-established interests and privileges. The data suggested 
that different segments of the profession had different fears. 
Prior to the reforms, advocates were very worried about losing income due to the 
possible decrease in the number of cases that they would receive. They frequently 
emphasised that if the sheriff judges would not grant sanction or if the solicitors 
preferred handling cases by themselves, advocates would suffer financially, especially 
the junior ones.  Furthermore, advocates were very concerned about the future of their 
profession and the possibility of the segments of the profession becoming more 
similar, eventually leading to a fusion of them. A very experienced advocate, Robson, 
stated his concerns: 
Back in my day, when I was called to the Faculty, I was one of 35 and this year 
there are four people who were called at the Bar. For only four people to be 
coming to the Scottish Bar is a real worry. Really if that continues, the Bar will 
not survive. Solicitors will replace the Bar. We'll end up with a fused profession. 
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If people aren't coming into the profession, the Faculty of Advocates will wither 
and die. I think it would be a great shame. The Faculty of Advocates has been 
here for 400 years for a reason. I do think it offers something different, and the 
independence is very important. 
Here becoming similar also means that institutionalised intra-professional status 
hierarchies were being challenged by the reforms. The high status that advocates 
enjoyed is mostly based on their professional experience, expertise and specialisation, 
as well as distinctive professional traditions created and secured by their historical and 
influential professional body, the Faculty of Advocates. According to the data, the 
Faculty was afraid of the negative impacts of the reforms on the advocates and 
therefore they kept justifying their importance as an institution for Scotland during the 
submission process before the Act passed. In their submission letter, as well as their 
other publications regarding the reform, the Faculty kept focusing on proving why 
their existence matters. In the way they do so, the importance attached to the high 
status of the advocates was very apparent. That also implied that they were worried of 
losing their high status within the whole legal profession. 
By contrast, solicitors, expressed an almost singular focus on the development of their 
businesses and profit margins. The findings showed that since the established business 
model and practices of solicitors traditionally did not require them to appear in court 
and work on each case thoroughly, they were worried about the financial and 
professional burden caused by the reforms. Although, solicitors were given an 
opportunity to improve their skills and expertise, and increase their jurisdictions, 
solicitors and their professional service firms almost entirely chose not to take 
advantage of this opportunity. Rather, there was evidence of a strong preference to 
continue to work with advocates in the same way as they had prior to the reforms. As 
one solicitor, Susan, told us: 
Although Lord Gill thought that it was a great opportunity - in an ideal world, if 
you are not trying to run a business and make a lot of money, yes, it is nice to be 
able to go and be an advocate and stand up and so forth. But the reality is that 
you don’t usually have that luxury and I am not sure if he quite understood you 
know how much time out of a solicitor’s diary it takes to turn up and hang around 
court and then present a case and so forth. We’re running a business, you know, 
that has to be competitive and profitable. 
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The differences in the business models of solicitors and advocates and how this affects 
their concerns and objectives was expressed by another solicitor, Callum: 
We are a business, we are in a business and advocates are self-employed and this 
is their business and so we have to be a bit more business minded about how we 
go about things.  
A solicitor advocate, Nick, who is a partner in a law firm also emphasised what really 
matters for himself and his firm: 
You are responsible for the running of the business and all the people you 
employ, making sure there is enough work, it is done profitably, and everybody 
can benefit from that. 
I have an overwhelming amount of data supporting the fact that different segments of 
the profession have different professional objectives. While for solicitors and 
professional service firms, this involved the continued pursuit of market power and 
profit, a major concern of advocates in general and the Faculty of Advocates’ in 
particular, was to retain their income, high status, professional skills and jurisdiction.  
Different Approaches to Status. According to the data, in the world of solicitors, being 
a partner in a law firm is one of the main sources of status. It is considered an indication 
of high status, success, hard work and high income.  Several of those in the study 
clearly expressed that being a partner provides status within the organisation and in 
the eye of public. As one of the solicitors, Adam, put it succinctly: 
There is something about being a partner in a law firm, even a small one, where 
you have business cards, and you have a status. And when people ask you what 
you do, you can say, “Oh I’m a partner in a law firm”. There is a kind of social 
kudos about it. 
Partners’ status also derives from the fact that they are considered as the leaders of 
their organisation, as one partner told me very proudly: “We [partners] are the 
principal of the business, so we are the leaders of the business. So effectively, we are 
the managers, and we are the leaders of the organisation”. Moreover, not all partners 
are at the same level on the status hierarchy. For example, salaried partners or junior 
partners are considered to have lower status than an equity partner who has an 
ownership stake in the firm. 
The data also suggest that solicitors attach their professional status to the status of the 
firm that they work at. Several solicitors expressed to me their pride at working in 
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firms that have offices around the country or overseas. Some emphasised how they 
progressed through their career by switching to bigger and more successful firms with 
strong ties to powerful groups such as unions or large corporations. That is, working 
in the elite law firms is a source and symbol of status in the world of solicitors. 
The data also suggest that solicitor advocates are considered as professionals who are 
relatively more prestigious and respected than solicitors. The fact that solicitor 
advocates have extra qualifications differentiates them from their solicitor colleagues. 
A solicitor advocate, Isaac, commented on the status elevation earned by transitioning 
from being a solicitor: “Certainly a lot of people go for the solicitor advocate 
qualification since it carries a certain kudos with it”. A very experienced in-house 
solicitor, Naomi, explained the position of solicitor advocates in her firm and within 
the profession:  
We have just got a couple [of solicitor advocates] in the office and I think it is a 
good thing and I would encourage people to do it because I think it is something, 
it gives people a sense of worth and value and the people in our office who have 
done it have got a real sense, it gives them a really good sense of value and within 
our office they are well regarded and I think that is the case elsewhere as well. 
So, within the profession I think that solicitor advocates are well regarded. 
My findings suggest that there is an established and deeply rooted professional status 
hierarchy within the legal profession where judges sit at the top followed by sheriff 
judges, advocates and solicitors. Although reforms presented an opportunity for 
solicitors to challenge the established order whereby advocates traditionally are 
considered to have higher status than solicitors, in the data, there was no indication of 
solicitors having bitterness in knowing that their status is lower than any other 
segment10. They do not think there is an issue in terms of status since the status of 
importance to them is inside their own segments in which status is conferred on the 
basis of becoming a partner or working in an elite firm. The data show that solicitors 
accept the established status hierarchy within the profession and do not dwell on the 
differences and almost do not care if they have lower status than advocates in the 
 
10 However, they resent the elitism within the Scottish Bar – For more details please see 
Paper 1. 
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overarching environment. For example, a very experienced solicitor and a partner of a 
law firm, Simon, stated without any resentment: 
I admire seeing skilful barristers presenting a case. And I’m in very little doubt 
that the very best of the Scottish counsel are professionally superior to solicitors. 
Solicitors do not have the equal rights of audience with advocates in the Scottish 
courts, one of the reasons why they are lower in the status hierarchy than advocates. 
Another experienced solicitor, Adam, told me that he does not have any problem with 
this situation: 
They [advocates] have the right to plead in the higher courts. But so what? And, 
at their best, they are better at that. 
As mentioned previously, the career systems of the segments are also different in a 
way that professionals with different skill sets follows different career paths in the 
different segments of the profession. In this regard, the data also suggest that the high 
status of advocates within the profession coming from their having outstanding 
professional skills is accepted by solicitors. The data show that solicitors choose being 
a solicitor knowingly that certain people will be advocates and the rest will continue 
to develop in their own segment of solicitor branch of the profession. For example, 
Gabriel, a solicitor of 27 years, stated: 
It's always been the best lawyers became an advocate, and so if you were 
interested in litigation, if you wanted to make your mark, if you wanted to 
become a sheriff 11[sic] or a judge, you had to go to become an advocate. 
A partner and solicitor advocate Ronald noted: 
There are always going to be persons, particularly persons of outstanding ability 
who will want to become advocates, go to the Faculty of Advocates. 
While solicitors pay attention to status ranking in their own world such as being a 
partner or working in an elite firm, according to the data, in the advocates’ world status 
is generally portrayed as depending on certain factors such as having seniority or an 
area of specialisation. That is because being an expert in certain fields provides higher 
status than others for advocates. Also, having a reputation of being an expert in their 
field, consistently providing high quality work, ‘taking silk’ to become a Queen’s 
 
11 A person who wants to be a sheriff does not necessarily have to be an advocate 
previously; solicitors can also become sheriffs. Gabriel was mistaken here. 
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counsel, or being an ‘excellent and independent’ advocate are other sources for status 
in the advocates’ world. For example, as a junior advocate, Tony, evaluated his 
position status wise as: 
I think the status of being a junior advocate is a relatively low status, until you 
establish yourself, so I don’t feel that I have increased my status massively by 
coming from being a trainee solicitor to becoming a junior advocate. 
Matt, an advocate of 10 years, explains how his speciality is considered as low status 
within the world of advocates: 
I have managed to practice mainly in public law partly through having first done 
some immigration work, which for some reason has a fairly poor reputation in 
Scotland, I think because of fairly poor quality work that has been undertaken in 
that area, so it has an associated lowly status in the opinion of some practitioners 
and certainly judiciary.  
Furthermore, in addition to capability of handling very complex cases, expert skills 
and knowledge that were recurrently portrayed as vital bases of an advocate’s 
professional status, the data show that advocates feel very proud of being a part of the 
Faculty of Advocates. They share and reflect the status of their professional 
association. That is, the long history of the Faculty as well as its contribution to the 
society and Scotland was another source of status for advocates. A quote from the 
letter that The Faculty of Advocates sent to the government during the consultation 
process of the reforms is indicative: 
The Faculty of Advocates is Scotland’s independent referral bar. It is also one of 
Scotland’s great national institutions. Before and since 1707, the Faculty has 
been central in developing and preserving Scots law as an independent legal 
system. Its members (including Sir Walter Scott and Robert Louis Stevenson) 
have contributed significantly to the Scottish Enlightenment and to Scottish 
culture generally. It was thanks to the donation by the Faculty of some 750,000 
books that the National Library of Scotland was established in 1925. 
4.3.1.2 Emotional and Cognitive Investment in Their Segments 
The data showed that different branches of the profession have strong emotional and 
cognitive investment in their segments and the practices within.  As was mentioned, 
they have different career systems and training programmes where the professionals 
acquire knowledge and expertise. Over several years they gain depth of knowledge 
and experience in the particular areas that are mostly relevant to their own mini worlds. 
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Therefore, they develop a different repertoire of skills and speciality with their 
cognitive effort that is useful for them in their own mini worlds. The data show that 
although there are opportunities for solicitors to shift from one segment to another if 
they wish and could, many of them have been working in the same segment for years 
and therefore have established knowledge bases and experience. They are heavily 
invested in the practices they have been engaging within these segments.  
This embeddedness and attachment also show itself in the daily struggles as well as 
the future plans of professionals. For example, a solicitor, Adam, shared with me his 
desire to found a law firm: 
As it turns out, 40 years after I started studying law, I'm still a lawyer [solicitor]. 
And I'm trying to build up a small firm, but it's a struggle in 2015. It's a struggle. 
What keeps me doing this? There is something in, yes, conditioning, when you 
have done something since you were 18. It's difficult to give it up. 
The data also show that other professionals, like Adam, are conditioned to act and 
think in certain ways depending on their segment of the profession. Different groups 
have established their own beliefs and assumptions with different discourses 
prioritised accordingly. The necessity to be profitable, different aspects of running a 
business,  the necessity of  being good at teamwork, the reduced and shared risk as a 
result of working in a firm as opposed to work individually like advocates, the skill of 
managing clients well, having counsel as a safety blanket were some of the common 
discourses that the solicitor participants used during the interviews. On the other hand, 
the importance of being independent, being trained to excellence, the importance of 
strict professional standards and work ethic and maintaining professional reputation 
and the importance of the Scottish Bar were some of the common refrains of advocates.  
However, professionals’ investment in their branch of the profession is not only 
cognitive, but also emotional. The findings suggest that professionals attached to their 
segments emotionally, too.  Their fears, anxieties and positive emotions are related to 
their mini worlds. Several solicitors emphasised that they like very much what they 
are doing and get a lot of satisfaction in what they do. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that most of the professionals do not like engaging in the main practices of 
other segments. For example, while many solicitors mentioned that they ‘hate’ going 
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to court, something advocates do regularly, and ‘do not like advocacy’, an advocate 
explained why he loves his segment of the profession as: 
I like the freedom. I like the independence. I think I would find it very difficult 
to go and work in a firm now [in the way that solicitors do].  
Also, contrarily, I found that solicitors are very much invested in their firms. For 
example, when they were asked how their career evolved, some of them told me the 
story of the firm they work at instead of their individual career path; or when they were 
asked about their professional values most of them talked about the values of the firm 
they work at instead of talking about their own individual values. Furthermore, more 
often than not, solicitors preferred to use the word “we” instead of “I” while answering 
the questions. It was apparent that some of them are very ambitious and emotionally 
attached to the particular practices of their firm and ideology behind these practices. 
As Sebastian, who has been working in the same law firm for more than 25 years, 
explained: 
What I’m loving very much about XYZ, we're seen as being a firm which tends 
to wear its heart on its sleeve a bit. We do act for all the major trade unions. We 
believe that our clients should get their maximum damages in minimum time. 
We don't like to see victims of accidents and industrial diseases being ripped off 
by large fees, and we're also a firm which has been deeply involved in 
campaigning on behalf of our clients and various pressure groups that we support 
over the years. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that professionals are also emotionally invested in the 
social bonds that they have in their organisation. They frequently emphasised their 
fondness for their team or community. For example, one of the solicitor participants, 
Nancy, stated: 
I got the job and thought well I will see how it goes, it was a temporary job to 
start with and then I just loved it so much that I stayed and I have never left 
because every day is a different question and it is very interesting to work here 
and the people I work with are really good to work with and so I have been here 
now for 32 years. 
The fondness for the community is not exclusive to solicitors. According to the data, 
advocates too have strong emotional attachments to their community which is 
embodied under the Faculty of Advocates. Furthermore, I found that triggers of some 
emotions that professionals feel change depending on the branch of the profession that 
they are from. For example, while solicitors generally emphasised that being able to 
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care for clients and helping them in desperate situations gives them satisfaction and 
pride, advocates feel satisfied and proud when they ensure excellence in court, provide 
independent and fair advice with good judgement.  
Also, it is apparent in the data that all professionals try to display the emotions that 
they consider appropriate and relevant. For example, since most of their clients are 
under enormous emotional pressure, solicitors emphasise they should display tender 
emotions and be sympathetic, kind, understanding and compassionate. A solicitor, 
Randy, explained: 
You just need to make sure you do the best you can and treating people the right 
way. And also, particularly with what we do in, you should have compassion. 
People who've had some form of bad experience, whether it's an accident or a 
disease or divorce or whatever, and they require to be dealt with in a certain way, 
and that's something which as lawyers [solicitors], we need to bear in mind all 
the time, people don't choose to become involved in accidents or to be subjected 
to dangerous working conditions.  
However, my findings also suggest that what is deemed to be appropriate emotion for 
solicitors is not considered as such for advocates. A considerable amount of data 
suggesting that advocates desire to be detached from the client as much as they can. 
For instance, Ashley, noted: 
When you are a solicitor instructed for a client, there is much more identification 
with the client than there ever is at the Bar. But we [advocates] have a sensible, 
always rational and emotionally detached way of engaging… The analysis and 
presentation of a case clearly, and free of emotional influence is best done by 
advocates. 
4.3.1.3 Ecology of Collaboration 
A third sub-theme of jurisdictional contentment dimension that emerged from the data 
was that both solicitors and advocates recognise the intra-professional differences and 
have created an ecology of collaboration. According to the data, the ecology of 
collaboration that parties are embedded has three pillars: a symbiotic relationship, 
coproduction and collegial accommodation.  
Symbiotic relationship. The data suggest that in their ecology of collaboration 
solicitors and advocates established a relationship from which both parties benefit. 
Solicitors viewed appearing in the courts as causing unnecessary costs for them and 
their businesses. They also believed that they did not have enough time to spend on 
the preparation of cases. They considered working with advocates as an opportunity 
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to focus on their own businesses. On the other hand, advocates’ main income source 
is derived from the instructions that they get from solicitors - more instruction means 
more income and experience. Therefore, there is a mutually beneficial relationship 
established within the profession. A solicitor advocate, Sam, who is also a partner in 
one of the biggest law firms in Scotland, explained his approach to the Scottish Bar.  
The Bar is an excellent source for us to use. We will always have counsel. You 
have all these brains working on trying to get a resolution, which is great. There 
is not much incentive for us to develop advocacy because we are quite happy 
using the Bar. We will continue to use them because, economically, it does not 
make sense for us to appear in the court… for hours. We can instruct an 
advocate and they can appear on their own. 
Coproduction. As a part of the ecology of collaboration, parties are embedded in a 
coproduction process where they all aim to serve the clients and represent them well 
in the courts. My data suggest that these segments have developed different repertoires 
of skills and these skills complement each other while working on a case. This aspect 
is succinctly summarised by one of the participants Ashley, an advocate as: 
When you work together on a case, a solicitor has a very different role. They 
deal with the administration of the case, they deal with the clients, they are 
specialised in that area, whereas an advocate has a totally different skill set. 
We work very much as a team. 
Many times, during the interviews, an advocate or solicitor would, in line with 
Ashley’s comments above, refer to the way in which they formed a team. They 
frequently emphasised that they all have a common objective of doing the best for the 
client and to achieve this objective, they collaborate and co-produce the end result. A 
very experienced solicitor, Randy, stated: 
The clients, the people who really matter, the injured people, will be best served 
by having somebody who knows what they are doing [an advocate] representing 
them and it is a great team [of solicitors and advocates]. 
Furthermore, the data suggest that solicitors recognise advocates as a group of 
professionals who have more skills and experience to deal with complex cases than 
they do. I see that in working towards the common objective of ‘doing the best for 
client’ and ‘contributing to the institution of justice’, solicitors want to benefit from 
the expertise of advocates and, hence, collaborate with them. Caroline, a solicitor, 
stated: 
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For clients, it can be helpful to have someone there who really knows what they 
are doing, not that I am saying I don’t know what I am doing! That has the 
specialist knowledge and it is good to have, it is just somebody else involved in 
the case that you can rely on in terms of talking about how we should be 
proceeding with the case tactically whereas now, because it is all sheriff court 
cases, we don’t have counsel to fall back on. 
According to the data, another reason for parties to collaborate is to share the risk. The 
data suggest that solicitors consider advocates as ‘a safety blanket’ that is to be used 
when the cases get more complex or risky. A solicitor, Naomi, explained she prefers 
to instruct counsel when she does not want to take the whole responsibility of a 
complex case: 
There are cases which are very complicated and where, as a solicitor, you might 
feel quite challenged about taking the whole responsibility for that yourself. It is 
good to have another set of eyes looking at it. Somebody else who can take a 
more detached view of it, because that is one of the benefits of counsel, I think, 
in that they are not actually meeting all of the witnesses and getting emotionally 
involved in the case, which we can often do. You become very invested in your 
cases. 
Collegial accommodation. The data suggested that there is a support system within 
this ecology of collaboration that I term ‘collegial accommodation’. An example of 
this collegiality among the segments can be easily seen in their training methods. The 
data indicate that although the training of solicitors and solicitor advocates are 
organised by Law Society of Scotland which is the professional body of solicitors, the 
training is usually delivered by advocates. The fact that advocates provide training for 
solicitors has been confirmed both by solicitors and advocates as well as several 
official documents. This shows that there is collaboration among the segments, rather 
than competition. A solicitor advocate, Isaac, stated: 
We have training on advocacy which we do mainly in-house or we actually 
have counsel come to us to provide training which might seem a bit perverse 
but I think they will know that they will get complicated cases, the bigger cases, 
so we don’t tend to, we have not had external trainers in. 
Another solicitor advocate who is also a senior partner in an established law firm 
explained the reasoning behind getting training from the Scottish Bar and why 
advocates are willing to do it: 
We have brought people in to do training from the Bar, for example, and they 
have been very helpful in doing that, to raise the standards [of solicitors] 
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generally.  I think we are all agreed whatever branch of the profession we are in, 
whether we are judiciary, the Bar or solicitors, we are all agreed that we want to 
have the highest standards for the clients. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that solicitors and advocates had several meetings to 
discuss how to reduce the negative impact of the reforms on the different segments of 
the profession to ensure that collaboration continued in a way that benefitted both 
parties. A solicitor, Susan, explained: 
The advocates were worried about what was coming and we have had a number 
of meetings with them to try to reassure them that we will continue to use them, 
that we will continue to pay them. We recognise the benefit of counsel and we 
have always worked really well together. 
4.3.2 Lack of Career Bridge 
The second aggregate dimension that emerged from the data analysis is the lack of a 
career bridge within the legal profession. By the lack of a career bridge, I mean the 
lack of a career path that would provide solicitors with the jurisdictional growth and 
professional expertise to the extent of not needing advocates’ help in courts.  Three 
sub-themes emerged from the data analysis that I believe led to a lack of career bridge: 
capability gap, learning cost, and the lack of a learning step. These three sub-themes 
with their own sub-categories are discussed below. 
4.3.2.1 Capability Gap 
My data suggest that there is a perceived capability gap between solicitors and 
advocates. In the analysis, it was apparent that while solicitors recognise that the 
reforms offer opportunities to handle a greater number of cases as well as more 
complex ones without the help of advocates, they usually consider themselves 
professionally not capable of doing so. Their main concern is their lack of experience 
and confidence in appearing in court since that aspect of the job has been handled by 
advocates for centuries. The data suggest that both junior and senior solicitors do not 
feel confident in undertaking the responsibilities coming with the opportunities 
presented. For example, a very experienced partner in a firm of solicitors, Jane, 
explained: 
I suppose for the older solicitors like me, and if you are thinking about change, 
the older solicitors in the office who have been practising for 20 years or more 
who are used to not appearing because they are used to counsel doing everything 
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in terms of appearance work in the Court of Session then it is challenging to have 
to suddenly get up and dust off your gown and go into court again and it can be 
quite frightening. 
Another very experienced solicitor, Claire, explained how she feels herself about 
standing in the court room to advocate: 
When you are out of practice of doing that, or you have just never had practice 
of doing that, it is quite difficult to imagine what it is like to run a proof and to 
have a sheriff say to you, but Mrs Daisy you don’t have any evidence for that, 
you know, be challenged on things… And if you are always having counsel tell 
you what to do, which is often what counsel does, I want this information and I 
think you should go and take a statement from that witness and I need this 
document and so on…It is not easy to do it all by yourself. 
Moreover, these concerns are not limited only to solicitors. The data suggest that most 
of the solicitor advocates also do not feel competent enough to handle complex cases 
since they usually use their extra qualifications for office jobs such as signing certain 
documents that a solicitor cannot, handling training of junior solicitors, and leading 
teams within their firms. The data suggest that solicitor advocates will pass complex 
cases to advocates. A solicitor advocate and a partner in a law firm, Nick, shared his 
decision process on whether to instruct counsel and, like many of the participants, he 
also clearly stated that he prefers using counsel when things are getting complicated, 
further pointing to a perceived capability gap. 
If it is very complicated, I would get counsel in, if it is not so complicated then 
we weigh up the position where we have to make a decision, do we do this 
proof/trial ourselves or do we get counsel in. 
A senior partner, as well as a solicitor advocate himself, Ted, stated that solicitor 
advocates in his law firm prefer not to appear in court despite having the qualifications 
required to do so.  
But we don’t use our solicitor advocates, they don’t appear, they don’t tend to 
appear, but I would say that is by no means unusual. Perhaps it is because I’m a 
partner [with many responsibilities], but I have two young colleagues who both 
sweated blood to do the solicitor advocate training and have not been to court to 
do sol-ad work since. They just don’t want to appear. 
According to the data, the reason why solicitor advocates do not want to appear in 
courts is explained by different participants, including solicitor advocates themselves, 
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because solicitor advocates do not want to handle relatively complex and difficult 
cases (as Isaac also stated above). An advocate, Bill, shared his observations: 
A lot of solicitors I work with and who are solicitor advocates are happy to do 
easy procedural hearings but when the going gets rough they are happy to bring 
someone else. 
Furthermore, my findings suggest that junior solicitors are also reluctant to handle 
complex cases. As one of the junior solicitor participants, Lucas, bluntly put it: 
Am I going to be doing a proof of my own for a case that is more than £15,000? 
No, I definitely am not going to be doing that, unless it is extremely 
straightforward. 
Furthermore, the capability gap between advocates and solicitors has been brought up 
by advocates many times particularly while discussing the differences among 
segments such as training and career paths. Advocates too consider solicitors relatively 
less capable of handling cases in the court room. Along with their perceived capability 
gap, solicitors consider the learning cost that is associated with the attempt to close 
this perceived capability gap as too high, something to which I now turn. 
4.3.2.2 Learning Cost 
My findings suggested that although the reforms presented an opportunity for 
solicitors to improve their skills, expertise and status, the cost of the learning required 
to do so was considered very high by the solicitors and their firms. In several 
interviews, solicitors emphasised how this is not a learning ground for them to improve 
skills by taking advantage of the opportunities that the reforms offered and they 
explicitly and implicitly pointed that there are costs involved in the learning processes. 
In the data, I found that solicitors consider three types of learning cost associated with 
the reforms. 
Losing time and money. According to my findings, solicitors and their firms believe 
that as much as they engage with the opportunities that reforms offer for them, their 
workload increases accordingly, reducing time they can spend on their established 
practices. As briefly mentioned, solicitors see certain aspects of the reforms as a 
financial burden that challenges the profitability and competitive advantage of firms. 
According to solicitors, their established practices do not allow them to spend time to 
improve professional skills or gain experience or to do relevant preparations. They 
 105 
constantly emphasised that appearing in court and doing advocacy requires rigorous 
preparation that takes time that they do not have. In addition, during the interviews, 
solicitors would often focus on how their overhead expenses are very high and 
spending extra time on preparation or waiting and appearing in court would lose them 
money. Solicitors kept reminding me that they run a business and it needs to be 
profitable, therefore even though reforms present opportunities for them, there are 
constraints, too. This situation is also clear to everyone in the field. For example, an 
advocate Ben, explained: 
I don't think they'll have enough time to improve their skills and expertise.... 
That's time.... Time is the biggest thing. They've got clients fighting them off, 
they've got other solicitors fighting them off, whereas, I can sit there as an 
advocate and spend hours on a case, days at a time sometimes. 
A solicitor, Adam, also supported the above point made by an advocate by explaining 
how the current business model makes it impossible to appear in court for economic 
reasons: 
My own experience as a solicitor, it is actually quite difficult for solicitors to 
do regular court hearings work simply for economic reasons. We have much 
higher overheads. So, it's much more expensive for us to be in court all day 
than it is for the advocate. It's also more expensive for us to do the preparation 
properly. And so, solicitors who are interested in court hearings work generally 
became advocates because that allowed them to practice freed up from all of 
those heavy overheads. 
A solicitor advocate shared her disappointment in how the current business model of 
the solicitors stop them from thriving and challenging the established orders: 
It came [resistance to reforms] from particularly pursuers, solicitors' firms, 
whose business models were set up to involve their solicitors sitting at their desks 
rather than actually going to Court. So, I think it's been disappointing and so far 
there seems to be so little emphasis on solicitors actually handling the work. 
Their business model at the moment is geared up to dealing with cases by 
working from their desk, and if they were required to be in court for maybe three 
or four days at a time, then that's an on-cost to the business. 
Another very experienced solicitor, Carrie, sums it all very clearly: 
When you are involved in that [appearing in court and doing advocacy], you 
literally go home at night and you prepare for the next day and that can be quite 
challenging if you have got other things to do, whereas counsel [advocates] can 
just say that for the next four days that is what I am doing. What they will do is 
that they will clear their diary for that four days and say I am doing that proof 
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and so I cannot do anything else during those four days and then when their 
involvement is finished then that is it. Whereas you have still got to go and report 
with the client, discuss things with the client, sort things out with the witnesses, 
you know, your involvement does not sort of end there, and then you are 56 or 
whatever. And then you are part of a business, things should be done profitably. 
So, I would say that the opportunities are there, the constraints are still there. 
 
Harming the client. My findings also suggest that another considered cost of learning 
for solicitors is to harm the client due to possible professional mistakes, lack of 
expertise, or inexperience while in the processes of learning new skills and gaining 
experience. In the findings, I saw that solicitors recognised the opportunities that 
reforms offered for them and usually accept that “in theory”, as several solicitors put 
it, they should have the ability to completely handle their cases in sheriff courts by 
themselves regardless of the complexity of cases. However, they frequently 
emphasised that trying to acquire and develop the necessary skills in the process might 
harm the clients. For example, a solicitor, Carrie, explains how the real-life cases are 
not a learning ground for solicitors: 
It is one of these chicken and eggs situation. You have to be able to build up the 
skills, but obviously these claims are very important for clients and so it is not a 
learning ground for us. That is not the case.  
Therefore, the possibility of harming the client is one of the reasons why law firms are 
reluctant to encourage their solicitors to learn relevant skills as soon as possible to 
appear in courts and handle cases alone. For example, a partner of a law firm, Nick, 
justified his decision:   
But I am not certain I would be forcing them [solicitors] to go and appear in 
court because I don’t think that it would be beneficial to the client. 
Harming their professional reputation. In the data, I also found that, although 
solicitors might want to try to handle complex cases alone without instructing 
advocates and to develop their professional skills, they do not want to be faced with 
the cost of harming their professional reputation as a result of errors. This was raised 
repeatedly by the professionals who were interviewed, particularly by the senior 
solicitors. I have significant data suggesting that these professionals do not want to 
risk their well-established professional reputations as very experienced solicitors by 
failing embarrassingly during their efforts to appear in court and stand on their feet 
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and have oral arguments. Furthermore, they also consider the legal consequences of a 
possible failure due to a lack of experience or expertise. The data suggest that solicitors 
and particularly the law firms working with corporate businesses and big insurance 
companies are very wary of handling cases without advocates. Ronnie, a very 
experienced solicitor advocate and founding partner of a big law firm, clearly indicated 
this: 
You don’t need to have an advocate, but you have to wonder as a solicitor why 
would you want to [handle things alone] because all you would be doing, I think, 
is opening yourself up to a professional negligence allegation.   
 
4.3.2.3 Lack of a Learning Step  
The data analysis showed that, despite of all the learning costs mentioned above, for 
solicitors who still want to learn advocacy properly, gain experience and handle cases 
alone successfully, there remain two barriers: Gatekeepers’ impact on learning and 
junior advocates’ learning step. I explain these sub-themes below. 
Gatekeepers’ impact on learning. The data suggest that before the implementation of 
the reforms, the gravitas attached to the impact of the reforms on professional groups 
was very significant. The reforms clearly threatened the well-being of advocates by 
opening up their work opportunities to solicitors by moving the cases in the higher 
courts, where only advocates have the right of audience, down to the lower courts. 
Many members of the legal profession as well as the initiator of the reforms anticipated 
that while solicitors would increase their case load, advocates would lose some of their 
income and status. Therefore, advocates were worried and repeatedly raised their 
serious concerns regarding the future of their profession during the interviews that took 
place before the implementation; they also shared their concerns with the government 
during the consultation process.  
However, it is found that after the implementation of the reforms, these worries have 
dissipated with things not significantly operationally changed. In addition to solicitors’ 
willingness to compete for work with advocates, the impact of the reforms on the 
different branches of the profession was dependent on when and under what conditions 
the sheriffs would grant sanction for advocates to be instructed by solicitors. Not 
knowing how strict the sheriffs would be in granting sanction, advocates and many 
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solicitors were very unhappy with the ambiguity. Prior to implementation of the 
reforms, Peter, an advocate, shared his concerns with me:  
What will happen as a result of these reforms is that solicitors will be obliged to 
appear in cases where they may not want to, because it will be harder to secure 
the services of counsel and there is the uncertainty about sanction. We will have 
to see, how this works out will depend how the sheriffs, what kind of cases the 
sheriffs grant sanction. And there's a great debate going on just now between my 
colleagues and solicitors as to how they should approach the issue of sanction, 
what should we be saying in order to get sanction?  
For advocates, getting sanction meant survival, maintaining their income, status, and 
the core of their profession. A solicitor advocate, Doyle, put it succinctly:  
The Faculty of Advocates, because they're the ones who stood in the old system, 
their livelihood depended upon getting instructions to appear in cases in the 
sheriff courts.  
However, following the implementation, it was apparent that sheriffs were very 
sympathetic to advocates appearing in their courts. Although advocates were very 
worried before the reforms were implemented, the findings suggested that their 
worries lessened as evidence grew that sheriffs would grant sanction more easily than 
they expected. Solicitor advocate, Nathan, provided his interpretation of the situation:  
Now the message which seems to have been clearly given [by the sheriffs], is 
that in cases which are maybe worth £25,000 or over, it's quite likely that 
sanction for counsel will be granted.  
My interviews with sheriffs also indicated that they have a tendency to easily grant 
sanction for advocates to appear in sheriff courts. They regularly emphasised that they 
give sanction if it is “reasonable” to do so as it is laid down in the Act12, yet whether 
it is reasonable “is left entirely to the sheriff’s discretion”, as Sheriff Parker stated. 
According to the sheriffs, they do not give sanction to “painfully obvious” cases, as 
Sheriff Samson put it, that are very simple. However, they confirmed that they are not 
strict about giving the sanction when it is demanded. For example, Sheriff Martin, 
explained: 
I suppose I have probably taken a fairly relaxed attitude towards it [granting 
sanction] and I am not scrutinising it. 
 
12 Courts Reform (Scotland) Act- Section 108 
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In another interview Sheriff Barley suggested it is unimaginable for him not to give 
sanction if both parties, defenders and pursuers, agreed to ask for it.  
If both parties are professionally represented are saying, yes we agree, then it is 
not going to be very often that I will turn round and say, well I don’t care if you 
agree I am not granting [the sanction]. I can hardly even imagine that happening 
to be honest, that is a power that exists in theory but the reality is that I probably 
would not exercise it. 
Furthermore, based on the data, one reason for sheriffs granting sanction easily is they 
think that advocates would provide a smoother process without the “frustrating 
mistakes” that, according to Sheriff Clive, are more frequent from solicitors. The other 
sheriffs who were interviewed also confirmed that they are not satisfied with the 
advocacy standards of solicitors. For example, Sheriff Parker suggested:  
By and large the quality of the bar is quite good and so you don’t usually sigh or 
groan when counsel appears but there are some solicitors where you might groan 
when they stood up.   
Sheriff Samson was similarly sceptical of solicitors’ performance in court, noting, 
“The people who are hopeless [in the court room] are probably solicitors.” This 
situation was also a common observation among other members of the legal 
professions as one solicitor, Anthony, explained:  
They [sheriffs] are having to see solicitors more often [because of the reforms]. 
I think that the feedback from some of the sheriffs is that they don’t have a good 
perception of the ability and competency of a lot of solicitors to appear and to 
properly do cases. I mean we have been basically told by one of the Sheriffs that 
they have a ‘heightened awareness’ of us [said with a sarcastic tone] I think they 
are probably seeing counsel more in dealing with cases and so I think they have 
probably got a greater perception of counsel’s abilities. 
The data also suggest that sheriffs desire and expect a high level of professional 
standards in their courts. They are very strict in following rules and most of the time 
their strict attitudes are not welcomed by solicitors or advocates. Ashley, an advocate, 
explains the situation as:  
Sheriffs are trying to make sure that people adhere to the rules very strictly. They 
have been very strict on the rules. The letter of the rules and if you don’t, if you 
miss a timescale or you put the wrong words in a document, the sheriffs make 
you turn up in court to explain yourself. A full explanation. Now that would 
never happen in the Court of Session.  
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The data suggest that the strict attitude of the sheriffs frighten many solicitors, 
particularly young ones, to appear in the court. It is found that sheriffs’ strict attitude 
has been discouraging solicitors to engage with the court work which is something that 
they are already reluctant to do so. My participants shared with me their memories of 
getting severely ‘scolded’ and felt ‘embarrassed’ due to ‘minor mistakes’ or 
‘oversights’. For example, a young solicitor, Cathy, shared her feelings as: 
I think that [sheriffs’ strict attitude] is very intimidating for a person [like me] 
who isn’t appearing in court regularly. 
An experienced solicitor advocate, Isaac, also pointed out that solicitors are afraid of 
appearing in court and may try to avoid doing so because of the sheriffs. 
I think the sheriffs have made life quite difficult for quite a few of us, particularly 
the younger solicitors. They tend to give them short-shrift and I think quite a lot 
of the young solicitors have been absolutely terrified to appear, which is not 
particularly good. And I think that they need to be careful that they don’t drive 
the people out of the court.  
Junior Advocates’ Learning Step. The data suggest that the Court Reforms have put 
junior advocates’ learning at risk. It is found that junior advocates have been having 
trouble in getting advocacy experience since the small value cases have been allocated 
down to sheriff courts where advocates are needed to be instructed by solicitors with 
a granted sanction. The data suggest that solicitors have been instructing senior 
advocates to deal with high value cases in the sheriff courts as well as in the Court of 
Session. Therefore, junior advocates suffer from the lack of opportunities to gain 
expertise, as well as work. As one of the junior advocates, Terry, explained: 
As a junior counsel now, it is so much more difficult to get that experience 
because you cut your teeth on the small cases and that is where it is so important 
to build your expertise and so you are able to do the bigger cases.  I am not 
sure that we are going to get that sort of experience because we are not going 
to get things started on these small cases anymore and so there is a real concern 
for the junior advocates.   
Since the reforms caused a massive reduction in the number of cases in the Court of 
Session where only advocates can appear, there are not enough lower-value cases in 
which junior advocates can be involved in the Court of Session.  Since the cases left 
in the Court of Session are very high value, this discourages solicitors from instructing 
 111 
junior advocates. One of the advocates and a devilmaster13, Amy, shared her 
observations: 
I think junior advocates are really suffering because they are finding it more 
difficult to get work. Because if you are newly qualified, if you are a new 
advocate, if the only cases in the Court of Session are very valuable then you are 
less likely to want to give that to someone who is just new. You are not going to 
take a chance on them, maybe you would want to go with someone you know, 
and you have worked with before and is more experienced. And so I think there 
is a dramatic impact on young members of the Bar.  Last year there were only 
three devillings, this year there are six, when I was called there were about 
twenty.      
As a result, junior advocates try appearing in sheriff courts. However, the data suggest 
that solicitors prefer instructing senior advocates over junior ones in the sheriff courts, 
too. This makes the situation difficult for junior advocates and reduces the 
attractiveness of the job. A young solicitor, Louis, explained the effects of this on him 
and some of his colleagues: 
I think it [the reforms] has definitely made it more difficult [to join the Bar] and 
therefore people are not considering it. What if you go to the Bar and fail to make 
a decent enough practice out of it? In theory, you can come back to the solicitor 
profession and, again after you spent all your savings during the devilling, people 
would look at your CV and think that was ridiculous. Why would I do that? 
Table 4-1 Supporting Data 
Aggregate dimension: Jurisdictional Contentment 
Second order 
themes 








• It depends on what your ambitions are.  But if you were following what 
might have been described as a traditional mail course of ambition, I am 
trying to avoid making any judgement attached to that, but if you assume 
that your ambitions are related to income and status then it would 
probably make a difference if you felt that you were going to become a 
partner in this firm. 
• I would say becoming a partner, especially an equity partner of a big 
firm, is pretty much it [when asked what provides very high status for 
solicitors] 
• No, not really. I mean yes and no [when asked if advocates have higher 
status than solicitors]. Yes, advocates have higher status, but I don’t 
want that. I want to be respected in this firm. Have an office to myself 
one day, then make a partner in 10 years, maybe in different firm, a 
smaller one.  
 
13 A devilmaster is a senior advocate who trains a junior advocate candidate during a year. 
This process is called “devilling” and the candidate is called a “devil”. 
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• Taking the silk has a great value for us. A great honour, I must say. It is 
the highest you can go as an advocate.  
• Advocates who have achieved distinction in Advocacy before the 




• It's good for the Bar, because it keeps us working, it's good for solicitors, 
because they can keep their solicitors behind the desk earning, doing 
more profitable work, rather than being stuck in court for four days. 
• It is hard to manage clients, you know. Solicitors do that for us.  
• They [solicitors] handle financial transactions and all [not us].  
• Well, we train each other you know. The Faculty provides training for 
law firms and most of us were trained as solicitors before joining the 
Bar.  
• Our perspective as advocates, we can't deal directly with clients, so we 
are a referral Bar, so our business comes through solicitors. If solicitors 
don't send you cases, then you're not working. 
• There isn’t much of a competition between the Faculty and the Society. 
They usually support each other, I mean, like, they lobby together, 
organise events, and train each other. 





• I think being a solicitor of is quite important to me. I have thought about 
other things that I could do, and they don’t interest me at all. 
• Where I am now [as an advocate], four years in, and I think I got my 
breakthrough immigration work and because it is also very interesting, 
and I love it.  
• There are more than 120 employees in this firm. As a partner, I need to 
think my employees. We need to make money, be profitable. 
• I am [as a solicitor] very interested in client psychology. I’ll have my 
masters’ in psychology from Edinburgh [the University of] at the end of 
November.  
• I love being a sole practitioner.  
• It is hard to leave the safety blanket of counsel behind. 
• My total time in the legal profession is now 15 years post university and 
as an advocate it has been eight and a bit years called plus a year of 
devilling before that. 
• At the end of the day the only thing is the risk with the bar is that 
obviously you are independent, you are self-employed, and you have to 
spend a year/nine months or so devilling and so there is a financial 
impact on that.  Also, you don’t have any pension. 
• The fact that they [advocates] have no contractual relationship with 
clients helps them to maintain a valuable extra degree of 
[emotional]detachment relative to all of the services which they provide. 
• After all these years, I learned to be more understanding and 
compassionate [towards clients], and put their bests interests firsts, then 
I think about financial implications [as a partner solicitor]. 
•  There are more than 120 employees in this firm. As a partner, I need to 
think my employees.  
• The bar in Scotland is already very small and it will disappear if we 
don’t do something about it.  
• I’ve always wanted to work in an urban law firm, perhaps a multinational 
one.  I did my internship in a rural office, you know, dealing with contracts, 
leases and so on. Didn’t like it, to be honest. Now in Glasgow I mainly 
work for clinical negligence cases. 
• At the end of the day the only thing is the risk with the bar is that obviously 
you are independent, you are self-employed, and you have to spend a 
year/nine months or so devilling and so there is a financial impact on that.  
Also, you don’t have any pension.  
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• There is no better way to become a Judge than being an advocate. So, 
you can have a fresh start even if you are 60.  
Aggregate Dimension: Lack of Career Bridge 
Second order 
themes 
First order illustrative quotes 
Capability gap 
 
• I think probably there is the perception that solicitors aren’t quite as 
good as counsel but I think that is mainly from the fact that we don’t get 
as much practice.   
• I would say, personally, and I think it's a complaint that's shared by a 
number of my colleagues, the quality of instruction that comes from 
solicitors these days, leaves a lot to be desired. And advocates spend a 
lot of their time telling people how to prepare cases, telling them to do 
things that 10 years ago you would never have needed to tell them, 
because the staff don't have the experience themselves. 
• Even with the straightforward personal injuries action, say, with a bit of 
complexity, like just involving a child, somehow many of us [solicitors] 




• I think that these people [solicitors] are relatively inexperienced, low 
qualified, with too many cases, and they can't afford the time to spend in 
court, and insurance companies will know that. So, there will be an 
incentive for insurance companies, I think, to drive down the offers that 
they make, because they know that cases are less likely to go ahead. 
• These are sensitive, highly personal cases. You must instruct a specialist 
[counsel]. Otherwise, you put your client in a vulnerable position. 
Clients usually are very emotional, and they suffer very much in the 
process [of personal injury or clinical negligence cases]. 
• You don’t want to deal with it yourself. If it turns into a complete 
shambles, then obviously you are just going to be sitting here for ages 




• Anything you consider in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable 
to do so which gives the sheriffs a lot of leeway and I think when you are 
presented with someone who is potentially not going to be paid if they 
don’t do it and the first thing on the other side is an insurance company 
who probably has, they know that they have got the money, you are going 
to have difficulties I think and certainly in the decisions that have come 
out the sheriff court have followed that line, although it is not as the 
insurance industry and no doubt the defender firms would have wanted it 
to be.  I don’t think it has worked out as well as they would have hoped. 
• Opportunities for young advocates to address the court and make legal 
arguments decreased. The reforms will exacerbate that, because if we're 
in the Sheriff Court, the opportunities, I think, for young advocates to 
appear will be greatly reduced. 
• But if you were a young advocate starting out now, or having recently 
started out, you would be desperate to work, and you would probably 
work on any terms on the basis that any kind of work is better than none. 
I know that a lot of my colleagues, you've obviously, you've spoken to 





The main purpose of this study was to better understand institutional field persistence, 
particularly in the face of severe exogenous shocks. In particular, I asked why such a 
pronounced change within the judicial system did not cause disruption within the 
professional field that occupied it.  Suddaby and Viale (2011: 428) state that “because 
professions are so embedded in social institutions, however, any change in 
professional jurisdiction creates a concomitant change in institutional structure. As 
professions expand their jurisdiction, they also reshape the landscape” (emphasis 
added).  Considering my research context, that made me question why the opposite 
situation is not true - that is when the landscape is radically reshaped by exogenous 
shocks, how can professional fields stay undisrupted without any dispute leading to an 
increase or decrease of jurisdictional reach of professional communities?  
Therefore, the primary contribution of this paper is that I am proposing a new theory 
of institutional persistence and continuity of professional fields that explains 
persistence mechanisms that keep the professional field together in the face of 
exogenous shocks. Research on institutional fields suggest that fields are inherently 
contentious, and change is the norm. However, in my research setting, the legal 
professional field had all of the ingredients that made a field fragile in the face of a 
severe exogenous shock: it was heterogenous, dependent on other institutions such as 
the state and justice, facing severe legislative shock, and change in the institutional 
field that the profession was embedded. Yet, it persisted without any disruption or 
jurisdictional dispute. With the model of institutional persistence of a professional 
field that I created based on my findings, I present the mechanisms previously 
unidentified in the literature that make a professional field persist even in the face of 
exogenous shocks that reshape the landscape radically. These mechanisms develop 
new ways of understanding professional field continuity while explaining why 
institutional persistence takes place in some conditions where many studies (e.g. 
Abbott, 1988; Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 2012; Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Zietsma et 
al., 2017) suggest contestation and disruption would take place. My contribution also 
lies in the fact that these mechanisms not only keep the disruption of a field at bay, but 
also hold the segments of a profession together, hence maintain its internal 
cohesiveness. These mechanisms can work together or separately, albeit one can be 
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weaker or stronger in effect than others. In my case, they work separately, but 
contributing to each other’s existence. Figure 4-2 presents the model. 
Figure 4-2 Institutional persistence in a professional field 
 
 
4.4.1 Institutional Persistence Mechanisms of a Professional Field 
Although it is the core issue of institutional theory, the explanation of institutional 
persistence and continuity has been neglected in the institutional theory literature 
(Greenwood et al., 2017; Scott, 2013; Sminia, 2011). While the literature on 
institutional maintenance has been burgeoning recently, it only focuses on what actors 
in the field intentionally do in order to maintain the status quo. However, with this 
research, I turn back to the roots of institutional theory and explain the field 
mechanisms that inherently existed in professional fields and support institutional 
persistence even though taken-for-grantedness is undermined through an external 
shock. I show how mechanisms in professional fields that keep contestation and 
change at bay and create very stable entities in contrast to “the well-established notion 
that professions exist as relatively unstable entities engaged in a constant dynamic 









































Jurisdictional Contentment. We see in my findings that there existed a mechanism that 
I called ‘jurisdictional contentment’ in the professional field. By jurisdictional 
contentment, I refer to the state of a professional field where the intra-professional 
populations, in other words segments or branches of a profession, are content with 
their own position within the profession.  In this state of a field, I argue based on my 
findings, an implicit settlement is in place that buffers the impact of exogenous shocks 
that may create jurisdictional contestation and disruption within a professional field. 
That is, different populations within the same profession are contentedly living in their 
own world, or sub-fields, and happy with their own status, jurisdiction and practice 
boundaries.  
In contrast to many studies that suggest fields are contested and there is constant 
jockeying among actors on who gets what particularly during institutional change, I 
extend our understanding on professional fields by showing that professional fields 
can be more peaceful places than the literature suggested. One reason for that is that 
‘jurisdictional contentment’ works as a mechanism that makes professional 
populations reluctant to go into a jurisdictional dispute and change the arrangements 
in the professional fields, even in the face of presented choice and opportunities to 
broaden the status and jurisdiction. The reflexivity of actors on their field position 
increased because reforms offered historical opportunities for solicitors to change the 
established arrangements and compete with advocates over status and jurisdiction. 
Yet, the professional field persisted without disruption. Consequently, by uncovering 
this mechanism, this research contributes to our understanding of taken-for-
grantedness by showing that professional field persistence can occur even during times 
of great disturbance if actors experience jurisdictional contentment within the 
institutional field.  
As a result, the mechanism of jurisdictional contentment prevents segments from being 
drawn into a jurisdictional war and it lessens the impact of an external jolt to precipitate 
institutional disruption.  As we see in the model, jurisdictional contentment consists of 
status settlements within subfields, an ecology of collaboration within the professional 
field and actors’ emotional and cognitive investment in subfields. Regarding status 
settlements, I recognise that status tends to be self-reinforcing especially in highly 
institutionalised settings. Once a status hierarchy is established, “even those 
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individuals and groups who stand the most to gain by disrupting hierarchy have some 
reason to forego any attempt to change the existing rank order” (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008: 365). Individuals have hierarchy enhancing beliefs and behaviours justifying the 
positions of others while legitimising and reinforcing the current status arrangement. 
Further, the well-known concept of ‘middle-status conformity’ suggests that middle-
status actors have a tendency to conform with the existing conventional practices and 
avoid from deviation with survival concerns and a fear of being subject to penalties 
(Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Wright & Zammuto, 2013). However, it has been 
acknowledged that an external force or shock, such as a radical regulatory change, can 
lead to hierarchical change (Bendersky & Pai, 2018; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). The 
research supporting a low-status group’s reluctance to challenge a status hierarchy 
centres on the perceived lack of an opportunity for change. The possibility of changing 
the status dynamic presents itself as a key mechanism that fuels the competition for 
status (Bendersky & Pai, 2018; Hays & Bendersky, 2015). Yet, contrary to the 
literature, I show that, firstly, even though there are opportunities presented for 
competition for status and change and the possibility of changing the established 
hierarchy is there, the intra-professional communities will not necessarily decide to 
climb the status hierarchy. Secondly, and as a primary point, the reason for 
professionals’ reluctance to do so is not the fear of deviation from the conventional 
practices as the literature on status conformity suggested, but they do not care about 
their status within the whole profession.  
Consequently, the notion of settlement is in place where different populations do not 
resent the fact that others have higher status within the whole profession. Rather, the 
status concerns of populations tend to centre on their own subfield where the source 
of status is different. In other words, contrary to the status literature, lower-status 
groups presented with a significant opportunity for change will not necessarily act on 
it if jurisdictional contentment was in place with segments’ different understanding of 
status. The fact that my findings suggest that professions experience status concerns 
within the boundaries of their population subfields, in other words within their 
segments, is the basis of my primary contribution regarding our understanding of field 
stability and status concerns. I extend our understanding on status hierarchies and field 
stability by showing that professional populations with lower status do not take their 
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current position within the profession as low status per se, but they value a different 
type of status. The status world of importance to them is inside their segment. That is, 
I argue that they are invested in their local status rather than their global status, yet, 
they are part of the same profession and they are all ‘local’ in theory. This leads to no 
latent contestation on status and jurisdiction, each part of a profession can be happy 
with what they are doing and their position within the profession. One of the 
contributions of this paper is to show that the professions experience status settlements 
in the solidly established boundaries of their segments and they experience status 
differently.   
The second sub-mechanism of field persistence that contributes to the ‘jurisdictional 
contentment’ within the professional field is the ‘ecology of collaboration’. Building 
collaborations in order to maintain or change the institution is acknowledged in the 
literature (Empson, Cleaver, & Allen, 2013; Hampel, Lawrence, & Tracey, 2017; 
Sminia, 2011). However, my contribution extends this work by showing how an 
existing collaborative ecology works as an institutional field persistence mechanism 
and holds things together within a profession and field. In my case, actors did not 
collaborate to maintain the status quo. The fact that they were already living in an 
ecology of collaboration served as a mechanism of persistence.  
I found that, in professional fields, the existing strong collaborative intra-professional 
bonds among the segments are buttressed by a symbiotic relationship that parties 
benefit from professionally. Moreover, all segments work as a team with 
complementary skills and expertise. They have a strong sense of collegial 
accommodation. In my research, these collaborative bonds were so strong that radical 
transformation could not break them. The strength of the exogenous shock was not 
enough to break the bonds. In addition, even an institutional entrepreneur with 
resources and skills who also was an insider as a member of the profession, could not 
foresee the strength of these bonds. Therefore, in the face of exogenous shocks, these 
bonds support the robustness of a field. 
Furthermore, as something that was previously unidentified in the literature, I showed 
that different segments, or populations in other words, are emotionally and cognitively 
invested in their subfield of the profession rather than the whole profession per se and 
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develop emotional competency differently. In this respect, populations’ emotional and 
cognitive investment in their own subfield prevents competition and conflict and 
protects the field from disruption and turning into a contested field. This was the third 
sub-mechanism of persistence that contributed to the mechanism of ‘jurisdictional 
contentment’.  
Cognitive investment is considered as a precondition for entering a field since “the act 
of entering” requires the belief that “the game is worth playing” (Voronov & Vince, 
2012: 65). Yet, although being the same profession, I argue that members of different 
populations think that they all play a different game than each other. They are 
cognitively invested in their own segments with their different training, career systems, 
knowledge, expertise, experience, beliefs, and discourses. Their intellectual 
engagement and rational interests have been shaped differently, as have the practices 
in which they engage on a daily basis.  
Moreover, the segments are emotionally invested in their own worlds. Their desires 
and fears are all related to their branch of the profession. Voronov and Weber (2016: 
457) argued that being a competent institutional actor requires “the ability to 
experience and display emotions that are deemed appropriate for an actor role within 
the institutional order”. I suggest that even in the same profession, different 
professional populations might develop emotional competence differently since their 
segments require different emotional experiences and displays. That is, I argue what 
is deemed to be appropriate emotions for segments are different and different segments 
of a profession develop an emotional and cognitive “capacity to belong to and inhabit” 
(Voronov & Weber, 2016: 457) that particular segment of the institutional order of a 
profession (Thornton et al., 2012), rather than the whole profession. Consequently, this 
sub-mechanism contributes to the state of jurisdictional contentment that holds the 
segments together within the profession without competition over jurisdiction and 
conflict during turbulent times as well as buttresses institutional persistence of the 
profession and its field.  
In summary, existing theory would predict that professional segments in an empirical 
setting like mine would be in jurisdictional competition with each other, particularly 
in the face of the external shocks, leaving the professional field very vulnerable to 
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change. Yet, I argue if the mechanism of jurisdictional contentment is in place, 
depending on the strength of it, the possibility of a jurisdictional war would be less 
than expected. That is because being in a state of jurisdictional contentment provides 
robustness for a professional field in the face of an exogenous shock and creates no 
motivation for the intra-professional populations to start a jurisdictional dispute.  
Lack of Career Bridge. The second main mechanism of persistence that I uncovered 
based on my findings is ‘the lack of a career bridge’ within a professional field. By 
‘the career bridge’, I refer to an effective process that provides a passage for 
professionals to move from one segment to another within a profession as a part of 
their career transition or increase their professional capacities to compete with other 
segments in a jurisdictional realm. I argue that the absence of such bridge works as a 
mechanism that maintains the status quo by inhibiting career transition in two ways: 
either by allowing little room for the intra-professional populations to shift from one 
segment to another, or by curtailing their capacity to increase their jurisdiction over 
the other segments within the same profession; even in the cases where significant 
opportunities to broaden the jurisdictional boundaries are offered through external 
shocks. For example, in this regard, the career bridge in my context could have led in 
two directions: either staying in the solicitors’ branch of the profession and becoming 
competent and confident enough to argue cases without the need for an advocate; or 
becoming an advocate. In either case, the bridge would have led to a point where 
solicitors have enough expertise and experience to successfully defend a complex case. 
In other words, the bridge would enable the jurisdictional migration within the 
profession. However, there was no such career bridge available, which served as a 
field persistence mechanism that helped keeping disruption of the professional field at 
bay and suppressing any dispute over jurisdiction.  
 “Careers are far from central in contemporary theorizing about institutions, and 
largely absent from theory about institutional change” (Nigam & Dokko, 2018: 2) and 
“only a few institutional scholars use careers as a lens to illuminate institutional change 
and stability” (Jones & Dunn, 2007: 438). Therefore, in this regard, this research 
makes an important contribution to our understanding of institutional change and 
persistence by theorising the concept of the career bridge in a way that it explains 
institutional continuity regarding the robustness of a professional field in the face of 
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exogenous shocks. I argue that the more difficult it is to access a career bridge that 
would allow segments within a profession to transition to another subfield, the lower 
the possibility of a professional field experiencing disruption. 
My conceptualisation of the lack of career bridge is strongly connected to the 
relationship between structure and agency since “careers represent actors’ movements 
through a social structure over time” (Iellatchitch, Mayrhofer, & Meyer, 2003: 730; 
see also Barley, 1989; Becker & Strauss, 1956). My findings extend our understanding 
on the limiting power of structure on actors’ career mobility by showing the 
mechanisms that closes the bridge of jurisdictional migration within a profession. That 
is, highly institutionalised structures and practices of professionals and their 
organisations constrain professionals from trying, learning and closing the capability 
gap between the intra-professional segments. It also prevents practice-driven change 
by not allowing segments to incorporate the new practices into their everyday routines 
The lack of a career bridge as an institutional persistence mechanism is particularly 
important when the mechanism of jurisdictional contentment is not in place or 
relatively weak. In this case, some professional groups may be out of the zone of 
jurisdictional contentment in a way that they are open to challenge the status quo by 
benefitting from the opportunities that external shocks provide or they can be open to 
manoeuvre in the field with an increase reflexivity caused by the change. Yet, I argue, 
even if these professionals have intention, increased reflexivity and opportunities 
offered by external shock, the lack of a career bridge that that would take them to a 
new professional status would constrain their mobility.  
Furthermore, with this research, I also contribute to the careers literature in three ways. 
First of all, “careers researchers rarely connect their studies on individuals’ careers to 
their effects on organizations, occupations, or fields” (Jones & Dunn, 2007: 446). In 
contrast, I show how intra-professional career structure affects field stability in the 
face of exogenous shocks. Also, there have been calls (e.g. Duberley, Cohen, & 
Mallon, 2006; Garbe & Duberley, 2019; Gunz, Mayrhofer, & Tolbert, 2011; 
Iellatchitch et al., 2003) for linking social context and career mobility and I extend our 
understanding of this link by showing how career mobility can be recursively linked 
to the institutional change happening in a field. Second, career studies, more often than 
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not, focus on individual career paths and largely ignore the interplay between 
institutional context and the career patterns of larger groups (Gunz et al., 2011). With 
this research, I empirically shed additional light on the career movements, or lack 
thereof, of larger intra-professional groups. Third, this research also attends the calls 
for more research on the boundaries of careers and barriers of career mobility (Inkson, 
Gunz, Ganesh, & Roper, 2012), specifically on intra-professional career boundaries 
and barriers. I particularly contribute to theory on career boundaries and their 
permeability by empirically uncovering underlying factors that affect the assessment 
of professionals to undertake new roles that belonged to another group of professionals 
or shift to a different segment as work transition.  
Gunz, Peiperlr and Tzabbar (2007: 484) suggest that the permeability of a career 
depends on three facets: “an awareness that a given work role transition actually exists 
as a possibility, an assessment of the achievability of making the work role transition, 
and the attractiveness of the work role transition”. My research extends this argument 
by uncovering further bases for these three facets in an empirical context. My research 
suggests that the sub-mechanisms of the lack of a career bridge, a capability gap, lack 
of learning opportunities and cost of learning, diminish the perceived achievability of 
the career transition. Also, the existence of jurisdictional contentment will reduce the 
attractiveness of a career transition. My research further contributes to the careers 
permeability literature, by linking the career permeability of intra-professional 
segments to the persistence of a profession and professional field. 
4.4.2 Internal Cohesiveness of a Profession 
Consistent with the discussion above, another way of looking at the field persistence 
is to focus on internal cohesiveness of a profession. Professions consist of different 
sub-populations, or segments, in contrast to the homogenous portrayal of professions 
in many studies (e.g., Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Zieztsma et al., 2017). My findings 
suggest that the heterogeneity of the legal profession is manifested as a mosaic of very 
elaborate practices and roles. These practices and roles connect “broader cultural belief 
systems and social structures to individual and organizational action” (Lounsbury & 
Beckman, 2015: 299). These roles and practices, as well as status hierarchies, are 
deeply rooted within the profession and link the different segments of the profession 
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together. Considering this level of diversity and hierarchy that is built on a very 
complex balance of many factors such as coexistence of multiple logics, interests, 
limited resources and so on, one wonders “how segments hold together as a 
profession” (Ramirez et al., 2015: 1347).  
According to Ramirez et al. (2015: 1343) this is something that is largely unexplored 
and the “mechanics of cohesiveness” is largely unknown. The literature suggests that 
these segments are “more or less delicately held together” (Bucher & Strauss, 1961: 
326) and the settlements among segments are very vulnerable to change (Ramirez et 
al., 2015). Yet, we see that professions can keep their internal structure and segments 
together, sometimes for centuries and even in the face of severe exogenous shocks, as 
was the case with this research. I therefore also contribute to this particular gap in our 
understanding of the professions and the cohesiveness of intra-professional segments 
by showing how the field persistence mechanisms were also sources of internal 
cohesiveness of a profession in regard to division of labour and established intra-
professional hierarchies.  
These mechanisms glue the segments together within a profession by not creating any 
motivation to challenge the established status quo of intra-professional arrangements 
and hierarchies. For instance, within the jurisdictional contentment mechanism, we see 
that different segments develop different professional objectives that do not overlap. 
Their status concerns are different. This difference in professional objectives and 
status understanding allows the segments to collaborate without challenging the 
established diversity and hierarchy within the profession. Also, the fact that segments 
are emotionally and cognitively invested in their own worlds, with the collaborative 
environment that they have, creates strong bonds between each segment. These bonds 
are not as delicate as the literature suggests. The strength of these bonds is buttressed 
with the jurisdictional contentment mechanism. Furthermore, even when jurisdictional 
contentment is not in place or weakens for some reason, the lack of a career bridge can 
prevent segments from becoming similar and eventually creating a professional fusion, 
or from competing against each other to an extent that the integrity of a profession 
breaks down. That is, the lack of a career bridge within a profession holds segments in 
position. 
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A consequence of focusing on the heterogeneity of professions may help us to 
understand institutional change and continuity from a different perspective because 
“institutional theory has not taken the variety of actors seriously” (Zietsma et al., 2017: 
421) even though “that multiple populations and subfields inhabit a field enables us to 
understand better the potential for contradictions within the field” (Zietsma et al., 
2017: 409). Accordingly, my research explains a remarkable lack of contestation and 
contradiction within a very heterogenous and established field. While explaining the 
institutional persistence mechanisms of a professional field, my research also 
contributes to our understanding of how professions retain their integrity and 
cohesiveness during turbulent times by shedding light on how intra-professional 
dynamics become entrenched, and why they are retained over time. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Under the overarching question of why institutional continuity takes place in a context 
that extant theory would predict that it would not, this paper specifically examines why 
a pronounced change within an overarching institution, the judicial system, did not 
cause disruption within the professional field that occupied it. By proposing new 
theory on professional field persistence, this paper contributes to our understanding of 
institutional persistence by uncovering two field mechanisms of persistence that 
enable fields to stay robust in the face of exogenous shocks and glue the different 










The role of emotions in institutional processes has been increasingly recognised (Lok, 
Creed, Dejordy, & Voronov, 2017). Researchers have studied how emotions affect 
institutional work (Creed et al., 2014; Friedland, Mohr, Roose, & Gardinali, 2014; Gill 
& Burrow, 2018; Wright et al., 2017), institutional disruption (Zietsma & Toubiana, 
2018), the creation of new institutional logics (Fan & Zietsma, 2017), institutional 
control  (DeJordy & Barrett, 2014; Delmestri & Goodrick, 2016; Gabbioneta, 
Greenwood, Mazzola, & Minoja, 2013; Jarvis, 2017) and the relationship between 
institutional logics and power (Jakob-Sadeh & Zilber, 2018). Yet, despite these recent 
developments, Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence and Meyer (2017: 14)  have underlined  
that “we have much to learn” regarding emotions; without further insight, “our 
knowledge remains incomplete and disjointed in many respects” (Wharton, 2014: 
336). As a result, there have been consistent calls for more research on the role of 
emotions in institutional processes (Greenwood et al., 2017; Lok et al., 2017; Voronov, 
2014; Voronov & Yorks, 2015; Voronov & Weber, 2016; Zietsma & Toubiana, 2018; 
Moisander et al., 2016). 
One important gap in our understanding of how emotions play a role in institutional 
processes is the emotional component of institutional theorisation. Theorisation, a term 
coined by Strang and Meyer (1993),  is acknowledged as an important step of 
institutional change (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) where change agents 
“render ideas into understandable and compelling formats” to convince people toward 
change and adopt new practices and roles (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; 
Greenwood et al., 2002: 75; Mena & Suddaby, 2016; Strang & Meyer, 1993; Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005). So far, theorisation has been conceptualised as a cognitive 
process. Given the task of theorisation is to convince and motivate people to adopt 
new ideas and act accordingly (Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang & Meyer, 1993; 
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Voronov, 2014), the inattention to emotions in theorisation studies is particularly 
surprising since emotions “accompany all social actions, providing both motivation 
and goals” (Jasper, 1998: 397). In this regard, Voronov (2014: 185) noted that 
“research on theorisation can advance further by explicitly attending to the role of 
emotions. Whereas researchers have attended to how theorisations are produced…It is 
important to understand whether and how they are in fact received by audiences”.  
Therefore, with a particular focus on the reception of theorisation, the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine what role emotions play in the theorisation process.  
In this research, I draw on Barbalet’s (1993) macrostructural theory of self-confidence 
as a social emotion that is fundamental for action and agency. According to Barbalet 
(2001:90), “all action is ultimately founded on the actor’s feeling of confidence in their 
capacities and the effectiveness of those capacities. The actor’s confidence14 is a 
necessary source of action; without it, action simply would not occur”. Echoing 
Zietsma and Toubiana (2018), I believe that the way we experience emotions and 
express them are socially conditioned, even though we experience them individually. 
I also believe that emotions are not only intra-individual processes, but can be 
intersubjective and collective experiences (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001).  
This study offers two main contributions to institutional theory. First, it develops a 
revised theory of theorisation that incorporates emotions. In so doing, this paper shifts 
the attention from the extant theorisation literature’s traditional emphasis on cognitive 
processes towards emotional processes that are required for successful theorisation. 
Second, this study identifies self-confidence as a social emotion, something almost 
completely overlooked in the institutional literature, and shows how it is critical for 
realizing institutional change. 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
5.2.1 Theorisation 
Institutional change requires the adoption of proposed new structures and practices. 
This requires a successful ‘theorisation’ of new ideas (Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang 
& Meyer, 1993). Therefore, the concept of theorisation is an integral part of 
 
14 In this paper, ‘confidence’ and ‘self-confidence’ is used interchangeably. 
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institutional change. It is the process whereby new ideas are “abstracted into 
comprehensive and compelling theoretical models that foster institutional change and 
the subsequent diffusion of those roles and practices” (Mena & Suddaby, 2016: 1670). 
That is, theorisation is “the task of establishing why  new ideas should be adopted” by 
“the rendering of ideas into understandable and compelling formats” (Greenwood et 
al., 2002: 75).   
Building on Tolbert and Zucker (1996), Greenwood et al. (2002) argue that successful 
theorisation consists of two major tasks: specification of the failures of the existing 
system and justifications of the new ideas. That is, theorisation is the stage of an 
institutional change where failings regarding the existing system are clearly laid out, 
while potential solutions to those failures are offered and also convincingly indicated 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang & Meyer, 1993). That is why “diffusion occurs only 
if new ideas are compellingly presented as more appropriate than existing practices” 
(Greenwood et al., 2002: 60). 
In its core, theorisation is linked to the notion of legitimacy because new ideas should 
be legitimate to be accepted by the actors within the institution (Suchman, 1995). 
Legitimation may emerge through the means of mimicry where actors follow the 
exemplary and successful others and expect economic gains (Scott, 2013). However, 
without new ideas being diffused and adopted by at least some successful actors in the 
field, legitimacy of those new practices cannot be achieved. Therefore, legitimacy 
should be mostly achieved by theorising the new ideas before the diffusion stage. In 
this regard, Greenwood et al. (2002: 61) argue that in many settings, particularly in 
normative, highly institutionalized and mature ones, such as professional settings, 
“legitimacy is unlikely to be based exclusively, perhaps not even primarily, on 
anticipated economic returns. Instead, new ideas may also have to be justified by 
aligning them with normative prescriptions prior to their diffusion (in the theorisation 
stage)”.  Therefore, a successful theorisation includes “nesting and aligning new ideas 
within prevailing normative prescriptions, thus giving them ‘moral’ legitimacy and/or 
by asserting their functional superiority, or ‘pragmatic’ legitimacy” (Greenwood et al., 
2002: 60).  
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Mena and Suddaby (2016: 1672) argue that there are “two key components of 
theorisation”, theorisation of new practices/structures and theorisation of roles. In 
theorisation of practices and structures, the focus of theorisation efforts is on ensuring 
the adoption of the new practices and/or structures. For example, Greenwood et al. 
(2002) showed how the professional association for accountants in Canada theorised 
and legitimated change by engaging a discourse that reshaped the boundaries of what 
the profession does. Theorisation in their case involved portraying the problem in the 
existing system and offering a solution as that profession was under threat unless they 
extended their services in a multidisciplinary way. Justification of these new practices 
were linked to the values of the profession, rather than their functional superiority. At 
the end, the practices of the accountancy profession and the structure of the 
professional service firms were changed.  
In the theorisation of new roles, theorisation efforts focus on the roles of the actors to 
foster the new practices in a way that actors with their new roles and positions would 
engage in the new practices. For example, Rao et al. (2003) showed how activists 
theorised the new roles of chefs in French gastronomy. As a consequence of their 
theorisation of the new roles, chefs adopted the new practices and meanings associated 
with them, leading to institutionalisation of these practices. In this regard, Suddaby 
and Greenwood (2005) also showed that the role identities of lawyers and accountants 
were re-defined and re-established by different groups using competitive rhetorical 
strategies in the theorisation process of a profound institutional change.  
Theorisation strategies may differ depending on the context and field (Delmestri & 
Greenwood, 2016). For example, in highly established fields, those who promote 
change usually try to integrate the new practices into old ones. That is, after they 
specify the failings of the existing system, they present the new ideas in a way that 
does not necessarily portray them as the most effective or efficient way of things, but 
as the most harmonious and compatible ones with the existing structures, practices and 
roles (David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016). For example, 
In Greenwood et al.’s (2002) study, professional associations, acting as institutional 
entrepreneurs, emphasised that the change was well matched with the values and 
previous practices of the profession. In Reay, Golden-Biddle and GermAnn’s (2006) 
study, change agents, who wanted to create a new professional role of the nurse 
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practitioner, ‘hooked’ this role into existed professional practices and procedures. In 
Lounsbury and Crumley’s (2007) study, actors who wanted to bring new practices to 
the field emphasised that new financial practices and old ones could go together 
smoothly.  
However, in emerging fields theorisation may differ. For example, in David, Sine and 
Haveman’s (2013) study on the emergence of the  consulting field, in order to theorise 
the change, institutional entrepreneurs used cultural and social logics that were 
externally available to the emerging field, built the links with high status actors and 
external authority figures, acted collectively, and highlighted how the new practices 
and structures would benefit the society in general. Furthermore, Maguire, Hardy and 
Lawrence (2004) found that in the emerging field of HIV/AIDS advocacy involving 
pharmaceutical companies and community organizations, theorisation included 
making sure that diverse stakeholders’ interests were comprised in the arguments; 
establishing coalitions with those stakeholders thorough political means like 
negotiation, bargaining and compromise; and linking the new practices and structures 
to stakeholders’ existed practices, procedures and values. 
As a discursive process, the use of language has been crucial in theorisation processes, 
since it has to specify the problems about the existing practices and structures, offer 
and justify the innovations, and provide motivation to act for change to take place, 
diffuse and institutionalise (Battilana et al., 2009; Leca, Battilana, & Boxenbaum, 
2006). To be able to do so, it is known that theorisers used different rhetorical 
strategies (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) in their theorisation such as storytelling 
(Morrill & Owen-Smith, 2002; Zilber, 2007) and frames (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 
2002).  
The better and more successful the theorisation is, the faster the diffusion of new ideas 
is expected to be (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Höllerer, 2012; Rao et al., 2003). 
Strang and Meyer (1993: 499) further suggested that “theorisation itself is the diffusion 
mechanism.” Furthermore, according to Höllerer (2012: 85), “theorisation is an 
ongoing, never ending process” that occurs before, during and after the diffusion of 
new practices. In addition, Building on Green (2004), Gondo and Amis (2013: 236) 
argued that “for a practice to become accepted, it must first make sense”. That is, 
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participants should be compelled that new practices and roles have value (Birkinshaw, 
Hamel, & Mol, 2008). Such persuasion requires justification of new practices as 
solutions to existing problems or better options than the old ones - that is almost always 
a deliberate effort. Thus, theorisation is a constant process of convincing and 
motivating others to accept acting in desired new ways.  
Although all of the above studies enhance our understanding of theorisation of 
institutional change and its diffusion, but “for the most part, our understanding of 
theorisation remains overly general” (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016: 514). 
Particularly, as an “important concept in institutional theory, theorisation still has a 
very cognitive connotation, yet social change is often associated with strong emotions” 
(Lok, Creed, Dejordy, & Voronov, 2017: 611). In this regard, Voronov (2014:185) 
pointed out that “because theorisation is believed to motivate people toward change, 
it must have an … emotive component”. This is something I take seriously here by 
explicitly attending to the role of emotions in the theorisation process. 
5.2.2 Emotions and Institutions 
Although early institutional theorists (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Jaeger & Selznick, 
1964; Parsons, 1960; Selznick, 1951, 1957) suggested their importance, emotions have 
been largely overlooked by scholars. However, recently, there has been a concerted 
effort to discover the links between emotions and institutional dynamics. In these 
recent studies, emotions have been acknowledged and portrayed as “a critical link 
between macro institutional arrangements and people’s participation in institutional 
processes” (Delmestri & Goodrick, 2016: 236). Through emotions, people are 
connected to institutions that they inhabit (Zietsma & Toubiana, 2018). In addition to 
the technical conveniences institutions provide (Selznick, 1957), people care about 
institutions and have a deeper and visceral connection with them (Bourdieu, 2000; 
Friedland, 2018; Voronov & Weber, 2016; Zietsma & Toubiana, 2018). Emotions 
have been portrayed as the heart of the institutions because while they constitute 
institutions, institutions also constitute emotions (Voronov & Weber, 2016). 
Therefore, institutional theory views emotions as socially constructed. That is, while 
actors’ experience and expression of emotions are conditioned by the institution that 
 131 
they inhabit, their emotions also shape the very same institution. In this study, 
emotions are also considered as inherently social. 
There has been a particular interest in understanding how emotions affect the 
reproduction and change of institutions. For instance, Voronov and Vince (2012) 
argued the importance of emotional processes for understanding institutional work. In 
their paper, they developed a framework explaining emotional underpinnings of 
institutional maintenance, disruption and creation. They argued that individuals are 
emotionally and cognitively connected to the institutions that they are embedded in. 
They suggested that these connections, emotional and cognitive investments in another 
words, determine if an actor would be willing to change, maintain or disrupt a field. 
Voronov and Vince (2012) claimed that cognitive disinvestment from an institutional 
order may not be enough to engage in activities aiming change; or cognitive 
investment in an existing institutional order may not be enough to motivate actors to 
maintain the status quo. Therefore, they suggested that the level of emotional 
investment in the existing order, or disinvestment for that matter, would determine an 
actor’s institutional work involvement, more than the cognitive 
investment/disinvestment.  
According to Scott (2013:66) certain emotions are a “powerful inducement to comply 
with the prevailing norms” because, he suggests, people feel shame and disgrace when 
they violate norms of the institutions that they are embedded in; or feel pride and 
honour when they perform exemplary behaviour. In this respect, studies showed that 
institutions have a power of employing emotions as self-disciplinary and self-
regulative mechanisms (Lok et al., 2017). For instance, Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen and 
Smith-Crowe, (2014) argued how motivation to engage in institutional work of 
creating, disrupting and maintaining activities are strongly linked to actors’ experience 
of shame in different conditions. Jarvis (2016) also showed how institutionalised 
shame reinforced the institutions that constitute the collective identity of actors, 
physicians in his case, and how field level actors participated in shaming to control 
institutional change and its effects.  Moreover, Gabbioneta, Greenwood, Mazzola and 
Minoja (2013: 499) indicated how analysts who questioned the corrupt activities of a 
company were shamed and “ridiculed” into silence by their peers. In a similar vein, 
Delmestri and Goodrick (2016: 246) argued that institutional reproduction was not 
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achieved by only continuing support of appropriate emotions, but also by “the 
suppression of the upsurge of disruptive emotions”. Similarly, Gill and Burrow (2018) 
presented a case where fear maintained institutional values, guiding and mobilising 
particular behaviours while serving as a form of discipline and control.  
On the other hand, negative emotions similar to shame and fear are not the only ones 
that affect institutional maintenance and stability. For instance, Siebert and colleagues 
(2016: 1627) showed how people’s enhancement with the spaces, their feeling of awe, 
“may have a stabilizing effect on institutions”. Align with that, emotions are also 
presented as an important aspect of people’s experiencing institutions (Creed et al., 
2014; Lok et al., 2017; Voronov, 2014;Voronov & Weber, 2016). Voronov and Yorks 
(2015: 17) state “in order to understand why people perform some forms of 
institutional work and not others, we need to understand how people experience the 
institutional arrangements that not only shape the resources available to them but also 
make their lives meaningful and prime how they think and feel”. According to 
Voronov (2014), institutions prescribe which emotions people are expected to display 
under different conditions, as well as which emotions they actually feel privately under 
what circumstances. Voronov (2014: 186) argues institutional logics are not only 
sources of cognitive schemas and identities, but also “prescribe and proscribe certain 
emotions”. For example, while market logic is associated  with greed, pride could be 
associated with the nation state (Friedland, 2018). In this regard, Toubiana and Zietsma  
(2017: 944) coined the term emotional register which referred to “the rules for the 
legitimate use and expression of emotions within that logic”. That is, institutions 
prescribe what actors should feel, under what conditions and how to display it. 
Aligned with the idea of an emotional register of institutional logics, Voronov and 
Weber (2016: 457) developed the notion of emotional competence (EC) which means 
“the ability to experience and display emotions that are deemed appropriate for an 
actor role in an institutional order”. They positioned emotions at the core of institutions 
since Voronov and Weber argued that emotions form people as competent actors, 
create a reality for them and cause passionate identifications with institutions. In other 
words, “EC describes a capacity to belong to and inhabit an institutional order… and 
enables people to take up emotionally prescribed roles in a competent manner” 
(Voronov & Weber, 2016: 457). They also contributed the conversation on the 
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question of how people experience institutions and incorporated their 
conceptualisation of emotional competence into the concept of ‘inhabited institutions’ 
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) by depicting emotions as “central to the very constitution 
of people as institutional actors that hold a personal stake in an institution” (Voronov 
& Weber, 2016: 456). 
Friedland (2012: 593) states “institutions depend, both in their formation and their 
core, on a passionate identification” and “we cleave to institutional ways of doing 
because of the way they make us feel; indeed we are the way they make us feel. 
Institutions are not only ways of doing, but of being”  (Friedland, 2018: 8). That is, 
there is a strong link between identity of actors and institutions. Actors passionately 
identify themselves with the institutionalised meanings and values. Thus, a change in 
the institutional arrangements that provide meaning for actors’ lives may be 
‘distressing, anxiety provoking, anger inducing, or even terrifying’ (Voronov & Yorks, 
2015: 567). For example, while studying the importance of institutional context in the 
experience of stress at war, De Rond and Lok (2016: 1980) showed how war surgeons 
lost the institutionalised sense of “the meaningful, the good and the normal” and, as a 
result, they experienced “senselessness, futility, and surreality” because they identified 
themselves with the institutions that they were embedded and values and meanings 
attached to those institutions. Furthermore, Wright, Zammuto, and Liesch (2017) 
showed that violation of the values of professionals triggered moral emotions and these 
emotions motivated institutional maintenance work during the periods of conflict that 
was caused by the contradiction in values of different actors.  
Voronov and Vince (2012: 64) argue that actors in the field “attempt to reconcile their 
private emotional experiences with the demands of their position in the field”. In this 
regard, the contradictions between what actors really feel privately and the 
institutionally demanded emotion can also trigger institutional change. For example, 
Creed, DeJordy and Lok (2010) showed how emotions of actors, ministers with 
marginalised LGBT identities, who experienced salient institutional contradiction 
between their role and the institution that they are embedded in converted them into 
change agents.  Regarding experiencing contradictions and institutional change and 
stability, Voronov and Yorks (2015) studied how people apprehend institutional 
contradictions as they are usually considered as the triggers of institutional change. 
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They argued people differ in their capacity to apprehend institutional contradictions 
because actors experience the contradictions differently depending on their emotional 
identification with institutional logics and participation of institutional projects and 
processes. However, Wijaya and Heugens (2018) showed how emotions could 
sometimes be limited as the mobilisers of institutional work even though people 
apprehend the contradictions and feel uncomfortable. In their study, Wijaya and 
Heugens (2018) showed that even if actors become morally perturbed with the actions 
of institutional leaders and are willing to change the institution that they are embedded 
in, they may not be able to mobilize to change because of their emotional ties with the 
existing arrangements. 
Recent studies have also showed how emotions energize and motive actors for 
institutional creation such as creating new fields, increase field participation or 
creating new logics (Fan & Zietsma, 2017; Grodal & Granqvist, 2014), as well as 
bonding social groups and institutions (Lawrence, 2017). For instance, Fan and 
Zietsma (2017) showed that how actors that were embedded in different fields with 
different logics overcame the limitations of their own logics to create a new and shared 
logic by mobilizing three emotional facilitators: moral emotions, social emotions and 
emotional energy. Furthermore, Grodal and Granqvist (2014) studied how emotional 
responses to discourses play a role in decisions to participate to an emerging field. In 
their study on an emerging nano-technology field, they found that discourses, 
participants’ expectations regarding the future of the field, participants’ emotional 
responses to discourses and the decision to be a part of the emerging field were 
mutually constituted.  
Moreover, drawing on a study on building a supervised injection site for illegal drugs 
users in Vancouver, Canada; Lawrence (2017) revealed the role of emotions in 
institutional translation of practices taking place in high-stake settings. In his study, he 
showed that triggering institutional translation required intense emotions such as pain, 
anger and suffering, as well as the public expression of these emotions. The 
emotionally triggered translation process later unfolded further by the motivation 
created by the emotion of empathy when people started to understand drug users’ and 
their families’ pain and suffering. Lawrence also showed how emotions, particularly 
 135 
empathy and anger, served as a connecting mechanism that brought people and 
organizations together to follow a common aim. 
In addition, focusing on the role of reflexivity in institutional work, Ruebottom and 
Auster (2018) showed how emotions changed actors’ understandings of their selves 
and worldview and facilitated new structural arrangements. They argued that emotions 
are crucial for generating reflexivity that is required for institutional work. In their case 
study of an interstitial event aiming to stimulate agency among young people, 
Ruebottom and Auster (2018) found that emotions could be used to make actors reflect 
on their social position, then disembed them from these positions and re-embed them 
into a new social order. In their study, organisers of the event focused on creating 
emotional energy to make the young people to feel like to be a part of the new social 
order and re-embed them to the new structural arrangements.  
As the studies above show, emotions are not intra-individual, but constitutive of and 
by institutions (Lok et al., 2017). This approach to exploring institutions involves the 
study of social emotions (Creed et al., 2014; Lok et al., 2017) since they are the 
“reactions to our perceptions of our social standing and that of others relative to norms 
and standards within social structures” (Creed et al., 2014: 279). Social emotions are 
especially important for understanding institutional processes because they are “are 
implicated in the ways people make sense of and participate in the interactions that 
underpin the shared enactment of institutional arrangements”(Creed et al., 2014: 279). 
Therefore, there have been calls for studying social emotions in relation to specific 
institutional contexts (Creed et al., 2014; Lok et al., 2017).  While being positive or 
negative, social emotions can be other-directed like trust, respect, anger or self-
directed like guilt, pride, embarrassment and shame (Barbalet, 1996; Creed et al., 
2014). There is one particular self-directed social emotion that has been overlooked in 
both the sociology of emotions literature and the institutional theory literature, 
although it appears to be fundamental for action and agency: self-confidence. 
5.2.3 Self-confidence 
In this study, I particularly draw on Barbalet’s (1993) macrostructural theory of 
confidence where he argues that self-confidence as an emotion that can be distributed 
across macrostructures such as social classes and can be felt collectively by segments 
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of society. He conceptualises the emotion of self-confidence as a basic social emotion 
that is fundamental to action and agency.  According to Barbalet (2001: 90) “all action 
is ultimately founded on the actor’s feeling of confidence in their capacities and the 
effectiveness of those capacities. The actor’s confidence is a necessary source of 
action; without it, action simply would not occur”. 
Self-confidence has attracted the attention of scholars from different fields such as 
education and learning, marketing, sports management, leadership, organizational 
behaviour, law, medicine, nursing and health. There are also studies focusing on 
related concepts such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, hubris, pride, and narcissism. 
However, these studies are of limited utility for my study because they either take self-
confidence as a purely cognitive concept and assess it exclusively from a 
psychological point of view and/or they conduct laboratory experiments to measure 
and understand the self-confidence of actors, ignoring the importance of social context. 
I approach self-confidence from a macrostructural perspective and consider it as a 
social emotion. Nevertheless, none of the studies above draw a consensus on the 
definition and the conceptualisation of self-confidence (Perkins, 2018). I define it in 
terms of opposites, as Barbalet (1993, 1996; 2001) suggested, as I explain below. 
According to many scholars, confidence is considered as an emotion that is at the 
opposite end of the spectrum to anxiety, despair, depression, insecurity, fear, 
nervousness, shyness, shame, embarrassment, and doubt (Aristotle, 1926; Barbalet, 
1993, 1996, 2001; Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007; Collins, 1981, 2004; 
Darwin, 1872; Kemper, 1978, 2006; Kidwell, Hardesty, & Childers, 2007; Kleres & 
Wettergren, 2017; Poder, 2010; Summers‐Effler, 2002; Turner & Stets, 2005; 
Whittier, 2001). These emotions are considered as the emotions of low spirit or low 
energy that make people want to be motionless (Barbalet, 2001; Collins, 1981, 2004; 
Darwin, 1872). These emotions can be paralyzing (Jasper, 2006; Kleres & Wettergren, 
2017), making people “tongue-tied” (Collins, 1981: 1004), leading to uncertainty 
(Barbalet, 1993), limiting the opportunities and resources for action (Barbalet, 2001; 
Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978, 2006). However, “confidence stands in sharp contrast” 
to these emotions since it is “an emotion of assured expectation which is not only the 
basis of, but a positive encouragement to action” (Barbalet, 1993: 263). Furthermore, 
emotions such as shame and shyness, are the emotions of social control and conformity 
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and they limit the range of action by self-censure and shaming (Barbalet, 2001; Creed 
et al., 2014; Darwin, 1872; Jarvis, 2016; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & 
Edmondson, 2009). However, as a completely opposite emotional state, confidence 
“is the feeling which encourages one to go one’s own way” (Barbalet, 2001: 86). 
Furthermore, Aristotle (1926), in his Art of Rhetoric, presents confidence as one of the 
ten emotions that is fundamental to human nature. While portraying confidence as a 
‘courageous emotion”, he states that “confidence is the opposite of fear, and what 
causes it is the opposite of what causes fear” (Aristotle, 1926: 225). 
Confidence is a future oriented emotion since it involves projection of self in future 
with an assured expectation of success (Barbalet, 1993, 1996, 2001). According to 
Poder (2010: 113), “both self-projection and assured expectation are essential to 
human agency, which is possible only in so far as the individual is able to project his 
or her capacities into the future.” Therefore, since information regarding the future is 
never fully available and the future is essentially unknown; one’s feeling self-confident 
generates a sense of security regarding the future, connects the future into the present, 
and serves as a foundation for non-conformism that allows one to follow one’s own 
path (Barbalet, 1996, 2001). 
Barbalet  (1993: 230) goes further to explain why self-confidence is an emotion: 
There is widespread agreement that emotion typically includes a subjective 
component of feelings, a physiological component of arousal or bodily sensation 
and an impulsive or motor component of expressive gesture. Each of these obtain 
for the experience of confidence. The feeling of confidence has characteristic 
content and tone which is both experienced subjectively (one knows when one 
feels confident) and expressed behaviourally (others can see that one is 
confident). Those who feel confident are likely also to report bodily sensations 
of muscular control, deep and even breathing and other sensations of well-being.  
However, self-confidence is not an intra-individually experienced emotion. It is a  
social emotion that is relational and dependent on “the social gaze of the other” (Scott, 
2018: 5) as well as others’ acceptance and recognition. The greater the acceptance and 
recognition, the higher the actors’ feeling self-confidence (Barbalet, 2001). In a similar 
vein, the emotion of self-confidence is strongly related to Collins’ (2004) notion of 
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emotional energy. Collins (1981: 1001,1002) argues that emotional energy is manifest 
itself when an actor “successfully accepted into interaction” as a result feels 
“confidence, warmth and enthusiasm”. He defines emotional energy as “a feeling of 
confidence, courage to take action or boldness in taking initiative” (Collins, 2004: 34). 
This approach is also aligned with studies that suggest that how positive emotions like 
confidence also widen people’s outlook on the future, encourage them to secure 
resources for future action and encourage them to act (Fredrickson, 2001; Poder, 
2010). Positive organizational scholarship also suggests that an actor’s capacity for 
action increases through positive emotions and energy (Dutton & Glynn, 2008; Quinn, 
2007), “rather than merely assuming that agency will flourish either as a result of 
cognitive perceptions of self-efficacy (Poder, 2010, p. 115). Confidence is also 
portrayed as a positive emotion, which is a blend of some other positive emotions such 
as hope and optimism (Stajkovic, 2006). 
Like other emotions, self-confidence has cognitive components. The concept of self-
efficacy is presented as the cognitive component of self-confidence (Perkins, 2018; 
Stajkovic, 2006). Although the terms self-confidence and self-efficacy are usually 
used interchangeably in many studies, they are in fact is different.  Self-efficacy is “the 
conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour required to produce 
particular outcomes” (Bandura, 1977: 193). Therefore, self-efficacy is a belief. It is “a 
cognitive evaluation” of abilities and past experiences while self-confidence is an 
emotional experience (Quinn, 2007: 75). Therefore, self-efficacy is not the same 
concept as self-confidence because “how people cognitively perceive themselves is 
not necessarily reflected in how they feel” (Poder, 2010: 110). One might think that 
they are competent to perform a task without actually feeling that they are. For 
instance, a medical doctor may know and believe that he/she has the abilities to 
perform an operation successfully but does not feel confident in the operating room. 
Therefore, while self-efficacy is not the same as self-confidence, it is a cognitive 
building block of it and there is strong relationship with feeling self-efficacious and 
self-confident (Perkins, 2018; Poder, 2010; Stajkovic, 2006). 
One’s access to relevant resources for future action is another key factor for one to feel 
self-confident (Barbalet, 2001). The access to resources is crucial not for the 
immediate need, but their availability for the future (Barbalet, 1996). One cannot keep 
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feeling confident on being able to act in an unknowable future without secured future 
access to resources (Barbalet, 1993, 1996, 2001; Poder, 2010). Therefore, self-
confidence is not only dependent on social acceptance, but also admission to relevant 
resources; as Poder  (2010: 113) nicely puts it “self-confidence is a genuinely social 
emotion, since the way we experience it, and whether we experience it, depends on the 
social context of relevant resources in which the person concerned is inevitably 
enmeshed”. 
Drawing on Barbalet (2001), Voronov and Weber (2016: 457) state “emotions are 
central to lived experience and the self and, hence, to action formation and an expanded 
understanding of actorhood”. That is, emotions are crucial to understand the 
relationship between action, agency and structure. Self-confidence is particularly 
important because it is “essential to any action aimed at going beyond mere routine 
actions” (Poder, 2010: 112). However, as a social emotion that is so fundamental for 
action and agency, self-confidence, or self-efficacy as its cognitive component for that 
matter, is almost completely ignored in the institutional theory literature. Therefore, in 
this research, I address this lack of attention by studying self-confidence of 
professionals during an institutional change.  
5.3 Data Analysis 
For this paper, my research aim was to see how emotions play a role in theorisation of 
institutional change and in its reception by the recipients of the change. Therefore, I 
needed to uncover the theorisation process first in my data analysis. I aimed to present 
the theorisation process of the change agents in my case study as it was by laying out 
all aspects of the theorisation process.  
In the data analysis, I looked at three sources of theorisation: Lord Gill as the 
institutional entrepreneur, the Scottish Government as the actor who presented the 
reforms to the parliament, and other official judicial office holders who were 
occupying the key management positions of the judiciary during the introduction and 
implementation of the reforms. These officials were the Lord Carloway as the Lord 
President succeeding Lord Gill, Lady Dorrian as the Lord Justice Clerk, and Mhairi 
Stephen as the Sheriff President of the newly established Sheriff Appeal Court. 
Accordingly, first, I looked at theorisation of the change initiator Lord Gill. Table 5-1 
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presents my data structure regarding the theorisation of Lord Gill.  Second, I aimed to 
uncover the theorisation efforts of other judicial office holders and the Scottish 
Government. Table 5-2 shows the data structure for the theorisation of the judicial 
office holders between the years of 2013-2019 and the Scottish Government that 
presented the reforms as a bill to the Scottish Parliament that introduced the reforms 
by passing the bill.  
Table 5-1 Data structure for Lord Gill's theorisation 




• Lack of confidence in the justice system 
• Inefficiency 
• Victorian/antiquated system  
• Problems with the court hierarchy 
• Problems regarding professional 
inefficiency 
 
Specification of the 
failures of the 
















• Immediate need for change 
• Historical opportunity for change 
 Creating a sense of 
urgency for change 
• Missing the chance of change causing 
missing it for good 
• The reforms are historical opportunity/once 
in a generation opportunity 
• Giving the reforms moral legitimacy 
• Giving the reforms pragmatic legitimacy 
• Showing the credibility of the review 
• Providing solutions to specific problems 
 
Justifications of the 
new structures and 
practices 
 
• Framing the survival of the profession 
depending on the adaptability of change 
• Framing solicitors as resilient to change 




• Portraying an ideal justice system 
• Economic progress 
• International reputation 
• Independent justice system 
Developing and 
sharing a vision 
 
My reason to include other judicial office holders and the Scottish Government at the 
time was grounded in several reasons. First, the reforms were a project of the 
government at the time and the success of the reforms were important for them. 
Therefore, how they tried to theorise the change mattered. Second, Lord Gill, as the 
Lord President, was officially the leader of the other judicial office holders. These 
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office holders were the implementers of the reforms, as well as the bridge between the 
judiciary and the rest of the legal profession. They were obliged to follow and promote 
the agenda of the State and Lord Gill.  They were also considered as the leaders of the 
legal profession since they occupied the main judicial offices in the country. Finally, 
and more importantly, since theorisation is an ongoing process that continues until the 
new practices and structures are taken for granted (Höllerer, 2012; Strang & Meyer, 
1993), it was important for me to see how theorisation continued after Lord Gill retired 
in 2015. It was a time when the implementation process was not completed, and the 
new practices were not completely adopted. 
Table 5-2 Data structure for the theorisation of other judicial office holders and the Scottish 
Government 





• Victorian/antiquated system  
• Problems with the court hierarchy 
• Problems regarding professional 
inefficiency 
 
Specification of the 






• Giving the reforms moral 
legitimacy 
• Giving the reforms pragmatic 
legitimacy 
• Providing solutions to specific 
problems 
 
Justifications of the new 
structures and practices 
• Framing solicitors as resilient to 
change 
• Framing the reforms as an 
opportunity for solicitors 
• Encouragement for commitment 
Motivational Frames 
• Re-iterating and reminding the 
vision behind the change (without 
mentioning Lord Gill) 
• Re-iterating and reminding the 
vision of Lord Gill (with the 
specific acknowledgement of Lord 
Gill) 
• Praising the review and/or reforms 
 
Reminding/emphasising 
the vision behind the 
reforms 
 
The coding process for emotions of the change recipients was very challenging. The 
data showed that participants usually felt a blend of emotions regarding the new roles 
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and practices that the reforms presented for them. For instance, during the analysis of 
data, the first and second orders showed that solicitors felt different emotions, like fear, 
nervousness, insecurity, self-doubt and so on. They also felt a blend of these emotions. 
Therefore, it was very difficult for me to pinpoint which exact emotion the participant 
felt. I tried to combine similar emotions together during the second stage of data 
analysis and reached three second order themes: fear, anxiety and insecurity. Yet, I 
could see that these three emotions were still reflecting a blend of emotions and they 
had more to them to explain the empirical context that I had. 
When I looked at the literature on the sociology of emotions, I saw that the blend of 
these particular emotions was a sign of a lack of self-confidence (Aristotle, 1926; 
Barbalet, 1993, 2001; Collins, 1981, 2004; Kemper, 1978, 2006; Poder, 2010). That 
revelation was consistent with how I also interpreted the data at the time.  Based on 
my experiences and interactions in the field during the observations and interviews, I 
also had interpreted all these emotions as the reflection of the lack of self-confidence 
of solicitors. I had realised that the blend of emotions the participants felt and 
expressed was about their level of confidence.  That is, I interpreted my data as an 
interpretivist researcher and concluded that the blend of these emotions reflected that 
solicitorrs’ feel lack of self-confidence. As a result, by going back and forth between 
my data and the relevant literatures, I collapsed the first and second orders to the 
aggregate dimension of “lack of self-confidence” (please see Table 5-4 below).  In 
addition, more often than not, the same quote was coded into several first orders 
because it reflected several themes within it. The below Table 5-3 shows an excerpt of 
how I coded emotions in the first stage of my coding process and the memos I wrote 
during the first stage of data analysis.  
Table 5-3 An excerpt from the first cycle of coding process 
Quote Open codes Notes to myself 
• These are [personal injury and 
clinical negligence] usually very 
sensitive cases. You need 
confidence in your judgment [to 
do advocacy for those cases] 
• Does not trust his judgment 
• Confidence in professional 
judgement necessary for 
advocacy 
He explains why he does 
not do advocacy in court. 
He does not feel 
confidence in his 
professional judgement in 
complex cases.  
• I don’t have enough experience. I 
have to think what is best for the 
client. 
• Perceived lack of experience  
• Feeling Incompetent 
As a result of a cognitive 
process- evaluating and 
deciding that he/she did 
not have enough 
experience.  
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• I think £100,000 cut-off is twice 
what it is in England, and about 
five times what it is in Northern 
Ireland [implying too high to 
handle a case alone as a 
solicitor] 
 
• The threshold is too high 
• High value cases beyond the 
capacity of the solicitor 
 
• If it is a complex case, I instruct 
counsel.  
• We usually instruct advocates for 
important and high value cases.  
• If it is a straightforward case, I 
might consider handling it myself. 
• Complex cases are not for 
solicitors 
• High value cases are for 
advocates 
• Important cases for 
advocates 
• Straightforward cases for 
solicitors. 
 
• They [advocates] will do a better 
job and the fact that they will do a 
better job is not in itself is a 
reason to use them and the court 
wouldn’t think so but provided 
that it is appropriate then people 
will tend to just say, well I will just 
instruct counsel for this.  You 
know sometimes the argument can 
be quite nuanced and it is 
something you need somebody 
with the experience to be able to 
look at and reply to. 
• Belief that advocates will do 
a better job 
• Acknowledging that the fact 
that they will do a better job 
is not in itself is a reason to 
use them 
• Nuanced arguments are 
beyond the solicitor’s 
capacity -need advocates in 
that case. 
• Solicitors have less 
experience 
 
•  It makes your processes, it 
makes everything complicated, 
you have to be very strict, tight 
and accurate so there is probably 
a lot less leeway [in the newly 
established courts than local 
sheriff courts], I would say. Then 
you go and instruct counsel. 
• Have to be strict, tight and 
accurate 
• Strict environment-less 
leeway in the new courts 
• Complicated issues for 
advocates 
Is there a belief here that 
she cannot meet the high 
standards of the new 
established court? If not, 
why would she complain 
about the necessity of 
being tight and accurate 
and present it as a reason 
for instructing advocates? 
• Well, chronically inadequate, I 
must say [when asked how she 
feels if she does not instruct an 
advocate for complex cases]. 
• Feeling 
inadequate/incompetent  
Here does chronically 
mean that she has a 
persistent/never going 
away feeling of 
inadequacy?  
• We do mock trials and trainings 
regularly here, but it is not the 
same, is it? It is terrifying in real 
life. Sheriffs are terrifying. I’m 
worried about my performance all 
the time. The mock trials, they 
don’t help much because I can’t 
afford making a mistake in real 
life. I have to think about the 
client’s best interests 
• Terrified because of sheriffs 
• Appearing in court is 
terrifying in real life 
• Insecure 
• Fear of failure 
• Fear of hurting client by 
mistake 
• Worried about his 
performance 
Here is another blend of 
emotions. The participant 
is here explaining why she 
prefer instructing counsel 
instead of appearing 
herself. 
Is fear of hurting client can 
also be considered as fear 
of failure? I believe so 
• She [a sheriff] brings solicitors up 
to just to give them a row and 
ending up making them cry in a 
packed room. I cannot face that. 
• Fear of embarrassment  
• Reluctant to raise action in 
ASPEC (because of sheriffs’ 
attitude) 
• Sheriffs are strict  
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It’s embarrassing. I’m reluctant 
to raise actions there by myself. 
• They [solicitors] get very anxious, 
they get very nervous, it requires 
your mind to work in a particular 
way, you would probably have to 
be quick-thinking, which isn’t 
necessarily the same as, well it 
often isn’t the same as deep-
thinking but there is no point in 
thinking of a clever question when 
you have sat down and closed 
your case.  You have to be able to 
think of a clever question whilst 
you are there and the preparation 
is demanding. 
• Solicitors feel anxious- from 
a sheriff’s point of view 
• Solicitors feel nervous- from 
a sheriff’s point of view 
• Advocacy require the mind 
to work in a particular way 
• Advocacy require to be 
quick thinking  
• Advocacy requires 
demanding preparation 
Sheriffs’s opinion on 
solicitors’ emotions 
 
• I don’t appear in court. I have my 
network of counsel that I trust, I 
instruct them. My husband is in 
the Bar, you see. I know how hard 
they work and they provide the 
best representation that you can 
get, to be honest. – Why don’t you 
appear yourself? It is not my 
thing. – can you elaborate a bit 
more, please. I don’t like it. it is a 
very tense process. The 
preparations, the responsibility 
and all.  
• Not appearing in court 
• Regular instruction of 
counsel 
• Advocacy require hard work 
• Advocates provides the best 
representation- They are 
better than solicitors 
• Feeling tense during the 
process of appearing in 
court (nervous?) 
• Avoidance of responsibility 
• Avoidance of preparations 
• Don’t like advocacy 
She was reluctant to talk 
about her feelings and why 
she does not want to 
appear in court. Gave me 
the feeling that she feels 
very incompetent 
regarding on feet 
performances. 
 
Table 5-4 Data structure for coding for emotions 
First Orders Second Orders Aggregate Dimensions 
• Fear of failure 
• Fear of embarrassment 
• Fear of angry sheriffs 
• Fear of going to court 
• Feeling terrorised 
• Feeling terrified 







(Public and private) 
• Feeling nervous 
• Feeling tense  
• Feeling anxious 




• Feeling inadequate 
• Feeling incompetent 
• Self-doubt 
• Feeling insecure 
Feeling insecure 
 
• Advocacy needs one to believe 
in himself/herself  
• Advocacy needs one to 
presents confidence in the 
court room 
• Must be confident in their 
judgements 
Expected emotional display in the 
field for performing advocacy 
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Another important point regarding the coding for emotions was to realise that there 
were cognitive assessments of participants that affected how confident they feel about 
their professional capacities in the face of the changes. In other words, they measured 
up their skills and concluded that they were not competent enough to handle the new 
roles and practices that the reforms offered. However, it was hard, and even 
impossible, to differentiate if the lack of self-confidence caused these perceived 
negative self-efficacy assessments or if these self-efficacy assessments caused the lack 
of self-confidence. The literature on emotions, particularly the literature on social 
emotions, helped me on this issue, too. We know that emotions constitute what people 
think cognitively, and what people think constitute how they feel (Turner, 2014b; 
Zietsma & Toubiana, 2018). There exists a recursive relationship. Also, literature on 
self-confidence suggested that self-confidence has a cognitive component that is 
‘perceived self-efficacy’. That is, the self-efficacy assessments are the cognitive 
building block of self-confidence as an emotion (Perkins, 2018; Poder, 2010; 
Stajkovic, 2006). Consequently, these self-efficacy assessments affect how confident 
the participants feel emotionally, and in turn, how confident one feels affect how 
he/she perceive his/her self-efficacy (Perkins, 2018; Poder, 2010; Stajkovic, 2006). At 
the end, while acknowledging this recursive relationship, I collapsed the first order 
statements reflecting a sort of cognitive assessment to the second order of ‘perceived 
self-efficacy’ (please see Table 5-4 above). 
Further, since self-confidence is a social emotion and highly dependent on the gaze of 
others, I included what others think of solicitors and their professional capacities to 
my data analysis to create a connection with the social context.  Therefore, I also 
• Lack of belief in the ability to 
meet the standards for 
court/sheriffs/clients 
• Lack of belief in professional 
competency 
• Lack of belief in professional 
skills and abilities 
• Belief that she/he is lacking 
necessary professional traits 
(confident, expert, persuasive, 
risk taker, quick thinker etc.) 





uncovered the dominant belief within the legal profession regarding the professional 
capacities of its members by the “pattern inducing” technique (Reay & Jones, 2016: 
449). Pattern inducing is a good fit with a constructivist-interpretivist research 
philosophy and related methodological approaches (Reay & Jones, 2016). Following 
the framework provided by Reay and Jones (2015), I worked thorough the data 
inductively, with a bottom up approach, to capture the dominant belief within the 
profession. Since beliefs are “revealed through language, practices, and manifested in 
symbols and materials” (Reay & Jones, 2016: 442), I made sure that  the data regarding 
symbolic and material aspects of the legal profession was considered in the data 
analysis. Then, similar to the process I explained in data analysis section the 
Methodology chapter (Chapter 2), I re-categorised the open coded data and reached 
the second-order codes, then I further re-categorised the second orders to reach the 
dominant institutional belief (please see Table 5-5). 
Table 5-5 Data structure for coding for dominant belief regarding solicitors in the field 
First Orders Second Orders 
Aggregate Dimensions 
(Dominant belief) 
Solicitors needs advocates for: 
• Complex-complicated 
cases/parts 
• Important cases 
• High Value cases 
• Challenging cases/parts 
• Difficult cases 
• Equality of arms 
• Cases requiring specialism 
Perceptions on Advocates’ 
competency 
Dominant belief in the field 
that solicitors are 
professionally inferior 
(Lack of external 
authorization) 
 
Solicitors can only handle: 
• Easy cases/parts 
• Straightforward cases 
• Low value cases 
Perceptions on Solicitors’ 
competency 
Advocates are: 
• Very experienced 
• Equipped with better 
training 
• Very skilled in different 
ways 
• Have good performance in 
court-no mistakes 
Perceptions on advocates’ 
skills and expertise 
• Best lawyers become 
advocates 
• Solicitors will always need 
advocates 
Belief that solicitors will 
never be as good as advocates 
• Only advocates can be 
judges 
Reflections of assumed 
expertise 
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• Only advocates can appear 
in higher courts 
• Solicitors’ not being 
allowed to enter the Faculty 
of Advocates 
• Advocates’ wearing 
different clothes- wigs, 
gowns 
• Advocates’ having ancient 
traditions that are not 
shared/practiced by 
solicitors 
• Advocates’ using jargon 
Symbolic and Material 
Superiority 
• Lack of confidence of 
solicitors 
• Their reluctance to appear 
in court because of 
nervousness, being out of 
their depth, anxious and so 
on 
Perception on solicitors’ 
emotional fitness for 
advocacy 
 
Then I brought the aggregate dimension of tables 5-5 and 5-4 together to reach further 
theoretical inferences. Going back and forth between the data and literature helped me 
to realise the fact that actors’ capability to display a particular emotion publicly, feel 
it privately, and get external authorization on their capacities were the components the 
concept of emotional competence for institutional actorhood (Voronov & Weber, 
2016). The below Table 5-6 presents this process. 
Table 5-6 Data structure for reaching further theoretical inferences 
Aggregate dimensions from table x and z Further theoretical inferences 
Lack of Self Confidence (Public display and 
private experience) 
 





In this research, I examined the role of emotions in the theorisation of institutional 
change processes. In so doing, I only focused on the solicitors, including solicitor 
advocates, and their reception of theorisation since three main purposes of the reforms, 
decreasing cost, increasing efficiency and increasing access to the justice system, 
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predominantly hinged on solicitors. That is, solicitors’ adopting new arrangements 
mattered for the change initiators to realise the reforms. 
The Scottish civil justice reforms required a wide array of practices and structures in 
many aspects of the justice system to change in order to solve a wide range of 
problems. After a long and largely smooth implementation process, the justice system 
was profoundly changed with its new structures and processes in place and running 
successfully. Yet, in one particular area regarding the increase of the threshold in the 
sheriff courts, solicitors did not adopt the new practices although that was crucial for 
the reforms to reach the desired end of ‘decreasing cost and increasing efficiency’. 
This particular outcome was highly dependent on the solicitors because their adopting 
new practices and structures would reduce the legal expenses for public and the state 
significantly while increasing access to and efficiency in the courts. Here the new 
practices and structures refer to solicitors’ handling high value cases alone, without 
instructing advocates, from the beginning of the case until the end and conducting oral 
arguments in the sheriff courts. 
In other words, by shifting cases from higher courts to sheriff courts, it was expected 
that legal expenses would significantly be reduced both for the public and the state, 
primarily for four reasons. First, there would not be a need for expensive advocates’ 
services in the sheriff courts. Second, the state would not have to pay additional fees 
for advocates’ services since there would be no automatic access to counsel in the 
sheriff courts. Third, the overhead fees in sheriff courts, such as the salaries of judges, 
are cheaper than the fees in the Court of Session. Fourth, legal fees for raising a case 
are cheaper in the sheriff courts than in the Court of Session. In this regard, theorisation 
of change mattered because solicitors had to be convinced to adopt the new practices 
and reduce their use of advocates. However, my findings suggested that theorisation 
notably failed in this regard and consequently solicitors did not adopt the new practices 
and structures.  
In my data analysis, three themes emerged: theorisation efforts, the reception of the 
theorisation efforts: lack of self-confidence and the dominant belief in the field 
regarding the professional competency of solicitors and advocates. Next, each theme 
will be explained in detail. 
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5.4.1 Theorisation Efforts 
5.4.1.1 Lord Gill’s Theorisation of the Change 
The data analysis showed that Lord Gill actively tried to theorise the reforms from the 
early times of preparing the review regarding the Scottish civil justice system until his 
retirement in 2015. In his review, as well as in the speeches addressed to either 
solicitors or to the whole legal profession, he followed several steps to theorise the 
change: specification of the failures of the existing system, justification of the new 
practices and structures, creating an urgency for change, having and sharing a vision, 
and deploying motivational frames. Next, I will explain each of these steps in detail. 
Specification of the failures of the existing system. Lord Gill’s theorisation efforts 
included specifying the failures, “flaws” or “fundamental weaknesses” in the existing 
system and explaining how these problems cause “failing in delivery of justice”. The 
data analysis showed that his theorisation of the problems within the system could be 
categorised into subgroups of expensiveness, organization, the publics’ lack of 
confidence in the justice system, problems with the hierarchy of courts, problems 
regarding professional inefficiency, and having an antiquated system.  
In this regard, Lord Gill continuously emphasised how expensive the system was in 
his speeches and the report on the Scottish civil justice system that he wrote. The data 
showed that in every public speech where he mentioned the Scottish civil justice 
reforms, Lord Gill emphasised the fact that “access to justice is inevitably and 
inextricably linked with affordability”, as he did in his “Looking over the horizon” 
speech in 2014. For example, in his speech in the Holyrood Conference in 2015, that 
was addressed to the legal profession as a whole, he stated that “future generations will 
be surprised to learn that we tolerated a system in which the legal costs of the first day 
of an action could exceed the value of the claim.”  According to the data analysis, high 
fees in the Court of Session, cost of unnecessarily instructing counsel for the state and 
for public, cost of delays, and cost of not using advances in information technology 
(IT) effectively were the main aspects of his specification of the problem of the 
expensiveness of the system. 
He also emphasised that the system was inefficient due to being slow, having delays 
and backlogs, the lack of using IT, overreliance on temporary resources, haphazard 
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organization of the court system and pressure of criminal business on courts. In 
addition, Lord Gill presented professional inefficiency as another problem that the 
system was suffering from. He particularly complained that the lack of specialisation 
in the judiciary, inappropriate and unnecessary use of advocates’ services, excessive 
workloads of sheriffs and judges, and solicitors’ taking too many cases – just for 
convenience – to the Court of Session instead of using the local sheriff courts. For 
instance, he noted in the speech to the Holyrood Conference in 2015: 
The whole purpose of these reforms is to maximise the efficiency and the output 
of the courts. We can no longer allow the progress of an action to be dictated by 
the convenience of the parties or their lawyers. The court has interests and 
responsibilities of its own. 
 
Lord Gill also explicitly mentioned the professional inefficiency problems in the report 
that he wrote: 
In a legal system in which most litigations are conducted by solicitors or counsel, 
the court should no longer be tolerant of professional inefficiency where the 
effects of it are to put an added burden on the judiciary and the court 
administration, to cause needless expense to the parties and to add to the law’s 
already notorious delays. In these respects, too, it is for the court to assert the 
public interest. Nor should it tolerate its own inefficiencies (Gill, 2009a: ii). 
 
In his theorisation efforts while he was specifying the problems with the existing 
system, Lord Gill portrayed efficiency problems as one of the core issues buttressed 
by and also the result of the other specified problems. For example, Lord Gill 
frequently stressed that the civil justice system was Victorian and functioned with 
antiquated structures and practices that also contributed to inefficiency of the system. 
Although linked to inefficiency issue, Lord Gill also portrayed having an antiquated 
system as a separate issue leading to failure in keeping up with modern Scotland and 
its needs. He repeatedly mentioned that these antiquated practices and structures 
caused inadequate remedies for the public, therefore failing to deliver justice in the 
21st century as he stated in his review: 
The basic structure of civil jurisdictions in the Scottish courts remains much as 
it was in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, fast moving changes in the 
social and economic life of Scotland in recent decades have left us with a 
structure of civil justice that is seriously failing the nation (Gill, 2009a: i). 
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He also frequently stressed,  as he in his speech to Law Society of Scotland in 2009, 
how “Scotland is far behind many other jurisdictions in its use of IT” and how the 
ancient methods, procedures, and paperwork styles, within court practices were in 
place for over more than one hundred years. In this regard, in his review, he stated:  
The practitioners of 100 years ago would have little difficulty in picking up the 
threads of today’s system In the Scottish civil courts, processes are still 
conducted as a paper exercise. Data keeping is done by manual counts. The 
format of pleadings and many of their stylised formularies have not changed in 
over 100 years (Gill, 2009a: iii). 
 
Another group of problems that Lord Gill specified while theorising the change was 
regarding the established court hierarchy. He portrayed the issue of court hierarchy as 
the “root of the civil justice problem in Scotland” in his review where he stated that: 
The root of the civil justice problem is that Scotland, uniquely among the major 
jurisdictions of the British Isles, has no proper hierarchy of civil courts at first 
instance or at appellate level. It has a flat, two‐level structure of first instance 
courts whose jurisdictions for the most part overlap. It has only one appellate 
court, to which most litigants can appeal without leave (Gill, 2009a: iv). 
 
According to Lord Gill, the problem of having “no proper hierarchy of civil courts” 
also led to other problems such as such as jurisdiction overlap between courts, 
unsatisfactory appeal process, and waste of judicial resources including talent of 
judges in the Court of Session because of the fact that the Court of Session was clogged 
up by “cases with modest value and of no legal importance” and “the decisions was 
being made at a needlessly high level”. He stated in his review that: 
In the Court of Session, the lower limit of value is much too low. It enables 
actions to be raised in that court that should be beneath the proper countenance 
of a supreme court. They are a needless burden on its resources (Gill, 2009a: v). 
 
He also frequently complained that “litigants have virtually unrestricted access to the 
Court of Session” (Gill, 2009a: iii) and all this made the Court of Session “a playpen 
for certain frivolous and irresponsible party litigants” (Gill, 2009a: iii). For example, 
he stated that: 
In a proper hierarchy, the litigant should not have a choice of two courts of equal 
jurisdiction. There should be a classification by which a litigation should be 
conducted only in the court that is appropriate for it by reason of its nature, value 
or importance. Without such a basic principle, the system is bound to deploy its 
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resources wastefully, to inflict needless expense on the litigants and to fail to 
deliver justice promptly (Gill, 2009: iv). 
 
Lord Gill kept emphasising that it was “ridiculous” to have a lower limit of £5000 for 
civil cases to be heard “in the highest court in the land” (Gill,2009a: ii), as he did in 
his speech to Holyrood Conference in 2015: 
Future generations will be surprised to learn that in the early years of the 21st 
century there were sections of the legal profession who thought it right to 
conduct civil litigations of a values of £5000 in the highest court in the land. 
 
Several times, Lord Gill also pointed that it was waste of sheriffs’ talents since they 
only deal with cases with a value that is less than £5000. He portrayed sheriffs as 
capable judges who could handle high value cases and stressed that the existing 
hierarchy of courts not only wasted the resources of the Court of Session, but also the 
resources of sheriff courts. For instance, in this respect, while comparing the situation 
with England’s justice system, he stated in his review: 
It is inconceivable that an English circuit judge15 would ever have to deal with 
the sort of minor business, civil and criminal, that constitutes so much of the 
workload of the sheriff court (Gill, 2009a: v). 
 
While he was specifying the problems regarding the existing system, he always 
stressed that all these problems were causing another big problem that was the public’s 
lack of confidence in the justice system. According to Lord Gill, “public confidence 
in the system is being eroded” (Gill, 2009a: i) and “all these [problems] diminish 
public respect for the law and cause a loss of confidence in society’s ability to resolve 
disputes justly” (Gill, 2009a: iv). In this regard, Lord Gill did not only mean individual 
litigants, but also commercial litigants such as banks and international corporations. 
He stated in his review, “some Scottish commercial undertakings have so little 
confidence in our system that they enter into contracts providing for English 
jurisdiction and choice of law” (Gill, 2009a: i) and he found this unacceptable. 
Justification of the new structures and practices. Lord Gill’s theorisation efforts 
also included the justification of the change and how the designed reforms provided 
 
15 A judicial position in England that is similar to a sheriff judge in Scotland 
 153 
solutions to the specified problems. According to the data analysis, he tried to achieve 
justification by three means: proposing specific solutions to the problems identified, 
giving the reforms moral and pragmatic legitimacy, and showing the credibility of the 
review that was the source of the reforms. 
Lord Gill and his team identified the problems within the system in the review they 
wrote on the Scottish civil justice system. In the review, they also offered a number of 
recommendations as solutions to those problems and explained in a detailed way how 
solutions would work if they were applied. After the review was published, Lord Gill 
continued to explain how the offered reforms would provide solutions to the problems 
of the system in his speeches. Lord Gill proposed a short-term or long-term solution 
to all the problems he mentioned in the review. For instance, he frequently elaborated 
on how the reforms would free the Court of Session since it would, as he also stated 
in his Holyrood Conference speech, “no longer bear the burden of low value 
litigations”. He also stressed how these reforms would solve the problems regarding 
hierarchy of courts because of the establishment of the new courts and appellate 
procedures, as well as the shift of cases from the Court of Session to the sheriff courts. 
He explained how the reforms would cause cost-saving, increase efficiency, prevent 
delays, increase the use of IT, enable sheriffs to manage cases better, maximise the 
productive use of court time, provide more specialism in the profession, enable 
constant monitor of the system, and so on.  
Furthermore, he tried to give moral legitimation to the reforms by linking the reforms 
to the values and principles of the justice system, and the legal profession. He 
explained in a detailed way how the reforms were strongly linked these values and 
principles.  Lord Gill claimed that the reforms were to protect the “admired qualities 
of fairness, incorruptibility and expertise of our judicial system” (Gill, 2009a: i). For 
example, he mentioned in his speech to the Holyrood Conference that the reforms were 
necessary since the justice system should “serve the litigant and to the wider 
community and its needs” or “courts and judges can and should contribute to the 
prosperity of the country”. He also said these reforms would enable the legal 
profession to “secure the rights of litigants”  and  “protect the independence of the 
system” in his speech to The Commonwealth Law Conference, “maintain Scotland’s 
reputation throughout the legal world” in his speech in the ceremony of his instalment 
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as the Lord President and Lord Justice General in 2012, “deliver the quality of justice 
to which public is entitled” in his review (Gill, 2009a: i) and so on. He stressed that 
the reforms were the opportunity to be able to do so. He stated at the Holyrood 
Conference in 2015: 
We have an opportunity now to improve upon these efficiencies and to avoid 
a relapse into the bad old ways. More importantly, we have a responsibility to 
litigants, to the public, and to the profession to ensure that our judiciary has 
control of the business of our courts. That responsibility is great. 
Furthermore, linking the principles and ideals of the legal profession and the reforms, 
Lord Gill several times portrayed the reforms as the opportunity to enact those ideals 
as he stated in his speech of opening the legal year 2013: 
These are troubled times for the profession [because of the reforms and upheaval 
they caused].  Change inevitably creates uncertainty, especially in the course of 
an economic recession.  I appreciate and understand the profession’s concerns, 
but it may be opportune if we recall that the legal profession is a profession of 
learned men and women whose ideal is that of service; service to the rule of law; 
to the courts and to the client.  For judges, our ideal is to give impartial and 
fearless justice to all who come before us.  This is our opportunity to commit 
ourselves afresh to these ideals. 
Or as in another speech, to the Law Society of Scotland in 2014, where he talked to 
the solicitor branch of the profession, he said: 
This ancient and learned profession has survived many radical changes. It 
continues to be respected for the excellence and professionalism of its members. 
The solicitor profession, in my view, must continue to reinvent and renew itself; 
to anticipate changes in the law, the market and society and participate in the 
process of change; and above else uphold its reputation as ‘trusted adviser of 
choice’ offering unique and skilled services to the client. An opportunity 
presents itself to do all of those things.  
Moreover, framing the reforms as a pathway to “increase access to justice” provides a 
moral legitimacy for them and makes it hard to say “no” to the change.  Lord Gill also 
several times stressed that the proposed reforms were proposed by the judiciary and 
not by politicians, as he did in his speech to the Law Society of Scotland in 2009 where 
he “urge[d] all the professionals to embrace a lawyer-led programme for reforms”.  
As mentioned above, Lord Gill’s presenting reforms as solutions to problems of the 
system pointed to their pragmatic value such as how the reforms would save costs, 
help economic progress, increase access and so on. That is, Lord Gill tried to create 
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pragmatic legitimacy by explaining their practical value. He frequently emphasised 
the functional superiority of the proposed reforms over the existing system. Several 
times, he highlighted how he and his team created a change that was “a pragmatic and 
practical programme of reform” and how “the new regime is logical and rational”, as 
he stated in his speeches to the Law Society of Scotland in 2009 and the Holyrood 
Conference in 2015. 
Furthermore, Lord Gill stressed that the reforms were designed in a way that secured 
their integration with the existing system in a pragmatic manner. For instance, he stated 
in his review that: 
Rather than make proposals requiring major investment that we could not cost, 
we have considered what practicable changes can be made to the existing 
system, accepting many of its limitations and trying as best we can to adapt it to 
meet current problems with best use of the existing infrastructure (Gill, 2009a: 
ii).  
 
He went on to explain: 
Our priority has been to make recommendations for pragmatic reforms that can 
be readily implemented at reasonable cost and will reduce the cost of litigation 
to the public purse and to the litigant. But will lead to new ways of thinking 
about the civil justice system and to the creation of mechanisms by which it can 
be reformed by continual evolution rather than by ad hoc changes. In this way, 
immediate and long‐overdue gains will be the precursors of more fundamental 
gains in the long term (Gill, 2009a: ii).  
 
Moreover, Lord Gill emphasised that the reforms would provide different benefits to 
different stakeholders such as solicitors, sheriff judges, the public and so on. While 
doing this he addressed the pragmatic value of the reforms for different groups that I 
will discuss in the next section. 
Lord Gill’s justification efforts also included trying to increase the credibility of the 
review of the Scottish civil justice system that the reforms were based on. He 
frequently stressed how much research had been done for the review and how his 
review team worked hard and conducted very thorough research. He kept emphasising 
that the review was based on “statistical data never before collected” (Gill, 2009a: iii) 
and how he and his team “have consulted widely and thoroughly” to different 
stakeholders (Gill, 2009a: x). In his speeches, he provided statistics deriving from their 
research that presented the conclusion of the review as the only logical outcome. Lord 
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Gill stressed that the offered solutions in the review were “not plucked from the air”, 
as he stated in his speech titled “Looking over the horizon” in 2014, but they were 
grounded on research and facts. Therefore, he provided justification for the process of 
determining the problems with the existing system as well as the solutions the review 
offered for those problems. For example, he explained, in his speech to the Law 
Society of Scotland in 2009 that: 
We have carried out a wide-ranging examination of the structure of the courts, 
their jurisdictions and their procedures. We have amassed a body of information 
never before collected in one source. We have received evidence from 
respondents to the consultation paper, from statistical data compiled by SCS16 
and from comparative studies of other jurisdictions. We have also held numerous 
meetings with interested bodies and individuals. 
He also stated that “the responses to the consultation paper were clear on the areas 
where reform is needed” in his speech to the Law Society of Scotland in 2009 or “we 
have carried out a remarkably successful consultation exercise that has left us with a 
clear vision for the future of civil justice in Scotland” (Gill, 2009a: x) in his review .   
Creating an urgency for change. According to my data analysis, building on the 
problems of the existing system that he specified, Lord Gill also tried to create a sense 
of urgency for change as a part of his theorisation efforts. By creating an urgency for 
change, Lord Gill justified the change itself. That is, he theorised why change must 
take place. He did this in two ways. First, in his speeches and in his review, Lord Gill 
claimed that there was an “immediate need” for change. He repeatedly stressed that 
the change was “long overdue” and “minor modifications to status quo is no longer an 
option” (Gill, 2009a: i) and the system needed an “urgent” change. He focused on how 
the civil justice system had been neglected for centuries, hence, the problems 
accumulated and created a “big mess”. He acknowledged that the solutions he offered 
in his review were limited because he was “constrained by considerations of cost and 
time” (Gill, 2009a: ii). He justified the limitations of the solutions offered by stating 
the urgency of change. For instance, in this regard, he stated that “In such an exercise 
[starting from scratch and devising a system of perfect civil justice], in our opinion, 
 
16 Scottish Court Services 
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the best would truly be the enemy of the good. The urgency of the matter is such that 
we cannot await the outcome of an exercise of that kind” (Gill, 2009a: ii). 
Furthermore, he provided regular reminders of the drastic consequences of not 
changing - that also implied a sense of urgency. He frequently explained if the reforms 
did not take place how the system would “perpetrate injustice”, “continue to fail the 
public”, cause Scots law to “face atrophy” and cause “independent legal profession to 
face an uncertain future”. For instance, in his speech in the Law Society of Scotland’s 
60th Anniversary Conference, he said that:  
Unless there is major reform and soon, individual litigants will be prevented 
from securing their rights, commercial litigants will continue to look elsewhere 
for a forum for their claims, public confidence in the judicial system will be 
further eroded, Scotland’s economic development will be hindered, and Scots 
law will atrophy as an independent legal system. The conclusions of our Review 
are as stark as that. 
Lord Gill also tried to create a sense of urgency for change by portraying his detailed 
review of the system as a historical opportunity for the country, implying that the 
chance to make things right would not come again in a long time. In his report, he 
stated that: 
The opportunity offered by this Review has been too long delayed. If it is not 
taken now, many years may pass before it arises again. In that event, the scale 
of necessary reform will continue to grow (Gill, 2009a: viii). 
At his speech at the Law Society of Scotland’s 60th Anniversary Conference, he stated 
that “this is not the time for tinkering with the system. We have had that for a century 
or more. This review is an opportunity to make a lasting difference”. He also stated in 
his speech to Law Society of Scotland in 2014, “it [not taking the opportunity] will 
merely postpone the difficult questions for another day. Experience shows that in civil 
justice reform ‘another day’ comes only once in a generation.” 
Motivational frames. The data analysis showed that Lord Gill aimed to theorise the 
change in a way that would increase the engagement of the legal professionals in the 
new practices and structures. First, he depicted the change as something “unavoidable” 
and “constant” in the legal world and gave previous examples of changes that occurred 
in the Scottish Justice System. He pointed that radical change would have come in any 
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way since the change is unavoidable. For example, he stated in his speech to the 
Holyrood Conference in 2015: 
Even without the civil justice reforms the profession would have faced the 
prospect of radical change. Consider the changes that have occurred in the 
profession since we reported in 2009. Would anyone now contend that, for 
example, the structure of the solicitor profession or the system of legal aid will 
be the same in ten years’ time as it is now?  
He also frequently stressed that the legal profession needed to adapt to survive: 
It is my impression that those lawyers who opposed change assumed that the 
profession was living in a static legal world. Events have disproved that 
assumption. In the Scottish legal world change is all around. Solicitor firms of 
high repute have gone to the wall. Famous legal names have disappeared as a 
result of the entry of international law firms into Scotland (Holyrood 
Conference, 2015). 
Building on his theorisation of change as something that is unavoidable and must be 
adapted to, Lord Gill further framed the reforms as a significant opportunity for 
solicitors. While acknowledging the challenges the reforms created, he kept pointing 
to the opportunities they offered, as in his speech to Law Society of Scotland in 2014: 
The solicitor profession, in my view, must continue to reinvent and renew itself; 
to anticipate changes in the law, the market and society and participate in the 
process of change; and above else uphold its reputation as ‘trusted adviser of 
choice’ offering unique and skilled services to the client. An opportunity 
presents itself to do all of those things. The Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill 
provides, I accept, a further challenge to the profession. More importantly, in my 
view, is the great opportunity that it presents for the solicitor branch. 
By opportunity, Lord Gill particularly meant the opportunities to improve professional 
skills and skilled advocacy, deal with claims of significant value and develop careers, 
and improve business opportunities as he explicitly and repeatedly stated in a speech 
to the Law Society of Scotland in 2014: 
What opportunity does it present? It throws open to every solicitor in Scotland a 
large tranche of work that hitherto has been the exclusive preserve of the bar and 
of solicitors with rights of audience in the higher courts.  
 
What opportunity does it present? It gives to every solicitor in Scotland the 
opportunity to develop skill in appellate advocacy and to develop an expertise 
that has hitherto been seen as the exclusive preserve of the bar.  
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That is, Lord Gill theorised the reforms by framing them as an opportunity for 
solicitors to embrace. He further stated, in his ‘Looking over the horizon’ speech 
addressed to solicitors, that “the reforms provide an opportunity for the profession to 
renew itself. The opportunity is there for the taking. I urge you all to embrace it.” 
However, while framing the reforms as opportunities, Lord Gill frequently stressed the 
fact that solicitors still could instruct advocates when they needed to, assuming that 
they would need to do so in complex cases. He stated that counsel’s service would be 
available depending on the “difficulty”, “complexity”, “the importance or value” of 
any claim and  he stated, in his speech in Holyrood Conference, that “the desirability 
of ensuring that no party gains an unfair advantage by virtue of the employment of 
counsel”. According to Lord Gill, if solicitors deal with relatively less complicated 
cases and leave the most complicated ones to the counsel, “counsel would have a real 
and meaningful role in the work of the sheriff court in its expanded jurisdiction”, as 
he further stated in the same speech. 
Having and sharing a vision. My data analysis showed that Lord Gill theorised the 
reforms as a part of his vision regarding the future of the Scottish civil justice system. 
He shared his vision with the legal professionals in his speeches and the review. He 
portrayed an ideal justice system that he wanted to reach with the reforms as a system 
that is “fair”, “accessible”, “efficient”, and “delivering high quality of justice 
expeditiously and economically”.  He shared his desire of creating a civil justice 
system that would be “fit to serve the modern society in Scotland that the previous 
generation of lawyers would not have recognised” in his speech in Law Society of 
Scotland in 2014. 
One important aspect of his vision was the desire to build a justice system that secures 
economic progress. In his review, Lord Gill argued that “an efficient civil justice 
system is vital to the Scottish economy” (Gill, 2009a: i). With the reforms, by 
improving the conditions of the Court of Session as the highest civil court in the 
country, he aimed to create “a court that will make its own contribution to Scotland’s 
prosperity” and a justice system that “big commercial cases are efficiently handled”, 
as he stated at the Holyrood Conference in 2015. Therefore, his vision with the reforms 
included creating a system that is “a driver for economic progress in Scotland”. He 
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also stated that “our courts and our judges can and should contribute to the prosperity 
of our country. We can do that.”  
In this regard, he frequently reminded the legal professionals that they should create 
the necessary conditions in the courts and the justice system to support the country 
economically: the reforms would enable this process. For example, he mentioned how 
in the past the legal professionals missed certain opportunities to support economic 
progress of Scotland and stated that in Holyrood Conference: 
In the 1960s and 1970s the economy of Scotland was transformed by the 
discovery of North Sea oil. The judges and lawyers of that time were not alert to 
the opportunity that Scotland could be an international forum for resolving 
disputes in the oil and gas industry. We paid a price for our complacency when 
the international oil and gas industry passed us by. Half a century on we should 
look at Scotland’s economic opportunities and see how the courts can best serve 
them. 
Another important aspect of the vision Lord Gill tried to share with the legal 
professionals was that he had an ideal to create a court that has a good international 
reputation. He particularly stressed that all these reforms also aimed “making Scotland 
a forum of choice for litigations from abroad”. Lord Gill summarised this ambition at 
the Holyrood Conference: 
We have the courts. We have the manpower. We have the skills of our judges 
and of our lawyers. My ambition is that we should create a court of international 
renown that will make its own contribution to Scotland’s prosperity.  
According to the data analysis, the final aspect of Lord Gill’s vision was to secure the 
“independency of Scottish law” and the justice system. He considered the reforms a 
way to make the system efficient and make sure that higher courts stayed as the places 
of intellectual development and provided judges with the best conditions to continue 
this intellectual discipline. He stated in his review that “an efficient civil justice system 
is vital to the survival of Scots law as an independent legal system” (Gill, 2009a: i). 
Considering the judicial system, Lord Gill desired a modern justice system to be proud 
of and good enough to compete with England. He was particularly unhappy with the 
fact that big commercial cases often were heard in England instead of Scotland and 
stated in his Holyrood speech: 
 161 
Scotland prides itself on the independence of its legal system. That independence 
is worth defending. We have a system to be proud of. But we are inevitably 
subject to the influences of a much larger legal system that is our neighbour. 
Much of our statutory law nowadays is common throughout the United 
Kingdom.  
And he added: 
If the continued independence of the Scottish legal system is a cause worth 
fighting for, our courts must meet the needs of the litigant. Unless the courts can 
provide a justice system that is expeditious, economical and excellent, Scots law 
faces atrophy and our independent legal profession faces an uncertain future. 
Table 5-7 Proof table for the data analysis of Lord Gill's theorization 
  Lord Gill’s theorization 




• The structural and functional flaws in the working of the Scottish civil courts 
prevent the courts from delivering the quality of justice to which the public is 
entitled. The Scottish civil courts provide a service to the public that is slow, 
inefficient and expensive. Their procedures are antiquated and the range of 
remedies that they can give is inadequate. In short, they are failing to deliver 
justice. Public confidence in our system is being eroded. The much-admired 
qualities of fairness, incorruptibility and expertise of our judicial system will have 
little significance if the system cannot deliver high quality justice within a 
reasonable time and at reasonable cost (Gill Review, 2009: i).  
• Scottish civil justice fails on all of these counts. Its delays are notorious. It costs 
deter litigants whose claims may be well-founded. Its procedures cause frustration 
and obstruct rather than facilitate the achievement of justice. (Lord Gill, As the 






• This programme has made it possible for reform in the entire justice system to be 
implemented according to a systematic, integrated plan. It is an outstanding 
example of public administration in Scotland. (Lord Gill, as the Lord President, 
speech titled “Speech to the Holyrood Conference”, 2015). 
• The increase in the privative jurisdiction and in time, the introduction of the 
specialist personal injury court should ensure that cases find their appropriate 
level in the court system. Expenses will be lower for the parties. Cases shall be 
dealt with more expeditiously than at present. The specialist sheriffs, in 
partnership with the profession, will develop a body of specialist and authoritative 
case law. A greater emphasis on case management and improved use of IT will be 
introduced by way of court rules and will promote a pro-active, front loaded 
litigation that reduces the time spent waiting in court for short straightforward 
hearings. At the same time efficiencies will be improved in the Court of Session. 
The Court of Session will continue to be the forum for high value and complex 
cases. Our hope is that these cases can be dealt with greater expediency as a result 
of the reforms, so that cancellations of hearings because of lack of judges and/or 
court time will be a thing of the past. (Lord Gill, as the Lord President. Speech 
titled “Looking over horizon: Life after the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill”, 2014). 
Creating a sense 
of urgency for 
change  
 
• I have been saying for years that such a review was long overdue. (Lord Gill, As 
the Lord Justice Clerk, Speech titled “Victorian Scots Justice System”,2009.) 
• Meanwhile, fast moving changes in the social and economic life of Scotland in 
recent decades have left us with a structure of civil justice that is seriously failing 
the nation. Reform is long overdue. (Gill Review, 2009: i). 
• You may think that the profession has enough to contend with without also having 
a civil courts review as well. I sympathise with that view. In over 40 years in the 
profession, I have never experienced times like these. But there is never an ideal 
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time for change. So, I urge you to be receptive to the conclusions of a lawyer-led 
programme for reform, if only for fear of something worse. (Lord Gill, As the Lord 




• I am certain that the Law Society and its members shall not only survive the 
legislation but shall adapt to it in its commitment to excellence. The reforms 
provide an opportunity for the profession to diversify, renew itself and to improve 
upon the work already undertaken in the Review. (Lord Gill, as the Lord President. 
Speech titled “Looking over horizon: Life after the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill”, 
2014). 
• The next few years will be a period of transition.  I am confident that the profession 
will adapt flexibly to whatever changes emerge.  I am convinced that these changes 
will be most effective and beneficial if all of us, for our respective parts, approach 
them with an open mind and in a positive spirit.( Lord Gill, As the newly appointed 
Lord President, in Ceremony of installation of the Lord President and Lord Justice 
General, 2012.) 
• To those members of the profession who will be opposed to our proposals, we 
observe that two of the outstanding features of the legal profession are its 
resistance to change and its endless adaptability. The history of the abolition of 
the two‐thirds rule, the two‐counsel rule, the transfer of divorce jurisdiction to the 
sheriff court, the extension of rights of audience and the introduction of licensed 
conveyancing is a history of reforms that one or other branch of the profession 
saw at the time as roads to ruin; yet the profession has adjusted to them, often to 
its advantage (Gill Review, 2009: ix). 
• At sheriff court level solicitors will have the opportunity to deal with claims of 
significant value and to exercise skilled advocacy in cases that in former days 
would have been litigated in the higher courts. (Lord Gill, as the Lord President, 
speech titled “Speech to the Holyrood Conference”, 2015). 
Having and 
sharing a vision 
 
• Our civil justice system will be fit to serve the modern society in Scotland that the 
previous generation of lawyers would not have recognised and will promote the 
fundamental principles that I mentioned at the outset (Lord Gill, as the Lord 
President. Speech titled “Looking over horizon: Life after the Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Bill”, 2014). 
• We have an opportunity now to improve upon these efficiencies and to avoid a 
relapse into the bad old ways. More importantly, we have a responsibility to 
litigants, to the public, and to the profession to ensure that our judiciary has 
control of the business of our courts. That responsibility is great. It will be achieved 
only through a concerted effort by all judicial office holders. In the public’s eyes, 
we are one, whether we are summary sheriffs, sheriffs or senators of the College 
of Justice. We take the same oath. We serve the same society. And we, like the 
lawyers and the public, are now on the road to the new digital world. It is the 
pathway to a modern justice system of which we can be proud. (Lord Gill, as the 
Lord President, speech titled “Speech to the Holyrood Conference”, 2015). 
 
5.4.1.2 Theorisation of the Change by the Other Judicial Office Holders and the 
Scottish Government 
During Lord Gill’s presidency and after his retirement in 2015, there had been public 
speeches made by other judicial office holders, Lord Carloway as Lord President 
succeeding Lord Gill and Lord Justice Clerk preceding Lady Dorrian, Lady Dorrian 
as Lord Justice Clerk, and Mhairi Stephen as the President of Sheriff Appeal Court, 
mentioning the reforms. While the main topic of some of these speeches was explicitly 
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the Gill reforms, other speeches only addressed the reforms indirectly. Since these 
office holders were official representatives of the judiciary, they were the 
implementers of the reforms and tried to theorise the reforms in ways that I now 
explain. Moreover, since the reforms were a project of the Scottish Government at the 
time, albeit weakly, the Scottish Government also tried to theorise the reforms via their 
publications. 
According to the data analysis, theorisation efforts of the other judicial office holders 
had a striking resemblance to Lord Gill’s theorisation steps suggesting that there was 
at least an attempt to coordinate efforts across those charged with designing and 
implementing the reforms. The data suggested that, in their speeches, all parties 
specified the very same problems of the existing system. These members also justified 
the offered solutions trying to provide moral and pragmatic legitimacy for the reforms, 
as well as carefully explaining how the reforms provided solutions to the problems and 
had positive impacts so far. Their providing pragmatic legitimacy was similar to Lord 
Gill’s since they all tried to explain how the reforms would function better than the 
previous system and were integrated to the certain elements of the existing structure 
so well that the expected performance would be very good.  They also tried to justify 
the reforms and the solutions they offered by sharing some statistics and information 
pointing to the positive impact on the civil justice system. 
In terms of providing moral legitimacy for the reforms, the data analysis showed that 
the judicial office holders, as Lord Gill, mentioned the values and principles of the 
justice system and how the reforms were all about enacting these values and principles 
such as securing ‘access to justice’, ‘protecting the independency of the Scottish law’, 
spreading the justice ‘wisely and fairly’ and so on. They also kept addressing the 
responsibility of the legal profession in terms of these values and tried to increase 
moral legitimacy of the reforms in the eye of the professionals. For instance, Lord 
Carloway who replaced Gill as the Lord President stated in a speech to the World Bar 
Conference in 2016: 
What is the role of the legal profession in all of this [change process]? The 
profession is a vital part of the machinery of justice. The court relies on both 
branches of the profession to perform their functions as representatives of the 
parties. Without this input, the risk that the court will fall into error is greatly 
increased. The challenges posed by the development of the traditional roles of 
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the profession, models of funding, competing interests, and modern technology 
are all ones which the profession, as well as the court system, require to meet. 
The rest of us in the profession, who have always seen their role as, not just to 
perform their particular task in the system but to improve it, to augment the 
quality of evidence and to promote justice generally, will alone continue to be 
the ligaments and muscle which move the skeleton of the law forward.  
Lady Dorrian, the Lord Justice Clerk, noted in her speech to the Twenty First Century 
Bar Conference in 2017 that: 
Justice must be delivered promptly, while the effect of the court’s decision can 
still deliver benefit to the parties and perhaps to society too. In addition, the 
courts must be accessible and responsive in a manner which is truly reflective of 
the realities of modern life. We each of us have a role in making sure that all of 
these reforms actually work; that they produce real and sustainable benefits 
Moreover, the majority of the speeches made by other judges had one or more 
historical examples that supported the principles of the Gill reforms and explained how 
certain values and concerns stayed the same, therefore, the reforms were to cure central 
problems in the justice system as well as strengthen the fundamentals of Scottish law. 
For instance, Lord Carloway, then the Lord Justice Clerk, at the Twenty First Century 
Bar Conference in 2015, stressed that the Gill reforms were such that certain historical 
figures would have been proud if they could have seen it. 
This is neither the first, nor will it be the last exercise in the reform of our courts. 
The reforms have been promoted out of concerns to secure access to justice, 
through increased efficiency, reduced expense and the hearing of cases by courts 
commensurate to their subject matter. These are not new concerns; Bentham and 
his contemporaries were grappling with them more than 200 years ago. The 
historical comparative serves to emphasise the need for the justice system to 
renew, adapt and respond to developments and innovations in broader society. 
Today, this is achieved through effective and meaningful use of IT, by 
rationalising court business and ensuring that cases are dealt with at the 
appropriate level. These reforms are ones of which Bentham would have been 
very proud. Bentham’s concern was to achieve a procedure which primarily 
served the needs of the people, and the essential concern of The Scottish Civil 
Courts Review – the Gill report – is to promote and support justice, more 
particularly access to justice, through the quality and efficiency of our courts 
Another example is from Lady Dorrian’s speech to solicitors and advocates at the 
Twenty First Century Bar Conference in 2017, where she explained how “protracted, 
expensive and inaccessible justice led to societal break-up and reduced trust in the 
system, and adversely impacted upon productivity” in Europe in the 18th century. 
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Thus, it was essential to apply the reforms in Scotland for not facing the same 
problems. She emphasised that the Gill reforms shared the same ideals with important 
figures in the history of law, and the solicitors and advocates should bear the 
responsibility required for this significant ideal. 
All of us, not just the judges but the solicitors and advocates too, have a part to 
play in securing the efficient disposal of business in our courts – reflecting, at 
least in procedural issues, Klein’s17 idea of teamwork between court and parties. 
The issues we are debating today are very similar to the issues have been 
grappled with by our forebears. Klein is perhaps the godfather, but the issues are 
real and important, and they never go away.  
It is no small thing to promote changes in law and practice. It takes time, it takes 
imagination, it takes careful and diligent thought and, we must all recognise, it 
takes a good deal of patience! But it is time, imagination, thought, and patience 
which it is well-worth expending if at the end of it we have a modern, adaptable, 
efficient and accessible legal system. That is precisely what was expounded by 
Klein more than 130 years ago. 
Furthermore, the judicial office holders also tried to theorise the reforms by frequently 
reminding solicitors the vision and ideals behind the reforms to the legal professionals. 
According to my data analysis, they did this in three ways in their speeches. First, they 
re-iterated the vision of Lord Gill with the specific acknowledgement of him. For 
instance, Lord Carloway stated in his speech of opening the legal year 2016/2017 as 
the Lord President: 
In February 2017, a decade will have passed since Lord Gill was tasked with 
carrying out a review of the civil justice system. Over that period, all of our 
professional lives - as judges, advocates, solicitors, and court staff - have become 
steeped in the process and language of change. The purpose and principles of the 
reforms - to make the justice system work efficiently and, in particular, to 
promote just decisions which are delivered in proportionate time and at 
proportionate cost - are well known. We must not lose sight of that goal. The 
purpose of procedural reform is ultimately as a means to an end. It is to secure 
substantive rights by ensuring that the public have access to the courts, 
unhindered by undue delay or expense. 
Second, the judicial office holders reminded the solicitors the purposes of the review 
or reforms without a specific acknowledgment of Lord Gill. The judicial office holders 
explained over and over again how the reforms would transform the system, why these 
reforms were important, and change was necessary for Scotland, and what the 
 
17 Franz Klein was an Austrian scholar who was very influential all across Europe 
regarding civil law. 
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principles and purposes of the review and the reforms were in general. After the 
retirement of Lord Gill and before being appointed as the Lord President, Lord 
Carloway stated in his speech titled “Aims of the civil courts reform” and made in the 
Faculty of Advocates in 2015: 
Courts reform is never complete. That is not a cause for concern. It is a sign of 
progress. The immediate goal has been to achieve structural change. The lasting 
effect will be to enable continuous improvement and to respond appropriately to 
changing conditions in a progressive society. The essential consideration is to 
promote and support justice, more particularly access to justice, through the 
quality and efficiency of our courts…. These are times of great change and some 
uncertainty in many quarters. The reforms present significant challenges to those 
striving to manage their impact on everyday practice. That is so not only for the 
legal profession, but also for the judiciary and the courts administration. All have 
had to devise methods of smoothing transition. It remains important in the 
transitional phase not to lose sight of the underlying rationale for reform, and the 
benefits which will ultimately be gained. 
Third, they praised the review or/and the reforms in their speeches addressing the 
strengths of the review and reforms, as well as how reforms were reason to be proud 
because of their intended ideals. In this regard, while opening the legal year of 
2015/2016, Lord Carloway, as the Justice Clerk, noted: 
There are too many to mention by name, but we are indebted to all who made it 
possible to have reached this stage in implementation and we will be equally 
indebted to those – notably the much pressed rules rewrite team, whose work 
cannot but be admired for its scrutiny of detail and those on the Scottish Civil 
Justice Council – who will take it forward. One individual, however, requires 
special mention. Lord Gill, who retired as Lord President in May, dedicated 8 
years to the reform of our court system. The implementation of the reforms in 
this new legal year owes so much to his foresight, determination and leadership. 
Despite the reservations of some, the reforms will be part of a lasting legacy. We 
will ultimately be in his debt. The Court of Session will be different, but it will 
be much improved as Scotland’s Supreme Civil Court. 
Furthermore, the data analysis showed that these judicial members also used 
motivational frames similar to Lord Gill’s. As a part of their framing solicitors as 
resilient to change, they depicted change as something unavoidable and constant while 
giving examples of previous changes occurred in the Scottish civil justice system. 
They tried to show that how “solicitor profession has an excellent track record of 
adapting to change – indeed anticipating change – not only in the law but in society 
and in the marketplace”, hence, they would survive this one, too. 
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They also framed the reforms as opportunities for solicitors to improve their 
professional skills, business opportunities and careers as Lord Carloway stated in his 
speech made in the Faculty of Advocates in 2015: 
With the rationalisation of the court structure comes the integral rationalisation 
of the legal profession. The solicitor branch, including those with the privilege 
of extended rights of audience, will enjoy increased opportunities to demonstrate 
and develop advocacy skills in significant cases at sheriff and Sheriff Appeal 
Court level, in the swathe of business to be devolved from the Court of Session 
and High Court of Justiciary 
 
The president of the Sheriff Appeal Court, Mhairi Stephen stated in her speech in 
Scottish Young Lawyers’ Association annual lecture in 2014: 
The solicitor profession is well placed to both anticipate and participate in the 
process of reforming the way legal services are delivered to clients in the justice 
system of the future.  More than that, the court reform programme presents great 
opportunities for solicitors themselves and their personal career development 
While these prominent figures of judiciary were trying to increase the acceptance of 
the reforms by solicitors, they frequently stressed the fact that solicitors still could 
instruct the counsel if they had difficulties or a complex case. 
Also, in the data analysis, I did not see much of a theorisation effort from the Scottish 
Government, particularly addressing legal professionals. There had been some effort 
made by the government representatives during the discussions in the Parliament 
aiming to specify the problems in the justice system and justify the solutions offered 
by the Bill. These efforts were mainly paraphrasing what the review and Lord Gill said 
rather than coming up with new justifications, solutions or mentioning other problems 
that were not in the review.  
There were also published reports of responses by the government addressing the 
concerns and questions raised by the consultation letters by different stakeholders. 
According to the data analysis, since there were concerns raised in the consultation 
process regarding “whether there are sufficient solicitors with the necessary expertise 
and experience to provide appropriate and equal representation to that which might be 
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available from counsel”18, government reports aimed to ease these concerns and 
theorise the change by justifying the increase in the threshold of sheriff courts. In order 
to do so, while not stating the confidence of Scottish Government in solicitors’ 
professional skills to handle the case alone, the reports emphasised the fact that 
solicitors could still instruct counsel if the sheriff judge hearing the case granted 
sanction.  
Table 5-8 Proof table for the data analysis on the theorization of other judicial office holders and the 
Scottish Government 
Theorization of other judicial office holders and the government 
Themes Illustrative Quotes 
Specification of the failures of 
the existing system  
 
• Do you see the civil courts as modern institutions which 
adequately deal with the disputes commonly arising in today’s 
Scotland? Do you consider that the criminal courts are 
producing fair trials which properly balance the rights of the 
accused with those of others? If the answer to each question is 
“well maybe not entirely”, the next question is what is to be 
done about it. (Lord Carloway, As the Lord President, the 
speech titled “Redesigning the court room”, 2016.) 
• The last major reforms before the Gill Review were in the first 
quarter of the 19th century. We now need to capture the 
benefits which 200 years of technological advances have given 
us. We certainly have not done so yet. (Lord Carloway, As the 
Lord President, the speech titled “Redesigning the court 
room”, 2016.) 
Justification of the new 
structures and practices 
 
• Today, two new courts are established. The all Scotland 
Personal Injury Court located in Edinburgh Sheriff Court will 
provide an impressive state-of-the-art facility. It will relieve the 
pressure on the Outer House. Although some fear the 
consequences of the change, it will remove cases of relatively 
low value and free up time to allow more significant cases in 
terms of value to be heard within a reasonable time. There is a 
particular concern with the time lag in the fixing of long proofs 
in the Outer House, which will be addressed in the coming 
year. (Lord Carloway, As the Lord Justice Clerk, Opening the 
legal year 2015).  
• As anticipated by the reforms, there has been a significant 
reduction in both appellate and first instance civil work in the 
Court of Session and in summary criminal appeals to the High 
Court. There has also been a predicted drop in the number of 
commercial cases. As a consequence of all of this, this court 
the Court of Session ought to become leaner, trimmer and fitter 
in the coming years. (Lord Carloway, As the Lord President, 
Opening the legal year 2017/2018). 
• The courts are in a period of transition; catching up with the 
technological advances of the modern world. Court 
proceedings have been broadcast live from this building for the 
 
18 The quote is from a document that was analysed. It was published by the Scottish 
Government in 2013 and named as “Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill: Analysis of 
Consultation Responses” 
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first time, opening our courts to a wider audience, even if the 
press reaction was mixed. Our justice system is seeking new 
and innovative ways to use technology to capture best 
evidence, avoiding the need for witnesses, accused and perhaps 
soon lawyers, to attend court unnecessarily. This will cause a 
hastening of the pace of business; a challenge which we must 
all strive to meet. (Lord Carloway, As the Lord Justice Clerk, 
Opening the legal year 2015).  
Motivational Frames 
 
• The Lord President in his introduction to the Scottish Civil 
Courts Review remarked that "Two of the outstanding features 
of the legal profession are its resistance to change coupled with 
its endless adaptability". That is true. The extension of rights 
of audience in the Supreme Courts to solicitors has 
reinvigorated both branches of the profession. Society, of 
course, has changed a great deal in the past three decades. The 
solicitor profession has an excellent track record of adapting 
to change. (Mhairi Stephen, as the president of the newly 
established Sheriff Appeal Court- 2014) 
• Much of this will be achieved in our professional lives, 
provided that we do not take a cantankerous and obstructive 
approach to it. Ultimately, it is much better that we have a legal 
profession that enjoys working in a civil or criminal justice 
system which works fairly and efficiently; not one which may 
be seen by some as failing in certain areas. It is my hope that 
you will all engage in this process so we can have a system in 
which, when the questions I asked at the beginning of this talk 
are asked, we can say “well, just about”. (Lord Carloway, As 
the Lord President, the speech titled “Redesigning the court 
room”, 2016.) 
• There are those who are, and will remain, resistant to change. 
The impact of continuing reform on court staff, the judiciary, 
and the profession generally is tiring. Reform fatigue is a 
recognised phenomenon. Maintaining business as usual, when 
substantial changes are being made, is a significant feat in 
itself. The court staff, judiciary, and the legal profession are to 
be thanked for their patience whilst the changes come in; not 
without tears. The reform project has benefitted and will 
continue to benefit considerably from the continued 
engagement of the legal profession. (Lord Carloway, As the 
Lord President, the speech titled “The Scottish Courts in the 
21st Century”, 2017.) 
• The work being done today is designed to bring our justice 
system into line with 21st century expectations. The legacy of 
my generation, when it comes to pass control to yours, will be 
a modern system which is fair, efficient and cost effective, but 
also one which is nimble and ready to adapt to the future 
expectations of society. Your generation – having lived through 
the significant changes ushered in by the 2014 Act and the 
philosophy underpinning the Civil Courts Review - will be 
uniquely poised to seize the baton and to carry on the course 
of change. (Lady Dorian, As the Lord Justice Clerk,“The 21st 
Century Court”, 2016.) 
 
Reminding/emphasising ‘the’ 
vision behind the reforms. 
• Whereas Bentham’s concern was to achieve a procedure 
which primarily served the needs of the people, the essential 
concern of The Scottish Civil Courts Review – the Gill report 
– is to promote and support justice, more particularly access 
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to justice, through the quality and efficiency of our courts. 
(Lord Carloway, As the Lord Justice Clerk, Speech to 15th 
Annual 21st Century Bar Conference, 2015) 
• It [justice system] will be changed from its current Victorian 
form into something fit for the 21st century. The direction of 
travel may differ between the civil and criminal processes, 
but there will be themes common to both. In all of this, a 
particularly important factor is your, the practitioner’s, 
attitude to the proposed modernisation; the view that you 
have about the efficiency and effectiveness of the current 
systems. (Lord Carloway, As the Lord President, the speech 
titled “Redesigning the court room”, 2016.) 
• The modern concept of access to justice recognises that it is 
not good enough for a decision simply to be correct, or at 
least of a high quality, on the merits. It must be delivered 
timeously, that is to say at a time when the parties, and 
perhaps society too, can still benefit from it. If a decision is 
received too late for it to be effective, it is worthless. A just 
decision is one which is delivered within a reasonable time. 
It must also be produced at a reasonable cost. As the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court has recently stressed, justice which 
is unaffordable to litigants is inaccessible. It undermines the 
substantive rights of those who cannot afford to enforce them. 
Where cases are allowed to drift, or where one party is 
permitted to prolong their resolution artificially for his own 
ends, there is a real risk that justice will not be done. (Lord 
Carloway, As the Lord President, the speech titled “The 
Scottish Courts in the 21st Century”, 2017.) 
• It [Gill reforms] has been an ambitious project, which 
constitutes a significant achievement in the re-distribution of 
business to the appropriate levels throughout the court 
hierarchy. However, the reform project is not complete and 
the innovations are continuing. (Lady Dorian, As the Lord 




5.4.1.3 Lack of Emotions in Theorisation of the Scottish Civil Justice Reforms 
My data analysis suggested that the change had been theorised based on rational 
arguments and alignment with the values and norms of the profession. As mentioned 
above, in his theorisation of the reforms, Lord Gill specified the problems with the 
existing system, justified the new practices and structures that were offered as 
solutions to the problems, created an urgency for change, framed the reforms as 
opportunities for solicitors and portrayed the reforms as a vision that is worth for 
changing the system. In addition, the theorisation efforts of other judicial office 
holders were very similar to Lord Gill’s.  
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By uncovering what Lord Gill and others did for theorisation, I was able to show what 
they did not. I saw that while Lord Gill and others built extensive rational and 
normative arguments to theorise the reforms, there existed a lack of emotion in their 
theorisation processes. The only emotion-related aspect of theorisation of all parties 
was regarding having a system to be proud of or having a system that is not beneath 
the English system. The data analysis showed that there was not any other emotion 
explicitly addressed in the theorisation efforts. However, implicitly, creating an 
urgency for change by laying out potentially disastrous outcomes can be considered as 
an attempt to create fear to urge the recipients to adopt the practices as fast as possible. 
Also, justifying that professionals are good at changing can be considered as an 
attempt to manage the negative emotions like distress and anxiety deriving from the 
fear of change. Yet, these were very implicit and very ineffective attempts that I will 
discuss next. 
5.4.2 Reception of the Theorisation Efforts by Solicitors: Lack of Self-
confidence  
The data analysis showed a lack of emotional resonance with the theorisation in a way 
that solicitors did not share the same desires or fears with Lord Gill. That is, when 
asked solicitors did not mention the importance of the reforms for the future of 
Scotland, the economy of Scotland, or independence of the Scottish law at all. They 
did not even slightly refer to the urgency of the change, or the negative outcomes of 
not changing during the interviews. They did not show excitement, a sense of pride or 
any emotional identification with the reforms or the vision behind the reforms. That 
is, in regarding the reception of theorisation, a lack of emotional identification to what 
theorisers said showed itself in the data. When asked about the drivers of the reforms 
and the positive and negative aspects of them, none of my solicitor participants 
mentioned a desire to be better than England, pride in the independency of Scottish 
law, the future of Scotland or any type of emotional driver for the reforms. As 
discussed in Paper One, professionals did not want the change to happen, let alone 
have an emotional identification with the reforms. 
Nevertheless, solicitors accepted that there were problems with the existing system 
and the change was necessary in certain aspects such as freeing the Court of Session, 
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increasing the usage of IT and having specialist sheriffs. For instance, a solicitor, 
Naomi stated: 
It is probably a good thing to have specialist sheriffs and I think across the board 
it is quite good to have specialist sheriffs because it adds another dimension to 
the case if you are appearing before a sheriff who you know has never done a 
personal injury case in his or her life before and it takes a lot more court time 
having to explain things and in my field, in the clinical negligence field. 
Isaac, a solicitor, stated: 
I think most of us agree that some cases which were previously dealt with in the 
Court of Session, for example, if the case is worth £10,000, it shouldn't be dealt 
with in the Court of Sessions, it should be dealt with in the sheriff court. Yes, 
these low value cases clog up the court and cause delays. 
According to the data analysis, solicitors also were “aware of the professional 
opportunities” offered by the reforms, as Daisy, one of the solicitors, stated. Solicitors 
frequently stressed that they recognised that adopting the new responsibilities and 
practices might have led to improvements in their professional lives and competency 
as, Kim, a solicitor, stated clearly:  
Good things [coming with the reforms] are intellectual challenge, job 
satisfaction, professional development - a solicitor has to learn parts of the job 
and so if those things are no longer outsourced then the solicitor has to learn all 
of the job and be able to fulfil that competently. So that will drive standards up. 
There will be more accountability to the solicitor.  
However, the data suggested that framing the reforms as opportunities as a part of 
theorisation was not enough for solicitors to adopt the new practices. I found that, there 
was one aspect of the reforms that all the solicitors were completely uncomfortable 
with: all the solicitors found the threshold of £100,000 for cases to be heard in the 
Court of Session to be very high and they did not see the point of building a new 
nation-wide personal injury sheriff court with no upper limit. Yet, the threshold 
increase was largely the main point of the reforms. For instance, Gavin, a solicitor, 
explained how he accepted the merit of increasing the threshold, but he also found the 
current amount very high: 
So, there was a case, I think, for putting the privative jurisdiction limit up, but 
not to £100,000. So, I agree that some reform would have been necessary. But 
now it is absurd.  If they had increased the privative jurisdiction to £50,000, I 
don't think that there'd have been much complaint from anyone. 
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My data analysis indicated that, at the core of the solicitors’ disapproval lied the fact 
that these changes would restrain solicitors’ attempts to instruct advocates, while 
pushing them to handle high value and complex cases alone.   According to the data, 
although there were also economic and practical reasons for their reluctance19, the 
strongest factor was solicitors’ lack of self-confidence, as Isaac, a solicitor, also noted: 
This might seem like an opportunity for us, if we have the confidence to say I 
think I could run this [ a civil case] myself. 
Or as Gary, a solicitor, noted: 
I know you’re thinking, ‘Well you are the specialist in this and so why can you 
not run these cases?’ There are lots of reasons, but I think it is more to do with 
the confidence, believing in yourself. 
Lord Gill, the Scottish Government and members of the judiciary were all aware of 
the disapproval of solicitors. However, in the data analysis, I saw that theorisation 
efforts failed in convincing solicitors to adopt the new practices and engage in the new 
tranche of work the reforms presented with the threshold increase and opening of the 
new nation-wide sheriff court with no upper limit. Therefore, solicitors’ interaction 
with the new practices remained very limited.  Next, I will explain further details of 
this theme. 
5.4.2.1 Lack of Self-Confidence 
My data analysis showed that solicitors experienced a lack of self-confidence in the 
face of the changes that the reforms brought. Their lack of self-confidence showed 
itself in the fact that they felt a blend of emotions, such as fear, anxiety and insecurity. 
These emotions are classified as the opposite of self-confidence (e.g. Barbalet, 2001; 
Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978; Kleres & Wettergren, 2017).  All the quotes regarding 
the emotions of solicitors below are based on the discussions during the interviews on 
why solicitors do not handle civil cases alone although the reforms presented 
opportunities for professional growth and opened the doors for solicitors not to instruct 
advocates even for complex and high value cases. 
 
19 Please see Chapter 4. 
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Fear. The idea of dealing with professional challenges coming with the opportunities 
that the reforms presented caused solicitors to experience the emotion of ‘fear’. In the 
data, I saw that solicitors were afraid of appearing in court that was also buttressed by 
the fear of failure and fear of embarrassment. When they considered adopting the new 
responsibilities and opportunities, they frequently mentioned that how it was very 
“frightening” or “intimidating” to appear in court, particularly after many years 
without doing so.  As Jane, a solicitor, stated, “it is challenging to have to suddenly 
get up and dust off your gown and go into court again and it can be quite frightening.” 
Another senior solicitor, Ian, shared how he feared appearing in court: 
I hate going to court a lot of the time, but ultimately that was the point of 
becoming a litigator. Or working in a litigation firm. I am a [personal injury] 
solicitor, but ultimately, I’m a litigator, most of our business is litigated cases, 
litigated claims and so I shouldn’t be afraid to go to court, but I do.  
The data analysis also showed that solicitors were afraid of appearing in court because 
they feared that they would embarrass themselves, particularly considering the strict 
attitude of the sheriffs in courts. Interviewees stated that sheriffs applied the rules very 
stringently and did not tolerate mistakes, therefore making solicitors severely 
concerned about their experiences in courts. Sarah, a solicitor of 12 years, told me a 
story about how some solicitors’ mistake caused them to embarrass themselves in front 
of their colleagues and how she is afraid of experiencing a similar thing if she goes to 
court: 
She [a sheriff] brings solicitors up to just to give them a row and ending up 
making them cry in a packed room. I cannot face that. It’s embarrassing. I’m 
reluctant to raise actions there by myself. 
In this regard, another solicitor, James, also hinted that he was afraid of making 
mistakes in the sheriff courts and then having a notoriety: 
You would go to the court, forget something or ask for something, and it would 
be refused, so you would have to go ahead with it and there became a reputation, 
I am speaking very frankly here, but there would be a reputation. 
Solicitors also frequently expressed that they felt “terrorised”, “intimidated” and 
“terrified” in front of angry and very strict sheriffs, as Clark a young solicitor 
expressed his feelings: 
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I think that [sheriffs’ strict attitude] is very intimidating for a person like me who 
isn’t appearing in court regularly.  
Another solicitor, Lucas, shared his emotion regarding appearing in court: 
We do mock trials and regular trainings here, but it is not the same, is it? It is 
terrifying in real life. Sheriffs are terrifying. I’m worried about my performance 
all the time, as a junior, you know. The mock trials, they don’t help much 
because I can’t afford making a mistake in real life. I have to think about the 
client’s best interests, and [the firm’s] too, to be honest. 
Anxiety. In the data analyses, I saw that solicitors also felt “nervous”, “anxious”, 
“tense”, and “edgy”. In one of the conversations during my field observations in the 
sheriff courts, a junior solicitor shared that he was rather uncomfortable at the time. 
When asked, he explained that he felt “on edge” because he had to handle certain 
difficult tasks in a “draconian” environment.  That is, while sheriffs’ strict behaviours 
make solicitors frightened, they also made them feel very nervous. As another young 
solicitor, Callum, also said at a different time: “It makes you nervous. I certainly feel 
nervous. Some sheriffs are very fearsome.” 
However, sheriffs were not the only reason for solicitors to feel nervous in court. The 
general idea of appearing in court for handling complex and important cases made 
them nervous and anxious. Coming together with the fear of failing in many fronts and 
embarrassing themselves, the idea of leaving “the safety blanket of counsel” made 
them nervous. For instance, Percy, a solicitor, explained why he does not appear in 
court to handle cases alone: 
I suppose it is not for me, I feel a lot of pressure, you know having to do advocacy, I 
suppose other people too, they might be nervous about it and they might feel that they 
want counsel there as a sort of safety blanket and I can understand that to a certain 
extent and I think obviously with higher value, more complex cases if you can get 
sanction for counsel then yes, that is definitely what we should be doing. 
Insecurity.  My data analysis showed that solicitors also expressed emotions of self-
doubt and insecurity. One common discourse I came across in the data analysis was 
solicitors’ emphasis on how advocacy requires one to “believe” in himself or herself, 
and do not doubt. They frequently shared that many people felt “insecure” due to lack 
of confidence. For example, Samuel, stated: 
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I think it will come, a lot of it has to do with confidence so that people don’t just 
say, ‘oh great, I can go and run a proof.’ it has to do with confidence, it is to do 
with being encouraged to do that. You have to believe in yourself. 
A very experienced solicitor who was also a partner in a law firm, Percy, stated: 
If you feel that advocacy is what you want to do, you want to go and argue cases 
and you believe in yourself then you will do it.  I think, for many, probably that 
nervousness and insecurity is always there.  I did like advocacy but I then had the 
nervousness and insecurity. 
Kevin, also a partner and solicitor in a law firm, similarly stated: 
People have to feel confident in what they do otherwise it is not fair to send 
them, you know there is nothing worse than being sent to do something you 
don’t feel confident. So, that conversation [within the firm regarding solicitors’ 
reluctance to appear in court and have oral arguments] was triggered entirely by 
reforms.  
A junior advocate who was a solicitor before 2014, Jonathan, mentioned the self-doubt 
of solicitors regarding their actions and lack of confidence in general: 
I think even being a solicitor, seeing some of my colleagues, you know, really 
struggling with crises of confidence sometimes about not knowing they have 
done the right thing or worrying too much about whether they were performing 
to expectations. 
I also found that solicitors sometimes found their reluctance to handle cases alone 
somehow irrational since lawyers were expected, by the clients, to be able to handle a 
case from the start to the end effectively. For instance, Kevin, said: 
Clients might say ‘well, I don’t really understand because you’re the experts, are 
you not capable of doing this [representing me without instructing someone 
else]?’ and then it does not sound terrific if you say, ‘well, you know, I can’t.’  
Furthermore, contrary to how solicitors felt about themselves, I found that advocates 
were very self-confident.20 In particular, they were very confident in their professional 
skills, expertise and general competency. They emphasised how they did not make 
professional mistakes, how good they were at skills such as writing, arguing, preparing 
themselves for difficult cases, and dealing with complex cases in general. They also 
 
20 Please see Chapter 3 for detailed quotations regarding how advocates feel about 
themselves. 
 177 
underlined that their professional standards were very high, and they had excellence 
in the court room and beyond.   
Perceived Self-efficacy. The data analysis also showed that solicitors did not only 
‘feel’ a lack of confidence, but also thought at and assessed their competence based on 
how they perceived their professional skills and abilities cognitively. These appraisals 
are based on carefully considered and calculated assessments of previous experiences, 
training, performances, observations and so on.  For instance, Gavin, a solicitor, 
assessed his competency based on his previous experiences and comparing himself 
with the performances of others: 
I don't particularly visualize myself as being quick at argument on my feet. I see 
myself as being somebody who has to go away and think about things. I can do 
some quite good academic essays. I can do presentations that I've thought about. 
But on my feet as a lawyer... I have appeared in the sheriff court a few times. 
But I've often found that the decision about whether I should ask that question 
or just leave that question, "Don't ask that particular question. It's risky." I find 
that very difficult. Whereas, an accomplished advocate is very good at knowing 
when to say nothing more, and don't ask anything more. The witness has said 
some good things, just leave him. Don't take any risk, don't ask him one more 
question in case he goes back on what he said. That kind of skill I admire very 
much in advocates. 
Adam, a very experienced solicitor and a partner in a law firm, evaluated his skills and 
explained the limits of them as: 
I have never been a terribly technical lawyer. I'm a bit like the football fan who 
they see Ronaldo, and they can't play like he can. But if he hits a bad shot or has 
a bad game, they'll criticise him. Well, I'm a little bit like that. If I see an advocate 
who does something wrong, or does things badly, I can tell that he's made a mess 
of it.  
I have rich data showing how solicitors decided if they needed to instruct advocates or 
handle things alone. Solicitors evaluated their professional competency in relation to 
the complexity, difficulty, value and importance of the case. This process requires 
constant measuring of their own competency against the advocates and each other, as 
well as in general to see if they would be capable of handling a particular case.  That 
is, according to the data, the decisions were not only based on felt emotions, but also 
based on “weighing up” the situation, as Nick, a solicitor and a partner in a law firm, 
noted: 
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If it is very complicated, you might get counsel in. If it is not so complicated, 
then we weigh up the position where we have to make a decision. Do we do this 
proof/trial ourselves or do we get counsel in?  
Isaac, another experienced solicitor, also noted that professional self-awareness had 
increased since reforms forcing solicitors to think more about when to instruct counsel. 
Now [after the reforms] we have greater awareness of what we are capable of 
and if we think what we are doing is good or bad or competent or incompetent 
and so that I suppose, we do have a greater awareness of our skills. 
Another interviewee, Ali, a solicitor, explained that there are certain aspects of the 
cases that he assesses and decides to leave to counsel or undertake himself or both.  
Now we have to think well maybe I cannot justify it [getting help from an 
advocate] for the whole action, but there might be parts of it where I think 
counsel’s input would be needed. And that is quite a good way of going about 
it, that is what we have done in some cases we have said, well in some cases we 
have not used them from the beginning, we have brought them in at a particular 
point, maybe when we have had an offer to discuss that with the client and that 
has made the difference and that seems to be reasonable, so a lot more thought 
was having to go into when do we instruct counsel and for what parts of the 
procedure.  
Also, according to the data, solicitors had the lack of belief in meeting the standards 
of sheriffs in courts based on their experiences. Some of them already failed in doing 
so and have developed a sense of the extent of their competency. They many times 
shared that the quality of their work was not good enough for the sheriffs, as Jess 
noted: 
The way that the All Scotland Personal Injury Court is running is very strict in 
terms of the rules, extremely strict in terms of quality of what you put in.  Very 
often things were rejected, our motions were rejected, a very, very strict regime. 
Overall, my data strongly suggest that solicitors did not consider themselves 
efficacious enough to handle complex cases in the sheriff courts and that led to their 
feeling a lack of self-confidence. Then, the lack of self-confidence affected how 
solicitors perceived their professional competency cognitively, which in turn, further 
reduced their self-confidence. 
Confidence as the expected emotional display for performing advocacy. My data 
analysis so far also showed that the legal professionals think that one’s believe in 
herself/himself, with a confidence their judgment, presenting arguments in the court 
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room with confidence are the expected emotional display to be considered as a capable 
professional who can do advocacy in court. Almost all of the above quotes explicitly 
or implicitly suggested the very same thing which is that doing advocacy requires 
confidence. Participants explicitly mentioned that “It [advocacy] is all about how you 
carry yourself before the judges and your colleagues. You need to be convincing and 
confident” as Paul, an advocate, stated. Also, a new advocate, Jonathan, when asked 
what were the challenges that he had as a very junior advocate in the court room, stated, 
“I would say feeling comfortable, calm and confident”. Furthermore, when she was 
explaining opinions regarding the instructing advocates, an experienced solicitor, 
Claire, said “You have seen them [advocates] and you think that they are very good, 
they are very convincing, you see that they are very confident, and you say they will 
do a better job”, Here, in a way, she portrays how an ideal advocate looks and behaves. 
Another experienced solicitor, Susan, also shared with me an example of an 
outstanding advocate: 
There was this gentleman, who trained me really, who I worked with, for the 
majority of my fee earning years. He was one of the best advocates in Scotland 
and so he is retired now, he was an outstanding advocate and a better person. I 
used to look at him and think ‘wow how can he act with such poise, confidence 
and assuredness on his feet?’ I mean he was absolutely outstanding in court.  
In summary, regarding the reception of theorization, we saw that solicitors were aware 
of the benefits of the reforms; however, they feel a lack of confidence that prevented 
them from embracing the new arrangements. Their lack of confidence manifested itself 
as a blend of fear, insecurity and anxiety, as well as limiting beliefs regarding their 
professional capacity. Solicitors also think that they should feel confident to perform 
advocacy and be able to display it, too. Table 5-9 provides further support for this 
theme. 
Table 5-9 Proof tables for the theme 'Reception of theorization: Lack of self-confidence' 
Aggregate dimension: Lack of Self-confidence 
Second Order 
Themes 
First Order Illustrative Quotes 
Fear • The idea [of going to court and having oral arguments] is scary, you see, after 
all these years… Every now and then, opportunities emerge [to handle the case 
alone from the beginning until the end]. But, I don’t wanna make a mistake. 
• I suppose for the older solicitors like me, and if you are thinking about change, 
the older solicitors in the office who have been practising for 20 years or more 
who are used to not appearing because they are used to counsel doing 
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everything in terms of appearance work in the Court of Session then it is 
challenging to have to suddenly get up and dust off your gown and go into court 
again and it can be quite frightening 
• I think the sheriffs have made life quite difficult for quite a few of us, particularly 
the younger solicitors. They tend to give them short-shrift and I think quite a lot 
of the young solicitors have been absolutely terrified to appear. 
• No, will never do that [appear in court and do advocacy] again. I could not stop 
crying in the court room, you know. I was terrorised by that experience [that 
she had in front of a strict sheriff judge]. My hands were shaking and all. It was 
terrible – terrible. [Because of a mistake she did, the sheriff hearing the case 
was angry]. 
 
Anxiety • I usually don’t like appearing in court. -Why? -Don’t know. I usually become 
a bundle of nerves, s’pose [laughing].  
• So that [appearing in court] puts pressure on people and quite a lot of anxiety, 
a lot of stress. 
• The upcoming oral arguments make me very nervous. I hate speaking up in a 
crowd.  
• I don’t appear in court. I have my network of counsel that I trust, I instruct them. 
My husband is in the Bar, you see. I know how hard they work and they provide 
the best representation that you can get, to be honest. – Why don’t you appear 
yourself? It is not my thing. – Can you elaborate a bit more, please. -I don’t like 
it. it is a very tense process. The preparations, the responsibility and all.  
• I’m worried about my performance all the time. The mock trials, they don’t help 
much because I can’t afford making a mistake in real life. I have to think about 
the client’s best interests and WWW’s too to be honest. 
Insecurity • Well, chronically inadequate, I must say [when asked how she feels if she does 
not instruct an advocate for complex cases].  
• These are [personal injury and clinical negligence] usually very sensitive cases. 
You need confidence in your judgment. 
• ASPIC [ All Scotland Personal Injury Court] needs to be flexible and a place 
where people feel confident that they will be listened to and there should be a 
general desire that the parties’ intentions will be taken on-board.  If it is seen 
as a place where you go to battle against people, against the sheriffs, it is 
never going to work and people will still choose to go to Glasgow Sheriff 
Court or to Dundee Sheriff Court or they will instruct counsel and it will not 
have the impact that they were hoping for.   
• I feel secure when I know that I have got somebody in the background who is 
better at it [handling complex cases and doing advocacy]. I am aware that I 
rely on my comfort blanket of always using counsel. 
• I would like to know that [the reason why the sheriffs are too strict] as well if I 
am honest with you, I don’t see what it [being too strict] achieves.  Yes, the 
rules are there, the rules should be followed, and you know solicitors 
shouldn’t just, they should be sticking to timetables but at the end of the day 
there are just some things, you know. What is the point of making us 
embarrassed, really? It doesn’t really make sense to me but that is just what 
we have to deal with. 
• When you are out of practice of doing that, or you have just never had 
practice of doing that, it is quite difficult to imagine what it is like to run a 
proof and to have a sheriff say to you, but Mrs Daisy you don’t have any 
evidence for that, you know, be challenged on things… And if you are always 
having counsel tell you what to do, which is often what counsel does, I want 
this information and I think you should go and take a statement from that 




• I don’t have enough experience. I have to think what is best for the client.  
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• I am not being unduly critical of my profession [ a solicitor-advocate], but it is 
just that you cannot dabble with this stuff, even at low levels of money it is just 
too complicated now. 
• So, we would tend to start the cases off ourselves, always, but if ultimately it 
looks like a case where the proof, for instance, is going to be very 
complicated, you think clients would maybe get a better service if you were to 
instruct counsel to do the advocacy part but they would tend to be further 
down the line towards the pre-trial meeting negotiation, preparation for proof 
dates that we would be tend to be thinking about getting counsel involved. 
• They [clients] become particularly involved often in their action, you know, 
they have maybe had an accident which has meant that they cannot work 
anymore and so they are now at home and they have lots of time to ruminate 
and this becomes a very big thing and sometimes so much so that until the 
action is out of the way they almost cannot move on and so it takes a certain 
skill to manage a client like that and sometimes you do need to involve counsel 
to say, I need a second opinion and I need somebody else to take a look at this. 
• That is a big cost and you cannot pass that on to the client.  So, you make sure 
you get it right first time.  It makes your processes, it makes everything, you 
have to be very strict, tight and accurate so there is probably a lot less leeway 
[in the newly established courts than local sheriff courts], I would say. Then 







• They [solicitors] get very anxious, they get very nervous, it[advocacy] requires 
your mind to work in a particular way, you would probably have to be quick-
thinking, which isn’t necessarily the same as, well it often isn’t the same as 
deep-thinking but there is no point in thinking of a clever question when you 
have sat down and closed your case.  You have to be able to think of a clever 
question whilst you are there and the preparation is demanding. A sheriff. 
• If you want to do that [advocacy], you need to believe in yourself, you need to 
show that. Working hard, being disciplined, being comfortable on your feet and 
whatnot. I’m not hardwired to be one [advocate]. A solicitor. 
• You need to be confident for being able to do advocacy. You need to believe in 
yourself. They’re [solicitors] insecure, they make mistakes. They’re clumsy in 
court. A sheriff. 
• If, however, you felt that Advocacy is what you wanted to do, you want to go 
and argue cases and you believe in yourself then you will do it.   A solicitor. 
• The bottom line is that the way I was trained was that you always think about 
the end result and so you are always thinking about, what if this case goes to 
court, have I got the evidence that I need, how will I prove this, how will I deal 
with that and I think you almost need that way of thinking to be able to fully 
feel confident. An Advocate. 
• So, either because they [solicitors] decide just not to pursue it because they 
don’t feel able to, or perhaps they do but get a bit out of their depth. - An 
advocate 
• It seems they [solicitors] all struggle with insecurity. You know, all these law 
firms are all about profit. Professional development is not their thing as much 
as they advertised their in-house trainings. They don’t teach how to handle 
yourself in court.- A sheriff 
• A lot of solicitors I work with and who are solicitor advocates are happy to do 
easy procedural hearings but when the going gets rough they are happy to 





Table 5-8 Further proof on solicitors' seeing the merits of the reforms 
Second order 
themes 







• I think it's also positive [aspect of the reforms] that more cases can be raised in 
the Sheriff Court without the need for counsel necessarily being involved, in 
terms of expense, and additional work in each case. 
• Well, it is obviously a great opportunity for us, you know, to be better at what 
we are doing. Handle a case from the beginning till the end. 
• I think that the intention was by removal of the lower value cases from the Court 
of Session was that we [solicitors] would have more conduct of most of the work 
in the Sheriff Courts.  As I understood it, one of the aims, as I say, was to reduce 
costs and not have people requiring paying for both a solicitor and an advocate 
or, as I say, a solicitor advocate. And obviously in any case raised in the Court 
of Session, only an advocate or a solicitor advocate can appear, and the 
intention, as I understood it, of Gill's intention was that with more litigation 
going through the Sheriff Court, there wouldn't be a need for the instruction of 
advocates, or I'll say counsel, in these cases. It is a good plan in theory, I’m not 
gonna lie to you, but don’t think that we [solicitors] are ready though. 
• It could have been better for solicitors to actually go to court than sitting at 
their desks. So, I think it's been disappointing and so far, there seems to be so 
little emphasis on solicitors actually handling the work. 
• I mean realistically there were an awful lot of claims being raised particularly 
for personal injuries in the Court of Session for relatively, well they would be 
for quite substantial sums that would be raised but ultimately the claim would 
be worth a relatively small sum and you do wonder whether applying the rules 
of what is proportionate that they should have been in the Court of Session. 
• I suppose, is that you've reduced the level of business within the senior, the 
higher-level Court of Session, thereby freeing it up, theoretically at least, to 
deal with the higher value more complex cases. 
 
5.4.3 Dominant Belief: Solicitors Are Professionally Inferior to Advocates  
My analysis showed that there was a dominant belief in the field that asserted solicitors 
were professionally inferior to advocates. This belief was so very deeply rooted in the 
field that there was consistency among sheriffs, high court judges, advocates, members 
of the Scottish Parliament, solicitors themselves, and administrative staff of 
government and professional associations. Furthermore, not just the analysis of the 
interviews, but also my analysis of documents including books and articles regarding 
the history of the legal profession in Scotland, the Thomson Review regarding the 
rights of audience in the higher courts in Scotland, parliament minutes and letters to 
the government regarding the reforms reflected the same belief. Several sub-themes 
emerged in my data that I will detail next. 
Perception of advocates’ skills and expertise. The data analysis showed that there 
was a common belief in the legal profession that advocates were better equipped to 
handle legal cases than solicitors. Participants from different groups such as sheriff 
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judges, solicitors or advocates stated that advocates were “very experienced”, “very 
skilled” in many ways than solicitors, had “better performances” in court, did not make 
“mistakes” and “equipped with better training”. The data analysis also showed that 
participants thought that these beliefs were so deeply rooted that, regardless if they 
were completely true or not, “there will always be a perception that counsel is 
somehow the more experienced or skilled”, as Gabriel who was a solicitor stated. I 
saw that believing that advocates were more skilled and experienced also brought the 
belief that they were more competent in handling certain type of cases, as I discuss 
next. 
Perception of advocates’ and solicitors’ competency. According to the data 
analysis, there was widespread belief in the legal field that advocates were the only 
ones who could handle the cases that were complex, important, high value, 
challenging, difficult or requiring specialist expertise.  Consequently, solicitors were 
considered competent to represent clients if only the cases that were straightforward 
and low value as Nancy, a very experienced solicitor, stated:  
There are obviously some cases where it would be completely inappropriate to 
instruct counsel, the very straightforward cases.  You would not have the brass 
neck to instruct counsel in a case like that, you would always want to do that 
yourself but there are other cases which are in the sheriff court and which are 
very complicated and where, as a solicitor, you might feel quite challenged. 
Furthermore, another aspect that emerged from the data was that having an advocate 
representing a client instead of a solicitor was considered as an advantage for the 
parties. As a result, the actors in the field believed that if one party had an advocate 
representing them, the other should also be allowed to do so. They built this argument 
on the notion of “equality of arms” which is a principle created by the European Court 
of Human Rights and requires a fair trial between parties. Equality of arms “is not in 
itself a right, but a principle intended to ensure that the parties' rights are realised in a 
balanced manner”  (Champod & Vuille, 2011: 23). In the interviews, participants 
frequently emphasised how having advocates representing their clients was important 
for the equality of arms. The legal professionals consider that one party has a solicitor 
representing them while other party has an advocate as a violation of the principle of 
equality of arms. That reflects the direct assumption of advocates’ competency as 
better than solicitors regardless of advocates’ personal and professional capacity.   
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Moreover, the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act, Section 108 explains the sanction for 
advocates in the sheriff courts where “the court is deciding … whether to sanction the 
employment of counsel by a party for the purposes of the proceedings” (The Courts 
Reform (Scotland) Act, 2014: s. 108).  According to Section 108, there are certain 
conditions to consider before granting the sanction as it is stated below (emphasis 
added): 
“The court must sanction the employment of counsel if the court considers, in 
all the circumstances of the case, that it is reasonable to do so. 
In considering that matter, the court must have regard to— 
(a) whether the proceedings are such as to merit the employment of counsel, 
having particular regard to— 
(i) the difficulty or complexity, or likely difficulty or complexity, of the 
proceedings, 
(ii) the importance or value of any claim in the proceedings, and 
(b) the desirability of ensuring that no party gains an unfair advantage by virtue 
of the employment of counsel. 
The court may have regard to such other matters as it considers appropriate.” 
The law has been designed in a way that reflects the dominant belief regarding the 
professional competency of lawyers, which is that advocates are professionally 
superior to solicitors. The law assumes that solicitors would eventually need help from 
advocates in one way or another, and it clarifies the conditions when it is “reasonable” 
to let them get this help. The law expects that solicitors will ask help if a case is 
complex, difficult or important. Also, it assumes that a solicitor cannot compete with 
an advocate and that would be an “unfair advantage” for the party with the counsel. 
Moreover, the law does not provide another way around in the sense that, while the 
right of solicitors to ask for counsel’s help has been guaranteed by law, there is no 
offered solution in case an advocate needs help. Moreover, if there is a very complex 
and important case and solicitor does not ask for help, no one can force the solicitor to 
instruct the counsel. That is, sheriffs cannot make the solicitor instruct counsel even 
though they think it is “reasonable” where the case is very complex and they think that 
solicitor would not be able to handle it. Here there is the assumption that solicitors 
would always ask for help themselves in the face of complexity in any way. All these 
reflect the deeply rooted beliefs regarding the advocates’ and solicitors’ competency. 
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Belief that solicitors will never be as good as advocates. Another sub-theme that 
emerged from the data analysis is the belief that solicitors will never be professionally 
as good as advocates. I found that participants think that solicitors will always need 
the advocates’ help and there will always be the role for counsel since solicitors will 
always have complex cases where they will want to have a senior person dealing with 
it. That reflects the belief that solicitors will never be good enough to handle complex 
cases alone. Also, according to the data, actors in the field believe that the best 
solicitors will choose to become an advocate and “there will always be that space for 
the good ones”, as Susan stated as a solicitor. As a result, the participants accept that, 
as Ted stated as a solicitor, “there will always be a perception that counsel is somehow 
the more experienced or skilled”. 
Reflections of assumed expertise. My data analysis showed that there are certain 
practices in the field that reflect an assumed expertise of the advocate’s over solicitors. 
These practices are all accepted and taken for granted by the actors in the field. One 
of the practices is that only advocates can be judges in the supreme court regardless of 
the professional capacity of the solicitor. In addition, only advocates can appear in the 
supreme court whereas solicitors can only appear in the lower courts. The data analysis 
showed that these practices are a “reflection of expertise” that is assumed by the actors 
in the field as it is possible for a solicitor to be better than a certain advocate. In this 
respect, one of the solicitors, Steven, stated “to be honest it is not always the case that 
an advocate will do a better job.  I mean some advocates have never been in practice 
as a solicitor, some have and then they go to the bar, others leave university and they 
pretty much go straight, and they may not have that much more experience”.  
Symbolic and material superiority. According to the data, the belief regarding the 
advocates’ being professionally superior to solicitors showed itself in the symbolic and 
material elements.  For example, the building that the Faculty of Advocates and the 
library is located, Parliament House, is a magnificent building with historical 
importance. Shared with advocates, the building was used as the Parliament until the 
19th century. “Parliament House, designed as the physical and symbolic heart of 
Scottish political power, is now the physical and symbolic heart of the Scottish legal 
system, further indicating the Faculty’s elite position in the apparatus of the Scottish 
state” (Siebert, Wilson, & Hamilton, 2016: 1612).  This building is where advocates 
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work, train, socialise, and meet with solicitors. However, solicitors are not allowed to 
enter the library of the Faculty of Advocates or use the resources within the library.   
That was something brought to my attention several times by the members of different 
groups. 
Also, advocates wear different clothes than solicitors in their court appearances. Their 
work costume includes a wig and gown that are quite spectacular in their own way and 
give an impression of importance and status. During my observations in the courts, it 
was difficult to distinguish who was a solicitor and who was a layperson with a suit 
and a tie in the corridors of the courts, whereas it was very easy to spot an advocate. 
In addition, my data showed that advocates have ancient traditions that are not shared 
and practiced by solicitors such as communicating with hand-written letters, using a 
very particular language with a rich and elaborate style, having different ceremonies 
and rituals, as well as having a different professional etiquette. All these symbolic and 
material elements reflect the established superiority of advocates over solicitors. 
Perception on solicitors’ emotional fitness for advocacy. Based on the data analysis, 
I saw that the fact that solicitors’ experience a lack of self-confidence is observed by 
other members of the professional field such as advocates and sheriffs. That makes 
them question the emotional fitness of solicitors for doing advocacy, particularly by 
the sheriffs. For instance, below is an excerpt from the interview with Sheriff Wilson 
who, while giving his opinions on the opportunities created by the reforms for 
solicitors, mentioned his expectations of those who have oral arguments before him: 
Sheriff Wilson: I don’t think that this is a great opportunity for solicitors. 
Opportunities were already there before. They had this creature of solicitor-
advocate, for instance. Still when you go to the courts, you’ll only see advocates 
standing on their feet. 
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the reason for this?   
 
Sheriff Wilson: You need to be confident for being able to do advocacy. You 
need to believe in yourself.  
 
Interviewer: So, do you think solicitors do not believe in themselves? 
 
Sheriff Wilson:  No, they don’t. They’re insecure, they make mistakes. They’re 
clumsy in court. You can’t just come along and say you forgot to do those 
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because of an oversight, or you did not do that because somebody was on holiday 
and then apologize endlessly. No, you are not children. 
Another example is from the interview with Sheriff Taylor: 
Sheriff Taylor: A lot of solicitors have an aversion to appearing in court.  
Interviewer: Why is that?  
Sheriff Taylor: Lack of confidence, it seems. There is a disappointing inclination 
to instruct counsel. 
Furthermore, a very experienced advocate and QC, Charles, shared his opinion on the 
lack of confidence of solicitors for doing advocacy in the court room as: 
So most definitely there is [an issue of confidence], and I am really quite 
surprised at the openness of quite senior people to say that I feel incompetent 
doing proofs-which to me seems inconceivable but then I know that I am from a 
different era.  
5.5 Discussion 
The intent of this study is to extend our current understanding of how emotions affect 
institutional change processes. In this regard, this paper particularly asked ‘what role 
do emotions play in theorisation processes?’ In so doing, my focus is on the reception 
of theorisation because new arrangements have to be accepted and adopted by the 
change recipients (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2002). 
This paper makes two main contributions to our current understanding of institutions. 
First, it shifts the attention from the extant theorisation literature’s traditional emphasis 
on cognitive processes towards emotional processes that are required for successful 
theorisation. Thus, this paper presents a revised theory of ‘theorisation’ that 
incorporates emotions and presents a model of theorisation based on the findings and 
the literature on theorisation and emotions.  Second, it brings ‘self-confidence’ as a 
social emotion into institutional theory. Self-confidence as an emotion, or self-efficacy 
as its cognitive component for that matter, has been almost completely overlooked in 
the institutional theory literature, even though self-confidence is crucial for action and 
understanding enactments of institutionally embedded actors. In this respect, the 
contribution of this paper also lies in the fact that it approaches the emotion of self-
confidence from a macrostructural point of view, and considers self-confidence as a 
social emotion that is embedded in social structures such as class, segments of 
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professions, segments of society, power and status relationships and so on (Barbalet, 
1993, 2001; Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978, 2006; Kemper & Collins, 1990).  By doing 
so, this paper further aims to introduce a greater appreciation of the role of self-
confidence to the institutional theory, as a “basic social emotion that constitutes agency 
on individual, social and institutional level” (Poder, 2010: 112). 
5.5.1 Revised Theory of Theorisation 
Our current understanding of theorisation portrays successful theorisation as a purely 
cognitive process that “increases the zones of acceptance by providing rationales for 
the practices to be adopted” (Rao et al., 2003: 816). Successful theorisation is depicted 
as “understandable and compelling” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 75) and being able to 
“earn endorsement and acceptance” of the relevant audience (Delmestri & Greenwood, 
2016: 514).  It is supposed to “persuade constituencies of the desirability and 
appropriateness of institutional deviance” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005: 37) and 
“craft a compelling message advocating for change” (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010: 1092).   
In order to do so, current accounts of theorisation suggest that two major tasks must 
be achieved: specification of the problems with the current system and justifications of 
the new ideas as solutions to those problems (Greenwood, Jennings, & Hinings, 2015; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Mena & Suddaby, 2016; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  This 
process requires giving pragmatic and/or moral legitimacy to the new ideas either by 
“nesting and aligning them with prevailing normative prescriptions and/or by asserting 
their functional superiority” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 60). In so doing, our current 
understanding portrays successful theorisation as a process that creates cognitively 
established chains of cause and effect (Cartel, Colombero, & Boxenbaum, 2017; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Mena & Suddaby, 2016; Strang & Meyer, 1993). These 
“causal chains may be either pragmatic or normative in nature” (Cartel et al., 2017: 
156) and “the rhetoric of these claims seeks efficiency, effectiveness, and moral 
acceptability for the new archetype” (Hinings & Malhotra, 2008: 119). That is, in 
short, literature on theorisation presents a successful theorisation as a purely cognitive 
process that aims to invoke cognitively and normatively fitting claims for the change 
recipients (Cartel et al., 2017; Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Weber, Thomas, & Rao, 
2009) since “theorization is essentially the process of matching adopters to practices 
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and practices to adopters” (Green, Li, & Nohria, 2009: 13). It is apparent that, the 
current framework of theorisation suggests that the new ideas and practices introduced 
during institutional change are adopted to the extent that theorisation is built on a 
compelling rationale and the existing values of change recipients.  
However, based on my findings, I present a revised theory of theorisation that 
incorporates emotions. In this revised theory, I argue that along with its cognitive 
building block which is developing cognitively/normatively fitting claims, successful 
theorisation must also include emotionally fitting claims. My revised theory suggests 
that regardless of how well the change is argued and the rationales are developed, 
theorisation will be inadequate unless the emotional component is addressed. Figure 
5.1 depicts the model that I created based on my proposed revised theory of 
theorisation that, next, I will explain in detail. 
Figure 5-1 The revised model of theorisation 
 
5.5.1.1 Emotionally Fitting Claims 
My main argument regarding the emotional component of my revised theory is that a 
successful theorisation should include “emotionally fitting claims”. I based this 
argument on my findings that pointed the missing link between the theorisers of 
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findings showed that theorisers of the Scottish civil justice reforms specified the 
failures of the existing system and justified the new structures and practices in a similar 
way to the many accounts of theorisation studies suggest (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Strang & Meyer, 1993). In their justification, Lord Gill and others aimed to provide 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy for the reforms by addressing the solutions that the 
reforms would bring to the existing problems as the literature suggested (David, Sine, 
& Haveman, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2002; Mena & Suddaby, 2016; Suchman, 1995). 
Theorisers of the change in my context also tried to show how reforms were aligned 
with the values of the legal profession. The arguments that Lord Gill and others 
presented clearly and logically showed why the current system was not working and 
the change was necessary and important. These theorisations emphasised how 
pragmatic and rational the reforms were in general and underlined the opportunities 
that the change offered for the solicitors. Theorisers also claimed that the reforms 
would advance the change recipients’ privileges and interests. However, when this 
particular part of theorisation was laid out, recipients did not take it onboard as much 
as it was desired by the theorisers and thus did not adopt the new practices and 
structures.  
My findings showed that although the change recipients, solicitors, recognised their 
rational interests and logic of the reforms in general, their lack of self-confidence 
stopped them from engaging with the reforms and adopting the new practices. Because 
of the emotional issues that the change recipients had, they were not receptive of the 
presented arguments. The data showed that solicitors understood these arguments yet 
understanding and accepting the merits of the arguments was not enough for them to 
adopt these new practices. Considering the fact that theorisation is deemed to be 
successful to the extent that the new arrangements are accepted and adopted by the 
change recipients, we see that theorisation in my case study was unsuccessful. Based 
on the recipients’ response, we saw there was an emotional unsuitability between the 
theorisation arguments on new arrangements and the change recipients’ emotional 
state. There existed an emotional barrier between what is said by theorisers of the 
reforms and what change recipients felt at the time regarding adopting the new 
arrangements. 
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If it was just down to rational solutions, as it is suggested in the literature, theorisation 
in this empirical setting would have likely been successful. Studies of theorisation 
assumed that actors would engage in action and adopt the new practices when they are 
cognitively compelled that change would serve the interests of them in some ways. 
The current accounts of theorisation research suggest that “theorizing about general 
organizational failings and alternative institutional arrangements” or creating “a purely 
cognitive awareness of institutional opportunities and of one’s interests being poorly 
served by current institutional order” (Voronov & Vince, 2012: 72) is sufficient for 
making people adopt the new arrangements. Yet, my findings show that theorisation 
built on only rational arguments is not sufficient. We saw in the findings that 
theorisation remained inadequate because promoters of the change theorised it without 
any emotional understanding of the recipients’ emotional state and they assumed a 
rational nature of human agency and ignored the emotions constituting the agency. 
In this regard, the revised theory of theorisation that this study presents suggests that 
theorisation should have an emotional component to be successful. That is, it should 
not only invoke cognitively/normatively fitting claims, but also invoke emotionally 
fitting claims specific to the recipients of the change. With these emotionally fitting 
claims, two tasks must be achieved: justification of emotional competence of the 
change recipients for the new roles and practices in the changing institution and 
creating emotional resonance among the change recipients. Figure 5.2. summarises the 
emotional component of theorisation model that this paper presents. Next, I will 
explain each task in detail. 
Figure 5-2 Summary of emotional component of the revised theory of theorisation 
 
Creating emotional resonance 
among the recipients 
Justification of the emotional 
competence of the recipients for 
the new arrangements 
Emotionally Fitting Claims 
 
*Recognising/addressing the emotional state 
and emotional needs of the recipients to feel 
emotionally competent for the new 
arrangements 
*Justify the emotional competence of the 
change recipients to themselves and others in 
the institution. 
* Aiming to create passionate identification 
with the change to create emotional resonance 
by developing emotionally resonant claims 
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Justification of emotional competence of the change recipients for the new 
arrangements.  In the empirical setting of this study, change recipients, solicitors, 
suffered from feeling emotionally incompetent within the new arrangements. 
Emotional competence means the ability to “experience and display emotions that are 
deemed appropriate for an actor role within the institutional order” (Voronov & 
Weber, 2016: 457). The findings showed that the change recipients experienced the 
feelings of emotional incompetence in two ways. First, they shared that they do not 
feel confident enough to undertake new challenges and engage with the new practices. 
Second, they emphasised that feeling confident and displaying the confidence is a 
requirement for successfully performing the new practices that they were asked to do, 
and they do not feel it. In other words, the change recipients implied that they do not 
have the emotional competence to adopt the new practices. In this empirical setting, 
solicitors did not experience the self-confidence privately or display it publicly that 
was considered a must for successfully performing the new practices and they were 
aware of this fact, also leading to experiencing further anxiety, fear and insecurity. 
In my findings we saw that the basis of the change recipients feeling of emotionally 
incompetent for the new arrangements was their feeling lack of self-confidence. My 
data showed that change recipients suffered from, as a reflection of their lack of self-
confidence, strong fear, particularly fear of failure and fear of embarrassment. 
Furthermore, they stated that they suffer from self-doubt, feeling inadequate and 
incompetent, hence insecure. Self-confidence as a social emotion that has been 
portrayed as the complete opposite of these emotions of fear, anxiety, and insecurity 
(Barbalet, 1993, 1996, 2001; Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978; Kleres & Wettergren, 
2017). Yet, theorisation process did not address this issue at all while still trying to get 
“endorsement and acceptance by relevant audience” (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016: 
514).  We saw that there was a mismatch between how the change had been argued by 
the theorisers and how it was received by the recipients.  Based on this, I argue, if  
“theorization is essentially the process of matching adopters to practices and practices 
to adopters” (Green et al., 2009: 13), then, this matching process should also 
emotionally match practices to adopters and adopters to practices. However, my 
findings showed that Lord Gill and others did not see if the recipients feel emotionally 
incompetent for the new order and address their emotional needs accordingly. They 
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did not acknowledge that solicitors were capable enough, emotional or otherwise, for 
the changing arrangements. They did not build arguments claiming that the new 
practices and new roles coming with the institutional change are a good match for the 
emotional competency of the recipients. Based on this, I suggest that theorisation 
process must include justification of the emotional competence of the change 
recipients for the new arrangements.  That is, theorisation should convince the 
recipients themselves that they are emotionally capable of undertaking the new 
institutional roles and inhabit the new institutional arrangements.   
Voronov and Weber (2016) argue that actors’ feeling emotionally competent depends 
on two factors: self-regulation and other-authorization. That is, both actors themselves 
as well as the others within the institution should consider them as competent 
institutional actors.  That is why justifications should address these two factors by 
recognising and addressing the emotional needs of the recipients to feel emotionally 
competent and justifying their emotional competence to themselves and others in the 
institution.  
Regarding the other-authorization aspect of feeling emotionally competent in an 
institutional order, we saw in the findings that solicitors are not considered, 
emotionally or otherwise, competent actors to fulfil the new practices that are offered 
for them by the reforms. The lack of self-confidence of solicitors seems obvious to 
others in the field, decreasing the emotional competency of the solicitors since ‘other-
authorization’ did not occur in the new system. In another words, solicitors were not 
able to display confidence ‘publicly’ that was necessary for performing the new 
practices. Therefore, they failed to live up to the expectations of the institutional order. 
The dominant belief regarding the professional capacity of solicitors asserted that 
solicitors neither have the professional skills and expertise nor the required emotional 
competency. That is, solicitors are not deemed as competent institutional actors by 
others. The fact that change recipients feel emotionally incompetent for the new 
institutional arrangements caused them to build a barrier between themselves and 
theorisation claims. In the theorisation efforts of all parties, there was not any attempt 
to develop professional acceptance and recognition of solicitors’ abilities, in an 
institution where no one accepted or recognised solicitors’ competency regarding the 
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new practices, particularly advocacy. Consequently, theorisation remained inadequate 
and ineffective.  
Furthermore, in the findings, we saw that there was a repeated rhetoric that solicitors 
were good at changing and adapting to change. However, solicitors’ lack of confidence 
was not fed by the fear of failure in changing, but by the fear of failure in performing 
skilfully and competently. This shows how the theorisers of the change failed to grasp 
the emotional needs of the change recipients. Lord Gill and others built their arguments 
on emotional concerns that were not experienced by the change recipients. Therefore, 
justifications during theorisation addressing the capability of solicitors in changing 
were not effective in persuading solicitors to adopt the new arrangements. Based on 
this, I argue that in order to successfully theorise an institutional change, promoters 
should address the emotional needs of the change recipients to undertake the new 
practices and roles.   
The emotional needs of change recipients faced with institutional change could be 
different in different contexts. In this particular empirical setting, feeling self-
confident and displaying confidence was the emotional need that should have been 
addressed. While institutional theory is mainly silent on the emotional underpinnings 
of the reception of theorisation processes and completely ignores the emotion of self-
confidence, some studies of social movements have acknowledged the importance of 
mobilizing the self-confidence within movements for enabling the action (e.g. 
Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Jasper, 2011). These studies highlighted how protest 
organizers try to ensure that individuals or groups feel confident due to the importance 
of protesters’ self-confidence for collective action. They mainly suggested that self-
confidence has to be constructed in shaky moments where challenges and adversities 
create fear and self-doubt (Barker, 2001). As being at the opposite spectrum with 
feeling confident, fear needs to be managed in order to make people feel confident and 
mobilize action (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001; Jasper, 2011). “For a movement to succeed, 
as we saw, activists must devote enormous effort to giving participants a sense of their 
own agency. They need confidence in their own ability to act, something that requires 
the suppression of demobilizing emotions such as apathy and fear” (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2006: 626). Similarly, the theorisation efforts of Lord Gill and others should 
have aimed to control the fear among solicitors because fear, particularly fear of failure 
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and fear of embarrassment, reduces self-confidence (Kleres & Wettergren, 2017) and 
loss of self-confidence may paralyze actors or cause panic (Jasper, 2011) while 
inhibiting agency and action (Barbalet, 2001). Yet, we saw in the findings that 
theorisers failed in managing the fear. They could not develop strategies that inspire 
confidence, as they should have (Flam, 2005). Solicitors suffered from fear of failure 
and embarrassment, hence lack of self-confidence. As a result, they did not respond 
well to the rational justifications of theorisation and did not adopt the new practices. 
In the findings, we also saw that theorisers did not mention how change would provide 
ways to secure access to resources that were necessary for the change recipients to 
perform the new practices. In my setting, these resources might be training 
opportunities, time, social support and so on. However, theorisation did not include 
explanations of how solicitors would have the required resources to be able to feel 
confident to adopt the practices in the present moment, as well as act accordingly in 
the future. Yet, one’s “access to relevant resources for future action” is a central factor 
for one to feel self-confident (Barbalet 2001: 86). The access to resources is crucial 
not only for the immediate need, but also their availability for the future (Barbalet, 
1996). One cannot keep feeling confident of acting towards an unknowable future 
without secured future admission to resources.  Therefore, self-confidence is not only 
dependent upon social acceptance, but also access to relevant resources.  In this regard, 
building on Barbalet, Poder (2010: 113) argues that “to feel confident about realizing 
a projection of oneself – confident, for example, that one will succeed in becoming a 
manager – one needs to know that one has entrée to resources of instrumental 
significance in this career development”.  
From a macrostructural point of view, emotions have been linked to individuals’ or 
groups’ positions in social hierarchies (Barbalet, 2001; Collins, 2004; Kemper, 1978; 
Kemper & Collins, 1990). As a positive and social emotion, self-confidence is also 
distributed over societal segments (Barbalet, 2001; Kemper, 2006). That is, while 
some groups have more confidence, some other groups have less. Particularly, high 
status actors have more confidence than lower status groups  (Kemper, 1978; Kemper 
& Collins, 1990; Turner, 2014a). 
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Actors feel positive emotions, particularly self-confidence, when they have access to 
resources (Barbalet, 2001; Kemper & Collins, 1990; Turner, 2014a). In addition, when 
people feel positive emotions like self-confidence, they act on opportunities, pursue 
other resources, and persist on and commit to their pursuit (Turner, 2014a). This 
experiencing positive emotions helping them to access more resources, then they 
experience further positive emotions; leading them to pursue and secure more 
resources. That creates a circle; a compounding impact of emotions. Even in the face 
of failure and negative emotions, those who have “a reservoir of self-confidence” 
perform better at rising from failure and committing themselves to success (Turner, 
2014: 193), while the ones who do not have the reservoir of confidence experience the 
opposite of these experiences.  
Therefore, a reservoir of positive emotions and self-confidence, is a valued resource 
that can be distributed unequally like any other resource. The consequence is that “the 
emotionally rich get richer, and the emotionally deprived get poorer” (Turner, 2014: 
193). That is why positive emotions are considered as highly valued resources that 
“have very large effects not only on people but social structure and culture at all levels 
of social organization” (Turner, 2014: 179). 
The above discussed aspects of the distribution of emotions among segments and the 
fact that emotions are resources for action, success and status is very important for 
understanding this research. The context of this study is an empirical setting with a 
status hierarchy that is historically very established with advocates having enjoyed a 
higher status than solicitors for centuries. Accordingly, we saw in the findings that 
self-confidence of the solicitors as a group were significantly less than advocates. Self-
confidence, as an emotion is a fundamental resource for action and is distributed 
unequally across fields. In my case, the designers of the institutional change did not 
considered this unbalance of emotions among the segments. Furthermore, this deeply 
established status hierarchy has established and long-standing customs, habits, 
division of labour and so on. Consequently, “it requires a great deal of confidence to 
challenge tradition” (Poder, 2010: 117). However, my findings showed that theorisers 
mainly ignored the fact they asked solicitors to challenge the tradition. They tried to 
justify an institutional change that required a jurisdictional migration in which ‘who 
does what’ migrates from one group to another, yet they did not consider the 
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distribution of emotional resources among the groups. They ignored that it requires 
confidence to be willing to take place in this migration- which I believe it also 
contributed to the failure of theorisation in this front.  
In summary, in this study, we saw that claims justifying the emotional competency of 
the change recipients to themselves or others was completely non-existent in 
theorisation. There were not any claims suggesting that change recipients were 
emotionally competent for handling the new arrangements.  Also, all of our discussion 
so far points that theorisation should include a correct assessment of emotional needs 
of the change recipients in order to claim emotionally fitting claims regarding the 
offered change. Yet, there were not any attempts to fulfil the emotional needs of 
change recipients.  
Creating emotional resonance among change recipients. In my revised theory of 
theorisation, I borrow the concept of ‘emotional resonance’ from the social movement 
literature and suggest that successful theorisation requires emotional resonance among 
the change recipients by developing emotionally resonant claims in addition to the 
traditional emphasis on the fact that theorisation should invoke cognitively resonant 
claims. Giorgi (2017: 721) defines emotional resonance as “an audience’s experienced 
personal connection with a frame at the emotional level, as an alignment with 
audiences’ feelings and desires” and further elaborates “emotional resonance is 
achieved when framing moves or shakes its target recipient”. That is, if an audience 
feels passionate identification with a person, cause, idea or vision, then emotional 
resonance is achieved (Giorgi, 2017). The social movements literature further suggests 
that the frames that change agents use must have emotional resonance with their 
audience to increase the possibility of success in mobilizing change (Goodwin, Jasper, 
& Polletta, 2000). Theorisation studies have ignored the importance of emotions in 
this regard, although as a discursive process, theorisation generally includes use of 
frames or other rhetorical strategies to convince actors to adopt new practices.  
I incorporate the concept of emotional resonance in my revised theory because 
theorisation involves not only rendering ideas into abstract and compelling formats, 
but also developing the capacity to inspire actors to act and stimulating their 
participation in the new practices by motivating them (Lok et al., 2017; Voronov, 
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2014). Yet, theorisation studies have largely overlooked the motivational nature of 
theorisation, and mainly focused on translation of ideas. However, theorisation is 
largely about convincing people to act and engage in change. In contrast to institutional 
theory studies, social movement studies offer insights regarding the link between 
emotions and motivate people to engage in change and action. For example, we know 
organizers build their movements on the pre-existing emotions of people such as love, 
anger or fear (Jasper, 1998) and moral shocks that people experiencing help recruiters 
to motivate people to join social movements (Jasper, 2011; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). 
Also, activists try to create moral outrage and anger to motivate people within social 
movements to act in desired ways by turning their fears and anxieties into anger 
(Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001) and “passion for justice, is fuelled by anger over 
existing injustice” (Jasper, 1998: 414). Activists also try to inspire hope and manage 
fear for mobilising people in a movement (Flam, 2005) and they intentionally 
undermine some emotions such as fear, shame and hatred, while strengthening the 
emotions of pride, solidarity and anger in order to “transform cementing, status quo-
supporting emotions into subversive, mobilizing emotions that bring about social 
change” (Flam, 2015: 266). All these studies suggest that a level of emotional 
resonance with the desired change among the audience is necessary for making them 
engage with the change and adopt the new practices.  
I acknowledge that managing emotions is not easy, even by the most skilled and 
charismatic actors (Tracey, 2016). Yet, it is necessary for mobilizing action and agency 
(Jasper, 2011).  My findings showed that in the process of theorising change there was 
not any attempt to manage emotions and develop emotionally resonant claims. We saw 
that Lord Gill as the institutional entrepreneur, developed a strong vision and shared 
his vision with the rest of the profession, a standard aspect of theorisation (Battilana 
et al., 2009; Leca et al., 2006). He abstracted changing practices, structures and roles 
into a vision and worthy cause. The vision was to bring a change that restores a sense 
of pride in the Scottish justice system. The cause behind the change was increase 
access to justice. However, these claims did not resonate with the recipients of the 
change. There was not any passionate identification with the vision and cause among 
the change recipients. They were not emotionally connected to these claims. On the 
contrary, the change recipients were indifferent towards the conveyed messages in this 
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regard. The claims of theorisation did not “strike a responsive chord” with the 
recipients (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986: 477). I argue that theorisers 
of the change should have recognised the emotional state of the recipients (Polletta, 
2009) and aimed to create emotionally resonant claims because emotional resonance 
among the change recipients is believed to decrease indifference towards conveyed 
ideas (Giorgi, 2017).  
I also argue that, in a situation of a field change, increased emotional resonance may 
help overcoming the anxiety, shame and fear caused by feeling emotionally 
incompetent in the face of new arrangements. It is because “emotional resonance can 
shake up existing feelings and unfreeze them” (Giorgi, 2017: 724). Therefore, 
theorisation efforts should aim to develop emotionally resonant claims so that the 
change recipients passionately identify with the change and find the confidence to try 
something new that they feel emotionally incompetent. 
It has been already suggested that presenting emotion based justifications or emotive 
appeals (pathos) to build pragmatic and moral legitimacy is important (Brown, 
Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Green, 2004; Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015). 
However, creating personal emotional connections with the change and institutional 
projects is beyond legitimacy concerns (Giorgi, 2017) and more to do with the having 
an emotional connection to these emotional projects. For example, in their study 
regarding how organizations create and encourage evangelists, in the context of 
Ontario wines, Massa et al. (2017) found that organizations used dramatic and 
emotional rituals to commit people to their institutional projects. The rituals 
organizations used for attracting evangelists turned into inspiring emotional 
experiences for participants with distinctive and receptive identities. While these 
emotional experiences make these participants behave in evangelistic ways, they were 
unsuccessful in inspiring some others. Also, Voronov, De Clercq and Hinings (2013) 
showed how Ontario winemakers altered the emotive content of their script depending 
on which audience they were interacting with. The insights from the social movement 
literature regarding the necessity of emotional resonance in narratives for change were 
implicit in these studies. Thus, I suggest that theorisation claims must be emotionally 
resonant with the recipients of the change in order to be successful.  
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Höllerer (2012: 89) argues “theorization is a dynamic and circular process that 
involves active adopters… where they are on the forefront of theorizing” providing 
ground for new ideas and practices to spread. However, in my data, there was no 
evidence regarding early adopters and their successful conduct of new practices. This 
also shows the scope and depth of the failure of the theorisation efforts. Overall, 
theorisers of the Scottish civil justice reforms failed as emotional competence and 
resonance builders. They could not motivate, encourage and compel people to act on 
change and adopt the new practices. 
5.5.2 Self-confidence and Institutional Change 
My work brings ‘self-confidence’ as a social emotion into the conversation in 
institutional theory. I suggest that self-confidence of actors within an institutional field 
is particularly crucial for the processes of institutional change since “action and, 
therefore inaction, derive from the degree of confidence actors feel about their 
capacities to realize an unknowable future” (Barbalet, 1993: 239). The prevailing view 
on action and agency in institutional theory is that people act relatively intentionally, 
while having legitimacy concerns and being conditioned by the institutions that they 
are embedded in. Recent studies have particularly emphasised “the awareness, skill 
and reflexivity of individual and collective actors” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 219). 
However, this more or less “conscious intentionality” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 
2009: 11) is not enough to explain agency and action because having an intention to 
act, in other words intention to engage with a practice, would not secure being able to 
act upon those intentions (Poder, 2010). I suggest that actors, individually or 
collectively, are dependent on self-confidence for engaging in any action that is not 
routine for them (Jasper, 2011). 
Cech, Rubineau, Silbey, and Seron (2011: 646) argue professionals must have self-
confidence to be able to handle “the practical competencies of day-to-day professional 
work; and identification with the professional role and belief that one will enjoy this 
role, with all the complexity, uncertainty, and responsibility that accompany its 
fulfilment” . This means that professionals need to feel self-confident in order to be a 
particular kind of actor in an institution with established practices let alone to handle 
new practices that are poured upon them through an institutional change. 
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Jasper (2011) states that emotions are crucial for understanding the important moments 
when people leave routine practices for the new ways of acting. In this regard, it is the 
emotion of self-confidence that creates a “willingness to act” (Barbalet, 1993: 229), “a 
boldness in taking initiative” and “a readiness for action” (Collins, 2004: 39); an 
inclination to “take on new challenges” (Poder, 2010: 112). It is an emotional basis for 
human agency since “self-confidence kindles action” and lack of it makes actors 
“avoid engagement and remain passive” (Jasper, 2013: 108). Given that self-
confidence is crucial for understanding enactments of institutionally embedded actors 
within the macrostructures and their access to resources, I suggest that institutional 
theory should work to better understand the emotion of self-confidence and how it is 
distributed in order to extend our understanding of structure, action and agency. 
5.6 Conclusion 
With this research, I developed a revised theory of theorisation that introduces an 
emotional component. In particular, I have argued that theorisation should include 
emotionally fitting claims in addition to the cognitive/normative claims that the extant 
theory suggests are required to be successful. I have further suggested that developing 
emotionally fitting claims requires theorisers to justify emotional competence of the 
change recipients for the new arrangements and create emotional resonance among the 
recipients. Furthermore, while echoing scholars who underlined the importance of 
emotions in institutional theory, I particularly highlighted the relevance of the social 
emotion of self-confidence, varyingly distributed across a field, for understanding the 







6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
 
The three empirical chapters, Chapter Three, Four and Five, of this dissertation 
together make three overarching theoretical points. First, the intra-professional 
dynamics of a profession are much more important in determining the process of 
institutional change than have been portrayed in the literature. These intra-professional 
dynamics affect how change unfolds, how it is understood and how resistance towards 
change takes place. Second, the consequences of these intra-professional dynamics 
significantly affect the institutional projects of other entities such as the state. 
Professions are strongly linked to other institutions and the internal dynamics of 
professions therefore have significant repercussions with the broader environment. 
Third, from a macro level perspective, professions are the actors within other 
institutions and their collectively agentic nature derives from the fact that they are 
institutional orders. They inhabit other institutions and experience them with their own 
“work activities, social interactions, and meaning-making processes” (Hallett, 2010: 
53). 
6.1 Summary of Theoretical Contributions 
Chapter Three contributes to the institutional maintenance and professions literatures 
by uncovering the factors that hinder maintenance work and offering insights into 
intra-professional segmentation and its consequences for institutional change. It is 
found in Chapter Three that institutional maintenance work requires strong, 
coordinated action across intra-professional groups if it is to be effective. Further, 
while uncertainty provides opportunities for institutional change, it hinders 
institutional maintenance efforts. Also, Chapter Three shows that intra-professional 
identity differences are sharpened rather than dulled when an externally imposed 
change threatens different levels of status and these sharpened differences are likely 
to prevent coordinated maintenance work, even when it is perceived as being in the 
best interests of all involved. 
Chapter Four contributes to the institutional persistence and professions literatures by 
extending our understanding of field stability and disruption by uncovering new field 
mechanisms of persistence. These can hold disruption at bay in fields in the face of 
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strong exogenous shocks and maintain the internal cohesiveness of a profession. These 
mechanisms are jurisdictional contentedness and lack of a career bridge. These 
mechanisms can work together or separately, albeit one can be weaker or stronger in 
effect than the other.  
Chapter Five contributes to the institutional change and professions literatures by 
providing a revised theory of theorisation that incorporates emotions into the current 
model of theorisation. It extends our understanding of institutional change by positing 
that theorisation, if it is to be effective, should include emotionally fitting claims in 
addition to the cognitively/normatively fittings claims that the current literature 
suggested. This chapter also further contributes to our understanding of emotional 
underpinnings of institutional processes by shifting focus to the social emotion of self-
confidence and its relation to the structure, action and agency. 
6.2 Limitations 
As every study, this study also has limitations. First of all, I was limited by time and 
resources and a longer engagement with the field would have likely revealed further 
nuances of institutional change. That would have helped me further strengthen my 
theoretical inferences. Second, I might seem naïve to some who might think that the 
power and interests behind many actions are invisible in this research and my 
“inadequate awareness of power”, like many other institutional theorists (Munir, 
2015:1) covers the conflicts and contestations in the field. However, I absolutely see 
the relevance of discussing power in institutional studies, particularly institutional 
maintenance since they are focused on retaining the status quo of established interests 
and privileges. Although I did not shy away from identifying uses of power, I did not 
find enough evidence in my data that depicts a power story. I expect, in order to 
discover issues related to power and interests more effectively in this research setting, 
one needs to look at deeper relationships among actors within the same segments, 
rather than the whole profession. For instance, I believe solicitors’ firms are not 
collaborative but more likely characterised as sites of conflict and competition. Thus, 
studying the stability of their environment might give us insight into power and 
politics. However, this was not in the scope of my research since my level of analysis 
was macro level: the judicial system and the legal profession.  
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6.3 Managerial and Policy Implications 
In addition to the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, this research also 
provides significant insights for policy makers and institutional entrepreneurs in 
general. The practical implications of this research are particularly relevant for those 
who are engaged in initiating change that involves professional groups. I suggest that 
policy makers should consider the internal dynamics of professions since professionals 
are, often, the implementers of institutional changes. 
For policy makers who aim to design change programmes to tackle a grand challenge, 
such as increasing access to the justice, I suggest that they should not take the support 
of professionals for granted. The literature on professions strongly suggest that 
professionals are very good at resisting change and maintaining the status quo. 
Therefore, based on the findings of my dissertation (Chapter Three), for those who 
want to reduce resistance towards an institutional change and overcome the likely 
maintenance efforts of parties with established interests, I suggest strategies that can 
sharpen intra-professional differences and create uncertainties so that maintenance 
efforts would be less effective and change would proceed without much coordinated 
resistance. Also, as an alternative, policy makers should take much greater 
consideration of interests that would motivate intra-professional groups to change. On 
the other hand, for those who want to establish strong resistance towards institutional 
change in heterogenous professional fields, I suggest employing strategies that focus 
on a shared identity and shared values within a profession.  
Policy makers or institutional entrepreneurs should be especially aware of the fact that 
professional bonds within a profession can be much stronger than they expect (Chapter 
Four). These bonds are the skeletons of professional fields that enables maintenance 
of the status quo. They can be so strong that even an external legislative deus ex 
machina or an impressive community leader with a strong vision may fail to break 
them. That is, while designing or implementing institutional change that involves 
professionals, policy makers should consider the strength of the professional bonds 
and act accordingly.  
Moreover, policy makers should particularly be aware of the distribution of emotions 
among the segments within society because these emotions are the sources of 
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resilience, assertiveness, and change (Chapter Five). These segments can be intra-
professional segments as it was in my case or be any other societal segments. What 
matters is that emotions are crucial for action and agency, yet not considering them 
while designing and implementing an institutional change may lead to failure or 
undesired and unintended consequences. Aligned with this point, policy makers who 
aim to deal with inequalities in society should see how emotions are distributed 
unequally across institutional fields. For example, self-confidence is a particularly 
important emotion that can be distributed unequally among different groups in society, 
yet it is necessary for those who is required to take action. For instance, there can be 
policies that aim to bring institutional change by creating opportunities for 
disadvantaged groups within society to improve education, health or income. 
However, if these groups lack the reservoir of self-confidence to take advantage of 
these opportunities or bounce back from previous failures, institutional change may be 
unachievable. Rather, offered opportunities may be seized by those groups with a 
bigger reservoir of self-confidence rather than the intended groups. Also, change 
agents should diagnose the emotional state of the change recipients and address their 
emotional needs to accommodate the new practices (Chapter Five). Change designers 
or implementers should strategically manage negative emotions such as fear and 
shame and nourish the positive emotions that encourage engagement with change such 
as hope and optimism. 
6.4 Avenues for Future Research 
We have given insufficient attention to understanding some of the major societal 
consequences of institutional processes…institutions per se do not matter. It is 
the depth and profundity of their consequences, coupled with their ubiquity 
(Greenwood et al.,  2017: 16). 
This dissertation provides insights into intra-professional dynamics within a 
profession and shows how these dynamics affect institutional processes and change 
initiatives of the state. I echo Zietsma et al.’s (2017: 421) suggestion that  “the 
dynamics of the subfield populations need empirical investigation, together with a 
search for other subfield populations. All of this is part of the important element of 
systematically elaborating different actors within a field, their common meaning 
systems and their homogeneity and heterogeneity.” I suggest that a fruitful area of 
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future research would be seeing how these internal dynamics of professions affect the 
institutional projects of other entities that aim to tackle grand challenges. In particular, 
what are the processes and outcomes of the actions of professionals engaged in 
institutional change?   
In addition, this dissertation provides insight into mechanisms that keep a professional 
field intact while facing exogenous shocks. However, my focus was on a highly 
established profession with its established intra-professional boundaries. In this 
regard, a second useful area of research would be examining what makes professional 
fields with boundaryless careers or emerging professional fields without established 
jurisdictions robust in the face of exogenous shocks. To assess whether the 
mechanisms in my research will hold these types of professional fields together and 
maintain their current structure and practices in the long term, it will be necessary to 
undertake additional fieldwork. 
Moreover, Chapter Three provides insights into the factors reducing the effectiveness 
of institutional maintenance efforts such as uncertainty and sharpened intra-
professional identity differences. Drawing on Chapter Three and the calls for 
additional research on institutional maintenance (e.g. Lawrence et al, 2009; Micelotta 
& Washington, 2013), I suggest that another area of growth would be further studying 
unsuccessful institutional maintenance attempts. For instance, what role do emotions 
play in the (in)effectiveness of maintenance efforts?  
Further, I encourage future research to turn back to the roots of institutional theory by 
re-focusing on institutional continuity and persistence by incorporating emotions into 
explanations of taken-for-grantedness.  What does it mean to emotionally take 
something for granted and how does this effect institutional reproduction? Scholars so 
far have particularly focused on the emotions of fear and shame during institutional 
control and reproduction. However, there may be other positive and negative emotions 
that can enable or constrain institutional control. For example, how do feeling of 
hopelessness, gratefulness or optimism effect institutional change? Or can the 
emotions of greed or envy be so taken-for-granted in certain institutional environments 
that wrongdoings are considered normal and they persist?  
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Lastly, given that incorporating emotions into institutional studies is new and that most 
institutional theory research has focused on emotions from a micro-foundational 
perspective, a very significant future research area would be studying emotions from 
a macro-structural approach. In particular, it would be useful to see how social 
emotions are developed across different segments of society and how they influence 
processes of institutional change? What are the consequences of the unequal 
distribution of emotions in institutional structures, particularly for societal change 
initiatives and grand challenges? Are there any examples of successful or unsuccessful 
institutional change because of the unequal distribution of emotions within 
institutional fields? These are matters that are worthy of further empirical and 
theoretical investigation. 
6.5 Final Remarks 
In concluding this dissertation, I would like to state that professions and professionals 
are crucial for addressing societal challenges.  Therefore, the improving of our 
understanding of the relationship between the professions, institutions and institutional 
change, I believe, is one of the main routes for us, as researchers, to help address 
societal problems. As a researcher whose passion lies in understanding the concept of 
change, I hope that I have contributed to this path by providing insights into the 
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8.1 Appendix 1: The draft of the first email sent to the participants 
 
Dear Mr/Mrs.,  
I am a doctoral researcher in the University of Edinburgh Business School. Along with my 
supervisor, Prof. John Amis, I am engaged in a study examining the development and 
implementation of the Gill law reforms. 
We have a very good academic team, and have been fortunate to be able to speak to some of 
the main figures involved in the reforms. We have noted that you contributed to the policy 
debate and might have an interest in the topic. If you would be willing and able to meet with 
us for an interview, Prof. Amis and/or I would carry it out at a time and place that is most 
suitable for you. 
Best wishes, 
Ilay H Ozturk 
Doctoral Researcher 
University of Edinburgh Business School 
 





Edinburgh Sheriff Court 




Dear Sheriff Wilson, 
I am a doctoral researcher in the University of Edinburgh Business School. Along with my 
supervisor, Prof. John Amis, I am engaged in a study examining the development and 
implementation of the Gill law reforms. We have a very good academic team and have been 
fortunate to be able to speak to some of the main figures involved in the reforms.  
We have noted that many of our participants recommended you as someone whom 
we should also interview in order to have a better understanding of the implementation 
process, underlying dynamics, expected outcomes and scope of the Courts Reform Scotland 
Act. If you would be willing and able to meet with us for an interview, Prof. Amis and/or I 
would carry it out at a time and place that is most suitable for you. We would appreciate it if 
you could please contact us through the email address i.h.ozturk@sms.ed.ac.uk. 
Yours Sincerely,  
Ilay H. Ozturk 
Doctoral Researcher 








I am a doctoral researcher in the University of Edinburgh Business School. Along with my 
supervisor, Prof. John Amis, I am engaged in a study examining the development and 
implementation of the Gill law reforms. 
We have a very good academic team, and have been fortunate to be able to speak to some of 
the main figures involved in the reforms. We have noted that some of our participants 
recommended you as someone whom we should also interview in order to have a 
better understanding of the underlying dynamics, expected outcomes and scope of the Courts 
Reform Scotland Act.  
If you would be willing and able to meet with us for an interview, Prof. Amis and/or I would 
carry it out at a time and place that is most suitable for you. 
 
Kind Regards, 
Ilay H. Ozturk 
Doctoral Researcher 
University of Edinburgh Business School  
 
8.4 Appendix 4: A sample of the interview questions. 
 







Thank you very much for being here with me and accepting my interview offer. First of all, I 
would like to assure you that you will remain completely anonymous and no records of the 
interview will be kept with your name on them unless you state otherwise.   
Also, I would like to ask for your permission to record this interview. 
The purpose of this research is to understand the ways in which the recent Scottish Civil Justice 
Reforms have impacted the practices and processes of aspects of the Scottish legal system. We 
are particularly interested in the ways in which the changes have been formulated and 
implemented, including ways in which relationships among key players will be reconstituted, 
distributions of power altered, and values and norms reconfigured. 
I have prepared an informed consent form. (Here, you can give the informed consent form to 
the participant). 
General Information About the Reforms: 
1- Could you please start by telling us about your career culminating with how you 
ended up in this position? 
2- Could you please explain/summarize the key aspects of the Gill Reforms? 
3- What are the key drivers of the reforms? 
4- What are the potential positive and negative aspects of reforms? 
5- I am quoting from Lord Gill: 
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“The civil justice system in Scotland is a Victorian model that had survived by 
means of periodic piecemeal reforms. But in substance its structure and procedures 
are those of a century and a half ago.” 
Ø Do you agree? 
Ø Why do you think that there have not been significant changes to the civil 
legal system over the last 150 years?  
Understanding How Change Unfolds in the Field 
6- Why do you think there was a 7-year gap between the review and the start of the 
implementation of the reforms? 
Ø Which interest groups/professional bodies have been involved in shaping the 
Reforms? 
Ø Was there any resistance to the Reforms?  
Ø  Why did groups resist? 
7- Are you a member of one of these interest groups? Did you or your group resist to 
change? If it is so, why? How did you resist? What was the outcome?  
8- There has been no significant change to the Scottish Civil Justice System for a long 
time. Do you expect any disturbance in the field dynamics caused by the reforms? 
9- How do you feel that power in the field may shift? 
Ø What will be the likely outcome of any shift in power relationships? 
10- What do you think the impacts of the reforms on interest groups might be?  
Structuration/Re-structuration of the Field and Vertical Integration 
11- Could you please draw the current field structure of the civil justice system? Key 
players? 
12- How do you think the structure of the field would change after the reforms? Could 
you please draw it? 
13- How do you think these reforms would affect the relationships between different 
groups in the field? 
14- Can you explain the relationship of the Scottish civil legal system with the rest of the 
UK? 
Organizational Behaviour, Values, Interests, and Professional Identity 
1- Please tell me how will these reforms affect your profession?  
2- What are the professional values you have? 
3- How important is to for you to be an advocate/solicitor? 
4- What would you say that motivates you to perform this job? 
5- What does it mean to be an advocate for you? 
6- What are the essential/core attributes to be an advocate? Has any of these attributes 
changed by time? 
7- What are the common attributes that all advocates have? 
8- What is the difference between solicitors and advocates? There are solicitor 
advocates? How do you feel about them? 
9- Can you tell me about the challenges you have while performing your job? 
10- Do you belong any professional association? Why? 
Getting Recommendations / Closing 
11- Who would you recommend that we should interview with in order to understand 
the nature of the reforms? 




8.5 Appendix 5: The list of responses to the Scottish Government’s 
consultation process and the relevant details 
 
Responses to the consultation on the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill 
No Name Page number 
1 North Lanarkshire Council 8 
2 Respondent 002 10 
3 Colin Reid 9 
4 Advocates' Family Law Association 18 
5 Judicial Appointments Board Scotland 2 
6 Compass Chambers 15 
7 Brian Fitzpatrick 13 
8 Falkirk Council 10 
9 LV 11 
10 RICS 2 
11 Family Law Association 6 
12 Sheriffs Principal 10 
13 Simon Di Rollo 13 
14 Forum of Scottish Claims Managers 15 
15 SMASO 1 
16 Highland Council 11 
17 Aviva 9 
18 Thompsons 26 
19 Gilbert Anderson 21 
20 Council of Employment Judges 11 
21 Royal Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow 10 
22 Alastair Kinroy 19 
23 Sheriffs' Association 18 
24 Sheehan Kelsey Oswald 10 
25 Core Solutions Group 11 
26 Murray Stable 16 
27 Scottish Action on Asbestosis 6 
28 Scottish Child Law Centre 11 
29 CALM Response 1 7 
30 Which 13 
31 USDAW 12 
32 Roderick Campbell MSP 10 
33 UNITE 8 
34 Clydeside Action on Asbestos 4 
35 East Lothian Council 12 
36 SHRC 4 
37 Citizens Advice Scotland 21 
38 Shelter Scotland 14 
39 William Donald Muirhead 6 
40 Axiom Advocates 18 
41 Scottish Women's Aid 16 
42 DWF Biggart Baille 11 
43 Westwater Advocates Personal Injury Group 16 
44 Andrew Hajducki QC 2 
45 Homeless Action Scotland 3 
46 Forum of Insurance Lawyers 11 
47 SLCC  10 
48 Hastie Stable 15 
49 Scottish Council on Deafness 2 
50 Money Advice Scotland 17 
51 Davidson Chalmers LLP 7 
52 Drummond Miller LLP 15 
53 SCRA  4 
54 STUC 6 
55 Bryan Heaney 16 
56 Families Need Fathers Scotland 12 
57 Society of Solicitor Advocates 19 
58 Association of British Insurers 14 
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59 Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 13 
60 JUSTICE Scotland 16 
61 James MacFarlane 10 
62 North Ayrshire Council 12 
63 RMT 1 
64 Law Society of Scotland 25 
65 Victim Support Scotland 2 
66 Scottish Legal Aid Board 10 
67 Castlemilk Law and Money Advice Centre 10 
68 Irwin Mitchell Scotland LLP 13 
69 Motor Accident Solicitors Society 12 
70 Federation of Small Business 2 
71 CALM Response 2 10 
72 Scottish Arbitration Centre 3 
73 Glasgow City Council 12 
74 Scottish Commissioner for Children and Young People 5 
75 UNISON 5 
76 Scottish Mediation Network 17 
77 Scottish Court Service 10 
78 Senators of the College of Justice 17 
79 Paisley Faculty of Procurators 11 
80 Scottish Family Law Arbitration Group 10 
81 RTPI Scotland 2 
82 Clan Childlaw 12 
83 Digby Brown LLP 13 
84 CELCIS 9 
85  Rachel Smith 11 
86 Administrative Justice & Tribunals Council 10 
87 PCS Court Service Branch 11 
88 PCS Scotland 14 
89 Respondent 103 1 
90 Lawford Kidd 15 
91 RSPB Scotland 6 
92 Friends of the Earth Scotland 8 
93 Medical Protection Society 10 
94 Pinsent Masons LLP 4 
95 Simpson & Marwick 11 
96 AXA Insurance UK plc 11 
97 Gladman Developments Limited 11 
98 LSA Brown & Co Solicitors  17 
99 Angus Smith Logan 12 
100 The Faculty of Advocates 46 
101 StepChange Debt Charity Scotland 10 
102  Morton Fraser 14 
103  Zurich Insurance PLC 12 
104  Phil Stuart 11 
  Total 1154 
Responses to the recent consultation on the treatment of civil appeals from the Court of Session 
105 Forum of Scottish Claims Managers 5 
106 JUSTICE Scotland 5 
107 Law Society of Scotland 5 
108 Network Rail 1 
109 Pinsent Mason LLP 4 
110 Scottish Legal Aid Board 2 
111 Senators of the College of Justice 2 
112 Zurich Insurance PLC  1 
113 Friends of the Earth Scotland 2 
114 Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland 1 
115 Penny Uprichard 2 
116 Faculty of Advocates 9 
  Total 39 
Submissions received on the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill 
117 Asda Stores Ltd 5 
118 Scottish Arbitration Centre 4 
119 Lawford Kidd, Personal Injury Solicitors 2 
120 Iain A J McKie 4 
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121 Clydeside Action on Asbestos 5 
122 Simpson & Marwick 4 
123 Ampersand Advocates 2 
124 Compass Chambers 5 
125 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers  2 
126 Advocates' Family Law Association 4 
127 Terra Firma Chambers 4 
128 Professor George L Gretton, University of Edinburgh 1 
129 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 2 
130 Axiom Advocates 9 
131 Educational Institute of Scotland’s 2 
132 Relationships Scotland 5 
133 Chartered Society of Physiotherapy Scotland 4 
134 Ailsa Carmichael QC 5 
135 Unison Scotland 2 
136 Name withheld 3 
137 Faculty of Advocates 13 
138 Faculty of Advocates (supplementary submission) 14 
139 Citizens Advice Scotland 9 
140 Citizens Advice Scotland (supplementary submission) 7 
141 Law Society of Scotland 13 
142 Part Time Sheriffs' Association 2 
143 Which? 6 
144 Forum of Scottish Claims Managers 4 
145 Scottish Trades Union Congress 4 
146 Association of Personal Injury Lawyers 13 
147 Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (supplementary submission) 6 
148 Gilbert M Anderson 6 
149 Medical Protection Society 2 
150 Zurich Insurance 2 
151 Bryan Heaney Advocate 6 
152 Motor Accident Solicitors' Society 4 
153 Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration 5 
154 Westwater Advocates, Edinburgh 5 
155 Unite the Union 5 
156 Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 2 
157 Scottish Mediation Network 5 
158 Keith Steward QC 7 
159 Forum of Insurance Lawyers 5 
160 Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission 2 
161 Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland 2 
162 Justice Scotland 11 
163 Justice Scotland (supplementary submission) 12 
164 Professors James Chalmers, Pamela Ferguson, Kenneth Norrie, Roderick 
Paisley and Kenneth Reid 
2 
165 Brian Fitzpatrick, Advocate 10 
166 Friends of the Earth Scotland and Environmental Law Center Scotland 7 
167 Families Need Fathers Scotland 5 
168 Marion Caldwell QC 1 
169 Scottish Civil Justice Council 4 
170 Scottish Women's Aid 10 
171 David Bartos, Advocate 9 
172 Police Scotland 1 
173 Group of Devils, Faculty of Advocates 2 
174 Society of Solicitor Advocates 4 
175 Scottish Legal Aid Board 8 
176 Macleod and MacCallum 4 
177 Scottish Police Federation 2 
178 Scottish Tribunals and Administrative Justice Advisory Committee 3 
179 Money Advice Scotland 8 
180 Ian Mackay QC 7 
181 Children's Hearing Scotland  3 
182 Usman Tariq, Ross McClelland, David McLean, Ceit-Anna MacLeod and Paul 
Reid (members of the Faculty of Advocates) 
7 
183 Association of British Insurers 3 
184 Thompsons Solicitors and Solicitor Advocates 22 
185 Thompsons Solicitors and Solicitor Advocates (supplementary submission) 2 
186 Clan Childlaw 3 
187 Lord President of the Court of Session 3 
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188 Lord President of the Court of Session (supplementary submission) 1 
189 Angus S Logan, Solicitor 2 
190 Family Law Association 4 
191 Professor Tom Mullen, University of Glasgow 7 
192 Shelter Scotland 3 
193 Scottish Court Service 1 
  Total 394 










































8.6 Appendix 6: The informed consent form that was used 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 




Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The purpose of this research is to 
understand the ways in which the recent Gill reforms have impacted the practices and 
processes of aspects of the Scottish legal system. We are particularly interested in the ways in 
which the changes have been formulated and implemented, including ways in which 
relationships among key players will be reconstituted, distributions of power altered, and 
values and norms reconfigured. 
 
Any information that you provide will only be used in aggregate form with other data collected 
as part of this study. Your confidentiality will be protected throughout with only the research 
team having access to your personal data. You will not be identified in any presentation or 
publication that emerges as a consequence of this work. The identity of the organization will 
be similarly protected. In agreeing to participate in this study, you acknowledge that you do 
so entirely voluntarily, and that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
question. 
 
If you are agreeable, the interview will be audio taped in order to ease data collection. 
Following transcription, a copy will be sent to you for review. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this process, please contact one of the 
investigators involved with the study: 
 
Name: Professor John Amis                      
 University of Edinburgh Business School 
Tel.: 07758 138971 (m) 
E-mail: john.amis@ed.ac.uk 
 
Name: Ilay Hicret Ozturk  
 Doctoral Student 
 University of Edinburgh Business School   
Tel:      07821 843275 (m) 







Date:                 _________________ 
